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The Role of the Imagination in Hume's Science of Man
In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on
the imagination.
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from
the claims of poets.
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events
in the History of England.
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining
of the false view.
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INTRODUCTION
section 1
In the Preface to Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick
speaks of two views about how to write a work of philosophy.
One view, he says, is that the author should have thought
through all the details of his position, and should have
refined them into a 'finished, complete, and elegant whole'
[Nozick p.xiilJ. The other view is that there should be room for
a less complete work, 'containing unfinished presentations,
conjectures, open questions, and problems, leads, side
connections, as well as a main line of argument' [ibid]. Now
the main line of argument in the present work is that what Hume
calls his 'Science of Man' is best understood as an attempt to
found the sciences on a single faculty, the imagination. Such
an argument necessarily involves a study of diverse subjects,
and (here) this calls for an admission of incompleteness and
inelegance.
However, there is another reason why the sort of open ended
work that Nozick describes seems suitable in the present
instance. A great deal of the interest in studying the role
Hurne assigns to the imagination arises from seeing how he
adapted the conclusions of others. To different degrees Hume is
a Ciceronian, a Malebranchean, and a Sentimentalist. Moreover,
without also seeing something of the debates that his work
attempts to resolve, we would be left without a sense of the
the great ambition that his work represents. For in attempting
to discover a foundation for the sciences, Hume assigned to the
imagination unprecedented functions. Some of these functions,
for example the role of the imagination in our reasoning about
causes and effects, have received a great deal of attention
from commentators. Others have been neglected. When, however,
we turn to these other areas of Hume's thought, we can see how
we cannot fully account for his conclusions about scepticism,
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politics, economics, religion, and the study of history,
without considering his employment of certain fundamental
principles of the imagination. Such principles, for example,
that postulate the association of ideas and the association of
impressions; that postulate that an idea can be converted into
an impression; and which describe how we are to account for the
effect of particular circumstances on our passions -
circumstances such as opposition or uncertainty. But this
appreciation has its price in a lack of completeness in any
single issue. For the presentation of these influences and
problems has to give way to the main task of finding a unity in
his own thought in the postulated way.
The present work is indebted to various efforts made by
historians of philosophy, philosophers and historians. And, in
a manner, it aims to provide an example of one of Hurne's most
deeply held beliefs about philosophy: that progress becomes
possible through dialogue. However, if there has been very real
progress in the study of Hume in recent years, there is still
great disagreement about many of his central doctrines. It is
not without reason that in one of the most original of recent
commentaries, John Wright suggests that a brief look at the
competing interpretations of Hume 'will leave the uninitiated
reader completely baffled' as to what Hume's beliefs really are
[Wright (1) p.1]. For is Hurne a sceptic, and if so, what sort
of sceptic? Should he be considered, as David Norton claims he
should, a 'moral realist'? Did Hume believe in a deity? It
might plausibly be argued that Hume scholars have displayed one
of the tendencies that Hume thought moderate scepticism can
counteract: the often unproductive tendency to gather into
sects around questions.
But if a brief look at recent general interpretations shows
contradictions, a brief look at the studies of the imagination
in Hume's Science of Man shows only inspiring work by Wright
which I will discuss in section 4 of Chapter III. To be sure,
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'the imagination' is briefly discussed in nearly all
commentaries on Hume's epistemology and philosophy of science;
and Jan Wilbanks has written a monograph called Hume's Theory
of the Imagination.
What is missing is a systematic commentary which explains
that the imagination is not only crucial to understanding
Flume's epistemology; it is also at the centre of his writings
on the passions; and, because of this, central to his work on
morals, politics, economics, art, and religion. From this point
of view, an account of the role of the imagination in the
Science of Man may be seen as a necessary corrective to a
general epistemological bias which has prevented us from
appreciating the strange nature, and huge ambition, of Flume's
Science of Man. For what Flume is interested in, is nothing less
than providing a new foundation for all the sciences:
'In pretending therefore to explain the principles of
human nature, we in effect propose a cornpleat system of
the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new,
and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security' [T xvi].
As I say, this does not seem to have been properly appreciated.
Wilbanks' work is a good example of this epistemological
bias. In his Introduction, Wilbanks quotes the following words
from Basson:
'What we need with Hume perhaps above all others is some
sort of clue which wilt guide us through his works, and
enable us to extract some sort of pattern' {Basson p.26].
Wilbanks remarks:
'In a sense, this is precisely what I have tried to do
with regard to Hume's statements about the imagination'
[Wilbanks p.3].
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This is incorrect: he does not find a way to guide us through
Hume's 'works'. He is only interested in Book I of the Treatise
and the First Enquiry. He has indeed set himself the much
narrower task of determining,
'how Hume's theory of the imagination is related to, or
involved in, the generic features and main lines of
argument of his philosophy of the human understanding'
[ibid p.1].
But nor is it enough, if we want to understand Hume's
project, to study only the Treatise, even if we go so far as to
include Books II and III. I shall argue that we should also
consider Flume's essays, and the History of England. For in
these works we can see Hume put into practice the principles
which he earlier outlined in the Treatise.
Hume's first readers, of course, did not have this
advantage; and famously, the Treatise 'fell dead-born from the
press' [M.O.L.234]. Perhaps one reason for this was that Hume
was not as clear, in the Introduction to that work, as he might
have been about the nature of the 'Science of Man'. I will now
discuss that Introduction, and return later to the particular
question of the role of the imagination in the Science of Man.
In the Advertisement prefaced to the first two volumes of
the Treatise, he says that 'My design in the present work is
sufficiently explain'd in the introduction' [T xii]. There
seems reason to doubt this. For Hurne does not make it easy for
the reader to make the imaginative leap that is required to
understand the 'design' of this revolutionary work. The
announcement of his programme in the Introduction to the
Treatise, seems clear; but as soon as one tries to find the
details one run into difficulties. For example, what does he
mean by the 'Science of Man'?
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He seems to suggest that the science of man is the science
of human nature that can provide the foundation for all other
sciences. That is, it is distinguishable from, and prior to,
those sciences. For ''Tis evident,' he says,
'that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,
to human nature; and that however wide any of them may
seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage
or another' [T xv].
This, he says, applies not only to the sciences of 'Logic,
Morals, Criticism, and Politics', whose connexion with human
nature is 'close and intimate'; but also to 'Mathematics,
Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion', which are, 'in some
measure dependent on the science of MAN', since these subjects
are 'judged of by... [the]... powers and faculties' of men
[ibid]. Thus, he says that
''Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we
might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted
with the extent and force of human understanding, and
cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we emloy, and of
the operations we perform in our reasonings [ibid].
But perhaps this sentence suggests that the science that is
prior to all other subjects, viz.,'the science of man', is
'logic'? This is the opinion of James Noxon; or at least half
his opinion, in that he believes that Hume uses the term
'science of man' ambiguously. Sometimes, Noxon says, Hume means
'logic'; and sometimes he means the four moral sciences [Noxon
p.4].
However, the following words from Hume show that Noxon's
interpretation cannot be right. Here Hume is talking of a
science of human nature that is the capital 'of these sciences'
(that includes 'logic'). We can capture, Hume writes, the
'capital or center of these sciences...human nature itself',
then we 'may extend our conquests' over the sciences that
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'intimately concern human life' (which are, we have seen,
'Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics'); and after this we
may 'proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are
the objects of pure curiosity' [T xvi]. Of course, that the
conceit is not as plain as one would hope is part of my
account of the failure of the Treatise. Nevertheless, it
does seem to rule out Noxon's idea that 'logic', or the study
of the 'principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and
the nature of our ideas' is one meaning of the phrase 'science
of man'. To use Hume's conceit, it is a castle, but not the
capital. From this point of view, Noxon's thesis is an example
of the epistemological bias that I mentioned above.
In fact, if we look for a study of human nature that can be
distinguished from his study of the four moral sciences, we
will be looking in vain. So it seems that 'the science of man'
is contained in study of the foundations of these subjects,
which, with the exception of 'criticism', are found in the
Treatise.
The 'science of man', then, is both the science of human
nature, and the four subjects mentioned above. The paradox is
there because Hume studies human nature by considering the
sciences that human beings develop. And the way he studies the
sciences is by considering the 'powers and faculties' of 'the
mind' [T xvii]. So on the one hand, we are discovering the
'powers and qualities' of 'the mind' by considering the way
that human beings develop the sciences; on the other hand, we
are discovering the nature of the sciences by considering the
'powers and qualjtje5 'of the mind'.
This may become plainer if we consider another closely
related problematic notion in the Introduction. This is Flume's
talk of a 'foundation' for the sciences. Evidently, by saying
that the sciences are founded in human nature, Hume immediately
distinguishes his project from that of Descartes. Nor of course
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is it assimilable to a Kantian project of finding in concepts a
justification of an a priori nature. Rather, this 'foundation'
is a matter of explaining the genesis of our beliefs; what Kant
was to call the 'de facto mode of origination' [Kant A 85/B
118].
This involves attempting to find principles that may be
used to explain any number of different events. For example, we
will see how he thinks that principles of the imagination can
'explain' events as seemingly different as our pity for a
beggar, and our belief that B will follow A. Just as the
natural scientist will attempt to explain why an apple falls
and the sea has tides through a law of gravity, so, with his
understanding of the nature of 'explanation', will Hume attempt
to explain the origin and nature of the sciences through
general principles. Nor does the comparison with the natural
sciences stop here. For these circumstances can only be known,
he believes, through observation. This is necessary, for 'the
essence of the mind' is equally unknown to us with that of
external bodies,
'it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its
powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact
experiments, and the observation of those particular
effects, which result from its different circumstances and
situations' [T xvii].
The result is that we must 'glean up our experiments' from
'a cautious observation of human life'. And when we compare our
experiments, he says,
'we may hope to establish on them a science, which will
not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in
utility to any other of human comprehension' [T xix].
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section 2
With the above discussion of the Introduction to the
Treatise in hand, I will now turn again to the question of the
imagination in Hume's work by briefly indicating some of the
lines of argument of the present work.
I suggested above that Hume wants to make his principles as
universal as possible; and so explain all effects from the
fewest possible causes. In this way, he imagines he is like a
natural scientist; though his own aim is to 'found' the
sciences by finding principles of human nature; and this
involves studying what makes it possible for human beings to
develop the sciences.
The principles he arrives at, his most universal
principles, are principles of the imagination. He finds them
sufficient, I shall argue, to explain the most seemingly
different dispositions of man. So instead of considering man as
a creature best defined by his possession of rationality, Hume
sees him as controlled by the interaction of the imagination
and the passions. Apart from the very limited domain of the
comparison of ideas, the conclusions and the determinations of
'reason' are to be explained through this interaction; in
particular through the ways that ideas associate in the
imagination so as thus to guide passions and beliefs.
That the most economic way of explaining our behaviour is
through principles of the imagination is a lesson which he
teaches again and again. And, as we shall see, he loves to draw
attention to the way that one part of his reasoning, say on the
passions, gives 'confirmation' to another, say on the
understanding. This is one way in which he draws our attention
to his success in rendering his 'principles as universal as
possible' [T xvii]. Without the seemingly arbitrary way which
habit and experience 'operate upon the imagination' and 'make
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me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than
others', we could never carry our view beyond what is present
to the senses [T 265]. It is for this reason that Hume says
that 'the senses 
...[and]...understanding are...founded on the
imagination or the vivacity of ideas' [ibid]. Similarly,
instead of saying that moral distinctions are arrived at
through reason, Hume argues that we should think of the
imagination converting ideas into impressions.
Here, though, a difficulty may arise. When a person reasons
about causes and effects, he is not usually said to be using
his 'imagination'; indeed, to say that someone is 'using his
imagination for his facts' is one way of impugning that
person's judgment. This is to note that Hume uses the term
'imagination' in a special, or technical, sense. But he also
uses it in a sense which accords with a common use of the term,
as when he is speaking of the 'liberty of the imagination to
transpose and change its ideas' and create 'winged horses,
fiery dragons, and monstrous giants' [TIM]. (At such times he
will often speak of the imagination as the 'fancy').
A chief purpose of Chapter I is to consider the relation
between these two senses of the term. For unless Hume can find
a coherent way of dividing the two senses, all his pretensions
to an 'experimental method' must be considered as moonshine. If
we are to make claims for science, that is, we must have some
way of distinguishing such claims from those of poets.
In Chapter II, I will argue that in some moods, Hume
thought this distinction between poets and scientists
impossible. In his sceptical reasonings he finds that the
principles of the imagination that are the only explanation of
belief, seem in fact to be contrary to each other. If we accept
the 'trivial' propensity of the imagination that makes the
beliefs of common life possible, we should, to be consistent,
II-
accept other suggestions that have no better heredity; so 'that
we must at last become ashamed of our credulity'; for 'nothing
is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the
imagination' [T267]. But on the other hand, if we reject all
'the trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the
understanding, that is, to the general and more establish'd
properties of the imagination' we can find no reason to accept
any belief - not even in the existence of body [ibid]. Then how
are we saved? Not through a theoretical answer, but through
another 'trivial property of the fancy' : the difficulty with
which we enter into 'remote views of things', such as are
presented by sceptical arguments [T268].
Now I shall argue that 'Hume's scepticism' as it is
expressed in the Conclusion to Book I of the Treatise, is
founded on a study of the imagination in more than one sense.
And this is to imply that the tradition, as found, for example,
in the work of Beattie and Reid, of seeing Hume as primarily a
sceptic, misunderstands Hume's scepticism as well as it
misunderstands Hume's scientific pretensions. For what is
distinctive about Hume's scepticism, is that it is the product
of a 'scientific' study of the mind: if we accept the
conclusions of that study, we will believe that the threat of
scepticism will always be with us. This is to say that unless
we take seriously Hume's scientific pretensions we will
misapprehend the nature of his sceptical analysis. As Barry
Stroud well says, it is a misapprehension to consider Hume as a
'purely negative philosopher' [Stroud p.1]. On the other hand,
I argue that writers such as Stroud do not take Hume's
scepticism seriously enough.
However, what is perhaps most distinctive in Chapter II is
the analysis of another way that 'Hume's scepticism' is
informed by his work on the passions. And this is the way that
his reasons for thinking that moderate scepticism is favourable
to the progress of the sciences are grounded in 'scientific'
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conclusions about the nature of man; conclusions which are only
explained in Book II of the Treatise; and in A Dissertation on
the Passions.
I can introduce what I mean here by briefly commenting on
things Hume says in the Introduction to the Treatise which are,
like the relevant work on the passions, always ignored by
commentators seeking to understand his scepticism. Flume begins
the Introduction by noting the 'present imperfect condition of
the sciences' [T xiii]. He says that even 'the rabble without
doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear,
that all goes not well within' [T xiv]. Flume makes clear,
though, that the noise within is not a meaningless cacophony.
Within are sects or schools of philosophers each attempting to
make converts; but they can agree on nothing:
'Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain;
and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth,
as if every thing was certain' [ibid].
Reason takes second place to persuasion:
'Amidst all this bustle, 'tis not reason which carries the
prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of
gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who
has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours'
[ibid].
What he thinks is needed, as we have already seen, is a new
foundation for the sciences; which includes an understanding
that 'we cannot go beyond experience' [T xvii]. When we see, he
adds, that
'we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we
sit down contented; tho' we be perfectly satisfied in the
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no
reason for our most general and refined principles besides
our experience of their reality' [T xviii].
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Now in different ways, each of these last three quotations
displays Hume's work on the imagination and the passions.
Whilst we must at some stage separate his epistemology from
his psychology, we cannot understand the full reasons for his
thinking that 'moderate scepticism' is favourable to the
sciences without attending to his psychological speculations.
For example, the first quotation is an expression of his belief
that uncertainty and opposition from others will serve to
increase the strength of any passion. This is because the
'uncertainty', which opposition from others increases, produces
a variety of passions: 'All these produce an agitation in the
mind, and transfuse themselves into the predominant passion'
[T421]. The upshot is that without a proper foundation, rival
theories become more and more extravagant in response to each
other. (Moreover, our beliefs are made stronger through others
sharing them, on account of the phenomenon of sympathy). Hurne
is hardly the only person in history to have believed this. He
does seem to be alone, however, in having a theory of the
imagination to explain it; and then drawing on that theory to
understand why mitigated scepticism can be 'durable and useful'
[E II 161]. If only, he says, men could become aware of the
infirmities of their understanding, they would conduct
themselves with more humility; and so lessen the irrational
influence that they have on each other [ibid].
Then, to turn to the second quotation, they would no
longer be so inclined to be under the sway of a sect. To which
sect they would have been attracted not least on account of
sympathy and the love of novelty. Sympathy and novelty, I shall
also argue, are crucial notions in his understanding of the
value of scepticism; they too have their theoretical grounding
in his account of the imagination.
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As to the third remark above, about sitting down
'contented', Hunie says, optimistically, that if we come to
understand that we can give no ultimate reason for our beliefs,
then we will cease to worry:
'For nothing is more certain, than that despair has
almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that
we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of
satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes'
[T xviii].
So it is not only in the market place that what we have not
tasted seems so attractive; so too in the study. This is how
Hume explains the constant search for new views; of which the
Treatise, is of course an example. The reverse of this,
however, is that if the opposition to any good seems completely
overwhelming, the desire itself will vanish. So if we are
satisfied we cannot go beyond experience, we will 'sit down
contented'; and, no doubt, apply ourselves to other more
fruitful quests. And this too has its theoretical account in
his work on the passions.
Because he has this psychology of inquiry, Hume's procedure
is quite unlike that of his predecessors. To be sure, other
sceptics, we shall see, had talked of the value of scepticism
for providing us with the contentment about that which we can
be content about. But they had not attempted to provide an
'experimental' underpinning for such talk. Locke had spoken of
how we should
'sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which,
upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our
capacities' [Locke (1) Introduction 4].
But Locke had not sought general principles that explain the
relation between desire and satisfaction. And so what was
missing in his work was a proper account of the activity of
studying itself.
15
In Chapter II, then, I argue, amongst other things, that we
cannot understand the nature of Hume's scepticism without
attending to his 'experimental' work on the passions and the
imagination.
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One section of Chapter III contains a discussion of Hume's
views on the relation between the imagination and the passions
which informs all the later chapters; as well as, as we have
seen, Chapter II. This I shall now introduce.
Hume's inversion of the roles previously accorded to reason
and the passions is one of the best known events in the history
of philosophy. However, his general account in the Treatise, of
how the passions interact with the imagination, which, he
thinks, is the proper way to explain variations in passions,
has been given virtually no attention. One of the aims of the
present work is to remedy this situation. For it is an
unfortunate neglect: through his study of the imagination and
the passions, Flume arrived at certain principles that were to
inform his work for the rest of his life.
Such principles, I will argue, are thought by Hume to allow
us a more economical explanation of variations in passions than
that given by the traditional picture. Instead of a battle
between reason and the passions, Hume suggests we should look
to the temper of the individual and the situation of the object
of the passion. It is the second of these factors that is
susceptible to general principles. (Perhaps the representation
of the first belongs to fiction?). One principle deserves
special consideration. This is what I term the 'Principle of
the Conversion of Passion'. It is first described in
psychophysiological terms in the Treatise. When two passions
are produced by separate causes, 'and are both present in the
mind', the predominant passion will 'swallow up' the inferior
passion and convert it into itself [T420]. Crudely, this is one
way that a calm passion is converted into a violent one.
However strange it may seem to our ears, Hume thinks that the
process occurs 'within' the imagination.
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I have already mentioned, in discussing his scepticism, one
instance of how this theory affects Hume 1 s conclusions: the
uncertainty that dogmatic reasoners feel in the face of
opponents transfuses their passions into their predominant
passion: and so they become even more passionate in their
espousals.
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Now if the conclusions about reason and the passions
discussed in Chapter III are found throughout the present work,
so too is Hume's attack on Christianity. This is a theme of
Chapter IV.
The ubiquity of this theme is perhaps worth emphasising.
For one instance of the division of labour that is noticeable
in Hume studies is the way that Hume's writings on religion are
so often treated like his work, say, on national characters,
which can be more or less adequately understood apart from his
other work. But though of course many of his arguments on
religion are interesting and fruitful in themselves, such a
divorce has bad consequences for our understanding of his
philosophy.
I argue in Chapters III and IV that Flume's science of man
is, from one point of view, a moral crusade against
Christianity. For prudential reasons this was played down in
the Treatise. But if we look at the rest of his work, we shall
see, I believe, that the experimental 'foundation' for morality
that is given in the Treatise is matched by a remorseless
diagnosis of the horrors of Christian morality. In Chapter IV,
I note his attempt to provide the foundations for a completely
secular morality; whilst in the previous chapter, I argue that
Hume's well known attempt to improve his prose style after the
failure of the Treatise should be seen in the context of his
secularising project. However, the most extensive examination
of Hume's thoughts on Christian morality appears in Chapter VI.
There I argue that Hume conceived of Christian morality as a
malign inversion of ordinary morality. To be sure, he approved
of course of a great deal of the behaviour of his friends in
the Moderate wing of the Presbyterian church. But such
behaviour he would not have explained as a product of
theological beliefs. In so far as Christianity does have an
influence, Hume believed that it functions as a cover for the
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passions. For example, though it has been completely ignored by
those commentators who take an interest in the History, a
prominent theme of that work is the way that religion serves as
a cover for the activities of certain groups. The weakness of
religious belief is crucial here. The want of resemblance of
the afterworid to our present life, and the general tendency we
have to prefer the contiguous to the remote, mean that we are
ruled in religion, as in all other areas of life, by our
passions for things of this world. People do not believe what
they pretend to affirm {T114]. In his technical language, the
want of resemblance of eternity to our present life means that
'all the reasons we can invent, however strong in
themselves, and however much assisted by education, are
never able with slow imaginations to...bestow a
sufficient authority and force on the idea' [ibid].
Yet we shall see that Hume does indeed think that
religious believers have some belief; even if it does not
'approach' the beliefs of common life. Men have some fear of
losing their belief on account of the punishments in the next
world for those who renege. Thus it is this which leads men to
surround themselves with like believers; who, on account of the
effects of sympathy, support each other's beliefs. Religion
begins to dominate society. And in the case of Christianity
this has been so successful that our view of the sciences,
including ethics, is perverted.
Thus Hume's interest in religion plays a crucial thematic
role in the present work. And this alone may be some
justification for attempting to view the Science of Man with,
as it were, a wide angled lens. For when we do this we can see
how Hume's thought on religion cannot be fruitfully considered
in isolation from his understanding of, for example, morality,
science, and politics; and nor can his writings on these
subjects be understood in isolation from his writings on
religion. The point is not just the matter of having to reject
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the claims of religion in order to justify an experimental
method: the point is also that a fascinating part of his
discussion of these subjects lies in his attempt to explain how
religion has introduced a false consciousness, a false view of
what is happening, in these different areas of our lives.
It is not for nothing, then, that in the Introduction to
the Treatise Hume singles out natural religion as a subject
where we should hope for 'improvements' with especial fervour.
For natural religion is not content with examining the 'nature
of superior powers': it also seeks to know their dispositions
towards us and our duties towards them; consequently,
'we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but
also one of the objects, concerning which we reason' [T
xv].
Well indeed; but I will suggest that he thinks that this
reasoning about ourselves as God's creatures has enormous
consequences for understanding the nature of the moral
sciences. In this connection we will consider his attacks on
those who see man as a creature of reason, and as thus
different from the animals (Chapter I); his attacks on the
philosophical assumptions of moralists (Chapter IV); and on the
Whigs and Tories who, openly or covertly, base their theories
on religious assumptions (Chapter v). This belief that men read
into 'human nature' that which they bring from religious dogma
is one of the main reasons why Hume is so interested in the
different ways that men are led into false reasonings.
Certainly, he finds that there are propensities of human
nature which make the domination by Christian thinking
understandable; propensities, such as the thought explored in
Chapter I that we are defined by 'reason', that will always be
with us. Such philosophical errors serve to support the
institutions of religion; and so the misery that religion
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causes, can perhaps be lessened by a new vision of human
nature.
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section 3
One of the chief preoccupations of Chapter V, 'Politics',
is the way that Hume's theoretical writings on the imagination
provided him with a way of understanding the politics of his
own day.
For example, Hume, like many other writers of eighteenth
century Britain, was quite obsessed with the iniquitous effects
of political factions. However, what is distinctive about
Hume's writings on faction, proceeds from his experimental
starting point. Thus in Books II and III of the Treatise, he
shows to his satisfaction that men are sociable creatures. But
their tendency to gather into groups - to 'cantonise', to use
Shaftesbury's expression - does not show, Hurne thinks, that we
possess an affection for all, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson
thought. Hume thinks that the most economic explanation can be
provided by considering men as creatures who enjoy the company
of others on account of the way that an idea of a passion
becomes available; this is transformed into an impression in
the imagination. And
'Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a
passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion,
and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any
other image or conception' LT353].
But of course, not every person will have the same effect on
us. Hume's very general way of explaining the variations that
people will show in their reactions to each other is by
hypothesizing an association of ideas. For example, other
things being equal, we will enjoy the company of those who
resemble us more than that of those who do not. Why? Because
the stronger is the resemblance between ourseif and another,
'the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and
convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception' [T318].
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Thus when in the late 1730's Flume turned to the essay &enre
and the questions of British factions, he already had a far
more sophisticated account of the reasons as to why men
factionalise than those given by other writers. Moreover, I
shall argue that his discussions in the Essays Moral,
Political, and Literary of the dangers of factions in
eighteenth century Britain is likewise based on this earlier
analysis.
In any society, he says, there will be persons with
different inclinations; even if these persons have been
educated in the same way [G I 266]. When we consider the
British Constitution with this in hand, we immediately see in
it a source of faction. For that Constitution demands a balance
between the 'monarchial' and the 'republican' parts; yet some
will incline towards the monarchy; and others towards the
people. Given this institutional bias towards faction; and
given the delicate balance of the Constitution; the dangers of
faction had better be understood. Hume's essays (and letters)
are his contribution towards this understanding.
I will mention two dangers here. The first is another
illustration of the effects that opposition has on passions.
Political opposition, he believes, will increase the vigour
with which beliefs are held; moreover, such opposition will
lead groups to become more and more extreme in their claims.
Sympathy will raise the temperature even more. This account, it
will be noticed, is parallel to the explanation offered above
of the sources of immoderation in philosophy; the one, Hume
thinks, offers confirmation of the other. In each case, non-
rational factors can wreck judgment. In the political case it
can be seen that under the sway of faction it becomes very
difficult to impartially assess what is in the people's
interest.
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The second danger to the Constitution lies in the way that
our need for approval can be served by finding approval from
the members of our own faction. For this reason, when men act
in a faction, they ride roughshod over the claims of morality
when by doing so their faction's interest is served. This
conclusion, however, is not the sort of isolated insight that
any number of writers might have arrived at. For it can be
defended in the language of Hume's foundational work. In Hume's
theory of human nature, man needs approval for his actions and
beliefs; this is one of the main reasons why he gathers into
groups, whether in Westminster or on the football terraces, in
the first place. Such groups, however, will evolve their own
regulatory power; and so a point of view is constructed which
does not coincide with the moral point of view as it has only
the interests of the group as its end. Thus just as we usually
consider how we will appear in the eyes of society when
considering an action, here we consider how we will appear in
the eyes of the group. For we care about our name and
reputation; and, like the philosopher who is anxious to have
others share his beliefs,
'we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgment on
the correspondent approbation of mankind' LE II 276].
The party gives us that approbation if we share its point of
view.
What is distinctive about Hume's analysis in these essays
is the way that he attempts to view the question of faction
impartially. And this political impartiality coincides with his
scientific pretensions. On the one hand, the tendencies of all
factions are included in his descriptions. On the other hand,
the desire we have for approval of others in morality is an
example of the general weakness of our passions and beliefs in
isolation from others:
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'Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride
ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul
or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou'd
they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from
the thoughts and sentiments of others' [T363].
In other words, in describing these dangers, Hume is
drawing on his earlier insights that were expressed in terms of
the imagination, impressions, and ideas; language which was
evidently not suitable for the genre of the polite essay.
Appreciating this connection is appreciating how, from a few
very simple principles, Hume attempted to put politics on the
footing of a science.
However, it is not only these essays and the Treatise that
I examine in this chapter. In the first three sections I
discuss a series of letters that Hume wrote over the last
fifteen years or so of his life. I attempt to show how an
understanding of Hume's political theory helps us understand
what might otherwise be a mystery: the reasons for Hume again
and again describing the English as 'barbarians'; and his
seeming to link this with his claim that they were wanting in
political judgment. I argue that Hume believed that an
appreciation of the arts has an essential role in a polity with
a constitution as complicated as that of Britain's. The arts
give us practice in finding a disinterested point of view; and
of all peoples the English needed this ability on account of
the difficult political judgments which a constitution such as
the British Constitution calls for.
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section 4
Now in this Introduction I have been passing over, chapter
by chapter, some of Hume's arguments about various matters that
I discuss in this work. These arguments, I will suggest, are,
in a manner, the fruit of a few very simple principles of the
imagination; such as, for example, the principle that men are
more likely to associate resembling ideas than differing ideas.
I have laid a particular stress on two themes, partly
through showing how they appear in different chapters, that a
study of the role of the 'imagination' reveals. The first is
the role Hume gives to the imagination in explaining how calm
passions can be transformed into violent passions and vice
versa. This has been ignored by commentators; yet it is, I will
argue, of the last importance for understanding the relation
between a wide variety of his arguments.
The second theme is that of religion. This is the subject
of Chapter VI, though as I have indicated, it is also present
in all the other chapters. For it is not enough to see Hume, as
he is invariably seen, perhaps as a consequence of an
ahistorical approach, as offering a few brilliant arguments
against claims of religion. Hume believed, I argue, that the
claims of religion had perverted thinking about metaphysics,
morality, politics, and history. A new starting point was
needed. Thus, before the publication of the Treatise, he wrote
to his friend Ramsay:
'My principles are...so remote from all the vulgar
sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place,
they woud produce almost a total alteration in
philosophy: and you know, revolutions of this kind are
not easily brought about' [L I 26].
However, I want to end this Introduction by drawing the
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reader's attention to a third theme, one closely related to
that of religion. Hume desires not only to explain the origin
of the sciences; he also wants to explain why philosophers have
hitherto erred on so many questions. Now this is not a matter
of following through the steps of an argument and saying: 'and
here Plato/Aristotle/Descartes took the wrong turning; and this
resulted in the sorriest consequences for the history of
thought...etc'. Hume's explanation of error instead takes the
form of using his principles of the imagination in order to
give a causal explanation of our mistakes. For example, there
is his famous remark that
'the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on
external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal
impressions, which they occasion' [T167].
A similar analysis is given of certain philosophical notions of
'the ancients'. Thus he writes in the Treatise of his belief
that
'there might be several useful discoveries made from a
criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy,
concerning substances, and substantial forms, and
accidents, and occult qiThlities; which, however
unreasonable and capricious, have a very intimate
connection with the principles of human nature' [T219].
This is to say that he thinks the very mistakes of philosophers
confirm his hypotheses about human nature.
However, there are two errors of philosophers which are far
more important than the above errors. And in explaining these
two errors, Hume thinks that he can explain, on the one hand,
why men first believe X; and explain on the other hand the
forces that uphold this belief. There is the propensity men
have to create gods. Firstly, there is an explanation in the
Natural History of Religion in terms of a universal propensity
that human beings have of transferring to objects qualities
they observe in themselves; so far the error is like the
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philosophical errors of the ancients; with the difference that
it is fear rather than curiosity that propels them; but,
secondly, Hume also has an institutional account of the way
that priests come to take advantage of this inclination.
The other error is that of believing that man is
distinguished from the animals by his possession of a faculty
of 'understanding' or 'judgment'. In the first chapter, I
discuss how Hume tries to show how men naturally make this
error. What he thinks seems to happen is this. Though in truth
we are possessed of one 'faculty', the imagination, reflective
social creatures like ourselves need to talk of an
'understanding' and the 'imagination' in order . to distinguish
between two sorts of beliefs. Firstly, there are the beliefs
that allow us to control objects in the world; such as the
conclusions of science. Secondly, there are the beliefs of
poets, of children, and of the mad. The first sort of belief,
we say comes from the understanding; the second, from the
imagination or fancy. The problem arises when philosophers
arrive on the scene and interpret such talk as showing the
existence of two distinct faculties; and that 'the
understanding' is the faculty which defines man. However, his
explanation of error does not end here. For Hume also believes
that he can point to forces which uphold this picture of man.
Reason is held to be of 'divine origin' [T415]: man is held to
be alone the creature who is possessed of this faculty, and who
thus must fight against his passions.
Moreover, it is this faculty which informs man of the moral
nature of actions or qualities (Chapter IV); again, it is this
faculty which, according to Whig and Tory theorists, informs
him of his political obligation (Chapter V).
All such teaching, Flume thought, served the interests of
religion. For example, if moral distinctions are arrived at
through reason, the undoubted differences in the reasoning
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capacities that men have will mean that there will be 'experts'
in morality who will be able to inform ordinary people of their
duties. Thus after Hume presents his own view of morality in
the Second Enquiry, he remarks that it is so obvious that there
seems a 'reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses
have perverted our natural understanding' when such an obvious
theory 'could so long have escaped the most elaborate
examination' [E II 268-9]. Certainly Hume was keenly aware how,
in Europe, the history of the arts and sciences is intimately
bound up with the history of religion. In the essay 'The Rise
of Arts and Sciences', he remarks how monarchies,
'receiving their chief stabaity from a superstitious
reverence to priests and princes, have commonly abridged
the liberty of reasoning, with regard to religion, and
politics, and consequently metaphysics and morals [G I
187].
And he remarks in the History, that the power that the Church
received on account of its domination of learning was not
without its benefits. For example, this 'island possesses many
ancient historians of good credit':
'This advantage we owe entirely to the clergy of the
church of Rome; who, founding their authority on their
superior knowledge, preserved the precious literature of
antiquity from a total extinction' {H II 518].
In short, one aim of the present work is to show how Hume
attempted to explain why it was that philosophy needed to be
turned upside down. On the one hand, he wants to 'enquire
seriously into the nature of human understanding, and
show...that it is by no means fitted for such remote and
abstruse subjects', as for example, those presented by
superstition [E I 12]. On the other hand, the 'mental
geography, or delineation of the distinct powers and parts of
the mind' that this task involves, runs together with the
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separate task of showing how men have come to be bewitched by a
false picture of 'rational' man [ibid 1311. Hume desired, then,
to explain why men are naturally led, without even the aid of
priests, to mistaken beliefs. The first words of the Treatise
are:
'NOTHING is more usual and more natural for those, who
pretend to discover anything new to the world in
philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the
praises of their own systems, by decrying all those which
have been advanced before them' [T xiii].
But Hume is not content with decrying: he wants to explain why
others have been led to their positions.
How did Hume arrive at his grand vision? At times I make
suggestions. Unsurprisingly, these are not always direct
contributions to a history of the concept of imagination. It is
true, tialebranche's conception of imagination plays a large
role in this study. On the other hand, other elements of that
writer's work also play their part. Again, Shaftesbury and
Bayle are discussed at some length, but not on account of any
beliefs they have about 'imagination'. We shall see, in fact,
that the breadth of Hurne's vision rules out limiting the
discussion to writings on imagination. A more catholic approach
is needed.
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Chapter I
Belief
Part I
introduction
I suggested in the Introduction above that one of the great
problems that Hume's ambition presents to us is discovering the
method and assumptions that give unity to his writings.
However, talking of this unity does not answer the question of
where a discussion about his work should start. If the
imagination is at the heart of the science of man, then does it
matter where? Why should it be with Book I of the Treatise, as
is usual in lengthy works on Hume? For example, perhaps we
should start with Hume's work on religion, the implications of
which, I have suggested, are so pervasive?
In fact there are more reasons than custom to start with
Book I. For the imagination is a 'faculty' of ideas; and it is
in Book I that we find Hume's most extended analysis of ideas.
Nevertheless, this should not mislead us into thinking that the
imagination is only a subject for epistemology. The point is
that 'passions, desires, and emotions, which principally
deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas' [T8].
So what are these 'ideas'? How do they arise? And how do
they relate to the imagination? Answers to these questions,
which have such a wide bearing in Hume's work, will be given in
the course of the first major task of the present work. This is
seeing what led Huine to believe that:
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'the memory, senses, and understanding are...founded on
the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas' [T265].
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section 1
background
I want to tackle the question through considering the two
different ways Hume uses the term 'imagination'. How is the
broad sense of 'imagination', as that which refers to all
mental 'faculties', including 'judgment', related to the
faculty of the 'imagination' as that which conjoins and
separates ideas in a seemingly capricious way, that is, what he
sometimes calls the 'fancy'? In this section I begin answering
this question by noting his assembling of the contents of the
mind, and the means by which these contents are related. This I
try to develop through showing how, from the 'way of ideas'
starting point shared with Descartes, Locke and Berkeley, Hume
goes on to forge a theory of mind which pretends to explain
belief by reference to the faculty of the 'imagination'.
Reason, Hume finds, cannot justify the inferences that we make;
and so, he thinks, it must be the imagination that is
responsible for belief.
Hume begins the first book of the Treatise by marking a
division in the 'perceptions' of the human mind. Perceptions
which strike upon the mind with the most 'force and liveliness'
he calls 'impressions' [Ti]. And here he comprehends 'all our
sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul' [ibid]. Perceptions which are 'faint
images' of the above he calls 'ideas' [ibid]. Thus ideas are
defined as images: we can thus think about objects when they
are not present to the senses.
The next division is that between simple and complex
impressions and ideas. The former are 'such as admit of no
distinction nor separation' [ibid]. But the latter - as with
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the colour, taste, and smell of an apple - may be distinguished
in their parts [T3].
Here, then, we have some order to the 'objects' of the
mind. Flume now proceeds to consider their 'qualities and
relations' [ibid]. A circumstance that immediately strikes him
is the resemblance between impressions and ideas. When he shuts
his eyes and thinks of his chamber, the idea he has is an exact
representation of the impression that he 'felt' - that is, when
he had his eyes open. But he quickly realises that it is only
simple ideas that have exact copies in impressions. He can
imagine a city such as the New Jerusalem which has pavements of
gold and walls of rubies. Nevertheless, he challenges anyone to
show a simple impression that has not a simple idea - or vice
versa.
What other 'qualities' do impressions have? He asks 'how
they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the
impressions and ideas are causes and which effects' [T4]. The
full examination of this question', he says, 'is the subject
for the present treatise. For the moment he contents himself
with establishing his first principle viz.,
'That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are
deriv'Trom simple impressions, which are correspondent
to them, and which they exactly represeiii' LT4i.
This principle he supports with an appeal to experience: by
constant experience he finds that simple impressions 'always
take the precedence of their correspondent ideas' [T5]. Thus if
we want to give a child an idea of sweetness we present him
with an impression of sweetness. We do not, he says, proceed so
absurdly as to endeavour to produce the impression by exciting
the idea [ibid].
35
Now it may seem extraordinary that Hume does not spend much
time attempting to justify his 'way of ideas' approach to these
issues. The reason is that the notion that we are directly
acquainted with our perceptions was a commonplace assumption of
the philosophers mentioned above.
For example, Locke, in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, usually describes the contents of the mind, not
as perceptions, but as 'ideas'. He defines his use thus:
'It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand
for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a
Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by
Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the
mind can be ernploy'd about in thinking' [Locke (1)
Introduction 8.]
The general propriety of the 'way of ideas' method is pretty
much taken for granted by Locke. In a tone that was to be
echoed by Hume, he says, 'I presume it will be easily granted
me, that there are such Ideas in Men's Minds: every one is
conscious of them in himself' [ibid].
In the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley is just as
confident:
'It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects
of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually
imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by
attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or
lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination -
either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways' [ Berkeley
p.65].
It is an implication, then, of Locke's and Berkeley's as well
as of Hume's account, that our perceptions of external objects
are to be lumped together with our thoughts of absent or
fictious objects. That is, what we imagine. The lack of a
distinction here is ultimately due to Cartesian doctrine.
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Descartes had doubted all arid found that while he could
doubt that his body existed, he could not doubt that 'he'
existed. Thus he concluded, in the Discourse on the Method,
that he was different from his body.
'From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or
nature is simply to think, and which does not require any
place, or depend on any material thing, in order to
exist.Accordingly this 'I' - that is, the soul by which I
am what I am - is entirely distinct from the body, and
would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did
not exist' [Descartes (1) p.127].
Elsewhere he states very clearly how this being that he is is a
'thinking being': and here we see why imagining and perception
are placed together:
'By the term 'thought', I understand everything which we
are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have
awareness of it. Hence 'thinking' is to be identified here
not merely with understanding willing and imagining, but
also with sensory awareness' ibid p.195].
Because if I say that I am walking, therefore I exist, I may be
wrong - for I may be asleep.
'But if I take 'seeing' or 'walking' to apply to the
actual sense or awareness of seeing or walking, then the
conclusion is quite certain, since it relates to the mind,
which alone has sensation or thought that it is seeing or
walking' [ibid].
'External objects', then, are not directly acessible by the
mind. The mind is left only with mental objects as its objects.
From this starting point, Descartes attempts to provide a
foundation for the possibility of knowledge. Descartes finds
his justification in the c.ogito. But Hume's analysis reveals
that even after experience of constant conjunction reason
cannot point out why we should extend the experience to the
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future. It is this discovery we shall see that leads him to his
special sense of the term 'imagination'.
And this is the main element in his explanation of bel.ief.
This is to say that whereas Hume shares the starting point of
these other thinkers, his belief in the failure of reason to
justify our inferences leads him to give to that faculty which,
unc.ontroversially, can unite and separate ideas, certain
propensities which mark off his special sense of the term
'imagination'	 from the sense in which he uses it when he
wants to refer to capricious and irregular beliefs. Exploring
this special sense, as it relates to belief, is the task of the
chapter as a whole; but here it can be said that it encompasses
that which was called 'judgment' .This sense is not discussed
in the early pages of the Treatise for the same reasons that it
cannot be discussed here: the need for it must be first shown.
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section 2
the first sense of 'imagination'; or the 'fancy'
I want to introduce Hume's 'ordinary' sense of the term
'imagination' in the same way as I introduced his 'way of
ideas' approach in which it belongs. That is, by showing just
how conventional his approach was. The chief reason for doing
this is that in this way we can then better appreciate how Hurne
diverged from all other thinkers with his special sense of the
term. But there is another reason. As mentioned in the
Introduction to the present work, one of Flume's most
tenaciously held beliefs was that progress in philosophy is
usually made possible through dialogue. The importance for Hurne
of this belief is not only apparent in his explanation of the
general progress of arts and sciences as discussed in the essay
'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences'; it
informs, we shall later see, his arguments about why moderate
scepticism provides the healthiest attitude for philosophers;
and it is reflected in the Introduction to the Treatise.
The imagination is introduced in the Treatise as that
faculty of the mind that distinguishes itself from memory in
two ways. Firstly, by means of the weakness of its ideas: when
we remember any past event, 'the idea of it flows in upon the
mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the
perception is faint and languid' [T9]. Secondly, the memory
'preserves the original form in which its objects were
presented' [ibid]; but the fables and poems we know teach of
'the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its
ideas' [T1O]. When we read fables we find that,
'Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned
but winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants'
[ibid].
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However, says Hume, if we think more carefully about the
imagination, we shall see that it is not 'free' at all. Or
better: certain principles may be discovered which describe its
operations. For one thing, it is dependent on the impressions
we have had; this we saw above. Secondly, we find that we can
discover principles which describe the ideas which have their
origin in these impressions. If ideas were 'loose and
unconnected', then nothing, he says, 'would be more
unaccountable than the operations of that faculty' {T1O]. But
there are, he believes, some 'universal principles' which
'render it uniform with itself in all times and places' [ibid].
There is a 'uniting principle' which is 'a gentle force, which
commonly prevails'; it explains, for instance, why 'languages
so nearly correspond to each other' [ibid]. Likewise, as he
says in the First Enquiry, were the loosest conversation to be
recorded, 'there would immediately be observed something which
connected it in all its transitions' [E I 23]. What are these
principles? The imagination, he says, will naturally associate
ideas through their qualities of resemblance, contiguity, and
cause and effect.
The general importance of these principles for the science
of man can hardly be overestimated. For with these seemingly
trivial principles of the imagination, Flume attempted to
provide a new foundation for the sciences. So it should be
noted that when Hume introduces these principles, he is at
pains to emphasise that it is the possibly wondrous purposes to
which he is going to employ them that should interest the
reader - not the discovery of the principles themselves. So he
writes in the Treatise:
'Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world
will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the
natural and to shew itself in as many and as various
forms' T12-13].
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And in the first ten editions of the Enquiry concerning
Human Understanding, he explores (in paragraphs not given in
the Nidditch edition) 'some effects of this connection upon the
imagination and the passions' by considering what light his
principles throw on literary criticism [E (Hendel) 33-39].
These 'loose hints' he says, are
'thrown together in order to excite the curiosity of
philosophers, and beget a suspicion at least if not a full
persuasion that this subject is very copious, and that
many operations of the human mind depend on the connection
or association of ideas which is here explained' [ibid
3911.
The reason for this emphasis on what is to come is no doubt
because of the fact that other philosophers had included in
their accounts of the imagination principles which describe the
connections between ideas. This may be seen if we now turn to
two of these accounts.
The imagination, writes Hobbes, is nothing but 'decaying
sense' [Hobbes p.9]. For after the eyes are shut, we still
'see' an image of the thing seen, though it is then more
obscure than when we saw it with our eyes [ibid]. (In this, it
seems, he is following Aristotle. Aristotle considered the
imagination as an essential intermediary between the senses and
reason. It is necessary that 'every time one thinks one must at
the same time contemplate some image' [De Anima 432a]). When we
would express, says Hobbes, that which is decayed, we refer to
the 'imagination'; but when we would express the decay and
signify that the sense is fading and old, then we refer to this
faculty as the memory. 'So that imagination and memory are but
one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names'
[ibid p.10].
But it is this faculty seen from another point of view that
interests Hobbes the most. 'The imagination that is raised' in
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man by means of 'words, or other voluntary signs' is that we
generally call understanding' [ibid p.13]. He characterises
this mental activity as a 'train of thoughts, or mental
discourse', and says that it is of two sorts [ibid p.14].
Firstly, it can be 'unguided, without design' [ibid]. This
occurs when there is 'no passionate thought, to govern and
direct those that follow'; such are commonly the thoughts of
men without company and 'without care of anything' [ibid].
Nevertheless, even in such cases, we can, he thinks, 'oft-times
perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon
another' [ibid]. Still, 1-lobbes has no particular principles to
offer, such as resemblance and contiguity, in order to explain
the connections.
The second sort of 'mental discourse' Hobbes notes is that
which is 'regulated by some desire, and design' [ibid]. We
share with beasts the tendency to imagine the cause of any
effect that we imagine; but we distinguish ourselves by the
tendency to seek, when we imagine anything, 'all the possible
effects, that can by it be produced' [ibid p.15]. Sometimes a
man wants to know the effects of an action: 'and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof, one
after another; supposing like events will follow like actions'
[ibid]. This is what we call 'prudence'; and it is 'a
presumption of the future contracted with an experience of time
past' [ibid p.16]. Similarly, there is a presumption 'of things
past taken from other things, not future, but past also'. So if
we understand why one civil war has taken place, upon the ruins
of another state, we 'will guess the like war, and the like
courses have been there also' [ibid]. However, though the
imagination thus presented by Hobbes is a faculty which
provides us with the ability to seek out causes, it is, by the
same token, that which often leads us into error. For example,
as in the case of religion:
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'they that make little or no inquiry into the natural
cause of things' and yet fear for themselves, 'are
inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several
kinds of power invisible; and to stand in awe of their own
imaginations' [ibid 69].
Hobbes, then, uses a concept of the imagination to explain
error as well as success in our reasoning. We shall see Hume
doing the same. It is also true of another writer whose
thoughts on the imagination seem to have had far more influence
on Hume than those of Hobbes. This is Malebranche, whose
Recherche de la Vrit was recommended by Hume as an aid to
understanding the Treatise1.
Malebranche uses the term 'imagination'when he wants to
describe how we respond to the stimulation that our senses have
received. This includes the way that ideas are associated so
that we can respond without having to use our reason; 'the
soul's power of forming images' [Malebranche p.88]. It also
includes other ways that we respond to the information that our
senses give us. Thus within the concept 'imagination',
Malebranche includes memory, and habit [ibid p.106-7]. Now
however strange it may seem, when Malebranche describes the
functioning of the 'imagination' he does so through employing
physiological language. It is impossible to summarise what he
says without using it.
For instance, his account of the way that the mind
associates ideas is presented in terms of the 'mutual
connection of traces'. These are brain traces which are
correlative to ideas. Thus he says at one point:
'As soon as the soul receives some new ideas, new traces
are imprinted in the brain; and as soon as objects produce
new traces, the soul receives new ideas' [ibid p.102].
Now there are connections between ideas which he thus
'explains' by postulating connections between traces. We can
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notice connections between ideas if we think of those instances
when we cannot remember a person's name, we 'single him out by
this pocked face, or as this tall handsome man, this little
hunchback' [ibid p.105]. Such connections are useful, indeed
necessary for the preservation of life. Thus the
'trace...of a large body, about to fall on us and crush
us, is naturally tied to the one that represents death to
us, and to an emotion of the spirit that disposes us to
flight and the desire to flee' [ibid p.106].
The 'cause' of this connection of many traces is the 'identity
of the times in which they were imprinted in the brain' [ibid].
Most of Search After Truth is devoted to explaining how we
are led into error. In this explanation, the association
between ideas in the imagination plays an important role. For
example, there is the case of resemblance. Because the
'apparent size of the moon is not very different from that of
an ordinary head at a certain distance', and because we so
'often look at faces' 'we normally see a face in the moon'
[ibid p.135]. Hume in fact was to use the same example n
discussing the same confusion of ideas [NHR 29]. And he even
offered up an explanation in terms of contiguous brain traces
[T60-1]. John Wright, in fact, has argued that Hume accepted
Malebranche's conception of the imagination as his starting
point [Wright (1) Ps214- 221; cf Chapter III section 4].
However, the sense of 'imagination' that Hurne gives as
including judgment is not in any way assimilable to the sense
given to the term by any previous philosopher. Malebranche and
Hobbes thought that the imagination is necessary for our
preservation. But the idea that the imagination, not reason, is
the faculty responsible for all our beliefs in matters of fact
would have astounded them. What I now want to do is to examine
how Hume reached this conclusion. That is, I want to show how
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he makes the transition from the first sense of the
imagination, to his special sense.
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section 3
the imagination and belief
So far, then, Hume has allotted to the imagination only the
role of conjoining and separating ideas. However, his
examination of the relation of cause and effect leads to
ascribe to the imagination a wider role than hitherto
suspected. The 'imagination', in fact, comes to include that
faculty through which we form judgments. To be sure, Hume wants
to keep the first sense of 'imagination'; because he wants to
distinguish between reliable and unreliable uses of the faculty
- between the claims of poets and religionists, and the claims
of science. How does he arrive at the special sense? And can he
really distinguish it from the 'fancy'? In this section, I
attempt to answer the first question. Later I will discuss the
second question. For what I hope to show in this chapter is
that Hume's attempt to hold on to this distinction led to some
of his greatest ptilosophy. Book I of the Treatise, I believe,
cannot be properly understood without appreciating the attempt.
At one point Hume admits that the two senses he gives to
the term may cause confusion. Most unfortunately, his
explanation of his usage is somewhat convoluted:
'the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different
senses; and tho' nothing be more contrary to true
philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following
reasonings I have often been oblig'd to fall into it. When
I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the
faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose
it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our
demonstrative and probable reasonings' [T117-118n; cf
T371n].
The former sense here is that of the 'fancy'; the latter sense,
that of the 'imagination' in its special Humean sense which
includes all the 'faculties' of the mind other than memory;
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crucially it includes judgment about matters of fact not
present to the senses.
One sign of the breadth of the special sense that Hume
gives to 'imagination' is that he sometimes writes as if 'the
imagination' is interchangeable with 'the mind'. For example,
he writes of how
'the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is
apt to continue...';
but in the same paragraph he says:
'the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity
among objects.. .'[T198].
Moreover, once he has offered his account,'itnagination' becomes
interchangeable with the 'understanding'. Thus in Book II of
the Treatise, he remarks at one point: 'the imagination or the
understanding, call it which you please' {T440].
Now why does he study the relation of cause and effect? Hume
believed that the great importance of the causal relation is
that it enables man to reason beyond that which is present to
his senses. How is this possible?
In accordance with the principle that all simple ideas are
derived in their first appearance from simple impressions Hume
suggests that in order to understand this relation we should
look to its origin. What does he find? He finds contiguity and
the 'PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect' [T76].
But these relations of contiguity and succession do not give
him all he wants. For he realises that,
'An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without
being consider'd as its cause. There is a NECESSARY
CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that
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relation is of much greater importance, than any of the
other two above-mention'd' [T77].
So Hume turns the 'object on all sides' to discover 'the
nature of this necessary corinexion' and find the impression
[ibid]. Certainly, we have an idea of a necessary c.onnexion -
so perhaps we should give up the first principle? ot until, he
says, we have given the matter some further consideration.
After deciding to leave the 'direct survey' of the matter,
the question occurs to him: 'For what reason we pronounce it
necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning,
shou'd also have a cause?' [T78] This opinion is not founded on
intuition. We cannot demonstrate the necessity of a cause for
every event without showing that we cannot even conceive of the
possibility of a cause and effect being separated. And yet, as
all distinct ideas are separable, we can conceive of an object
to be existent at one point and non-existent at another. So if
the separation is possible in the imagination, then the 'actual
separation' of these objects 'implies no contradiction or
absurdity' [T80; cf T89; cf E I 29].
If the 'opinion' that every event must have a cause is not
derived from 'knowledge' or 'scientific' reasonIng'. then., fe
reasons, it must be derived from experience. And he decides to
approach the issue through examining this question:
we conclude, that such particular causes must
necessarily have such particular effects, and why weform
an inference from one to another' LT82i.
He soon finds 'a new relation betwixt cause and
effect', and this is constant conjunction [T87]. It is not
enough for objects to be contiguous and successive for us to
pronounce the objects 'cause' and 'effect'. There must be
several instances of these relations between the two objects.
But how can we learn from many 'objects' what we cannot learn
from one? It seems
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that from 'the repetition of any past impressions...there never
will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary
connexion' [T88]. Nevertheless, he says that it would be
foolish to despair too soon. We should 'continue the thread of
our discourse' [T88]. So, having discovered that after noticing
the 'constant conjunction' of objects 'we always draw an
inference from one object to another' , he asks about the nature
of that inference.
Yet what about the impression of necessity, the reader
might ask. Hume writes:
'Perhaps 'twill appear in the end, that the necessary
connexion depends on the inference, instead of the
inference's depending on the necessary connexion' [T88].
If it appears so, it is because Hume's examination of the
inference that we make from cause to effect takes us to the
true object of his interest: to reduce to a single faculty,
that is the imagination, the powers of the mind hitherto
accorded to reason [Fogelin p.56].
To see why he thought this we can turn to the argument that
convinces Hume that we cannot consider our reasoning about
matters of fact as arising from a special faculty. If the
transition from cause to effect, he says, is founded on past
experience and our memory of constant conjunction, then the
next question is
'whether we are deterrnin'd by reason to make the
transition, or by a certain association and relation of
perceptions' [T88-9].
Whether, that is, experience 'produces the idea by means of the
understanding or of the imagination' [T88]. If the transition
is made through reason, then it would have to proceed, Hume
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assumes, upon a principle expressing the uniformity of nature:
that is,
'that instances, of which we iave had no experience, must
resemble thos of which we have had experience, and that
the course of nature continues always uniformly the same'
rT9J.
	
-_
He spends little time arguing that such a principle cannot he
proved through 'demonstrative arguments': we can easily
conceive a change in the course of nature. It is indeed his
argument that there can be no successful probable arguments
that interests him the most.
It is 'unquestionable', he says, that probable arguments
are 'founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those
objects, of which we have had experience, and those of which we
have had none' [T90]. It is, therefore, impossible that 'this
presumption can arise from probability'; for 'the same
principle cannot both be the cause and the effect of another'
[ibid]. The argument is set out very clearly in the Enquiry:
'we have said that all arguments concerning existence are
founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our
knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from
experience; and that all our experimental conclusions
proceed upon the supposition that the future will be
conformable to the past'.
Therefore,
'To endeavour...the proof of this last supposition by
probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must
be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for
granted, which is the very point in question' [E I 35-36].
Even if we allow 'that the production of one object by
another...implies a power' it does not follow that the same
power will be present on the appearance of the object in the
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future [T91]. So, even after experience has informed us of
objects' constant conjunction, this argument shows that reason
cannot satisfy us why we should extend the experience to the
instances which have not fallen under our observation.
It is, therefore, to the imagination that we must appeal if
we want to explain why we infer a cause. We have seen that
certain principles 'make us' pass from one object to another,
even where there is no reason for that transition. And such is
the case with an inference from cause to effect:
'When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or
impression of one object to the idea or belief of another,
it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles,
which associate together the ideas of these objects and
unite them in the imagination' [T92J.
Hume is thus giving to the imagination a much more central role
than any other writer before. This he has been driven to on
account of the hopelessness of appealing to reason:
'Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to
have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any
inferences from causes to effects, nor repose belief in
any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends
solely on the union of ideas' [ibid].
However, a problem immediately becomes apparent for Flume's
putative thesis. If the imagination can 'mingle, and unite, and
separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred
different ways', then where is the difference between a fiction
and a belief [T96; E I 147]? For given that we are free to have
many ideas associated with an impression, there cannot be a
particular idea that is always found with a belief and never
with a fiction. All Flume can point to is that
'as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we
conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an
additional force and vivacity' LT96].
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Unsurprisingly, Hume was dissatisfied with this conception. He
returns to the matter in the Appendix of the Treatise. There he
says that,
'an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious
idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this
different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a
superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or
steadiness' 1T629].
But this is followed by a rather different thesis: belief,
he says, is something that 'distinguishes the ideas of the
judgment from the fictions of the imagination' in the way that:
'It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear
of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and
renders them the governing principles of all our actions'
[ibid].
The last clause in this sentence is not in fact just an
isolated insight. In the final chapter of the present work I
argue that a crucial part of 1-lurne's examination of religion is
his belief that religious believers are not really believers,
because they hardly differ in their behaviour from non-
believers. For example, compared, he says, with the interest
that men show about what happens after their death on this
earth, they show an extraordinary 'carelessness' and
'stupidity' with regard to a future state [T 113-114]. Of
course, his scepticism about their belief could hardly be shown
in any other way; and the main burden of his account of belief
rests on the wholly unsatisfactory notion of a more vivacious
idea.
In fact this account threatens to undermine his whole
attempt to give a foundation to the sciences. For the door
seems left open for superstition: 'When I am convinc'd of any
principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon
me' [1103]. flow, then, can we draw a distinction between
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science and superstition? This can be put in another way: how
can we draw a distinction between the two senses of
imagination? For on the one hand Huine wants to say, that it
must be the imagination that is responsible for all beliefs. On
the other hand, he still wants to be able to speak of the
imagination in the sense of the 'fancy'.
What has happened, in short, is this: Hume's investigation
of induction has focused our attention on the imagination as
the faculty which is responsible for belief. That is, Hurne is
giving a new sense to the term 'imagination'. But now it seems
that that scepticism, seemingly so useful for the project of
reducing a theory of human nature to a few principles,
threatens to undercut that very theory. Can he distinguish
between science and superstition; between science and poetry;
between the claims of the scientist and the claims of one who
has, as the saying goes, kangaroos in his top paddock? Can he,
that is, argue his case for the 'imagination' and yet still
sometimes speak of the 'fancy'? On the other hand, can he speak
of the imagination and the fancy as one faculty and yet speak
of 'the understanding or imagination' [T104] ? Is he trying to
have his cake and eat it? I will turn to these questions later
and I shall argue that Hume can consistently argue that we can
reasonably accept some beliefs and not others. But I begin Part
II of this chapter by discussing further the two senses of
'imagination' that Hurne uses.
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Chapter I
Belief
Part II
introduction
In Part I I tried to show how Hume believes that it is the
imagination that is responsible for our beliefs in matters of
fact. Hume, that is, is assigning to the imagination an
unprecedented role. Nevertheless, he still wants to keep a
sense of 'imagination' with which he can contrast judgment.
Thus we saw that he has two senses of 'imagination', one of
which can be characterised as the 'fancy'. Is this possible? Or
is he in fact undercutting his own scientific pretensions? This
is one of the major questions I address in Part II.
However, representing Hume's strategy towards the question
of belief in terms of two senses of 'imagination' is not indeed
the only thing I want to do. I also suggested in Part I that
Hume is not only interested in the above problem, but he also
wants to explain why what he sees as the true state of affairs
has been hidden for so long. He wants to explain why men have
come to represent man as defined by his capacity to reason.
Cartesianism, he seems to suggest, is no arbitrary rival. What
are the philosophical temptations? And what is its
psychological appeal?
Hume's own researches conclude quite otherwise to that
rival: man is a creature of the imagination. We construct the
categories of the understanding and the fancy in order to mark
off successful and unsuccessful general rules. Because this
rule is successful we say it comes from the 'judgment'; because
that rule is unsuccessful we say it comes from the fancy.
Trouble only arises when philosophers appear, and misinterpret
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such talk by hypostatising wrongly these 'faculties'; arid
concluding that it is the 'understanding' that defines man. In
reality, both types of rules come from a single faculty.
Now how do we conclude, that one billiard ball will hit
another? Through observation. And so how should we study
belief? Through observation. The false picture of man which
look to reason for an explanation of belief will study man in
isolation. In contrast, Hume employs observations about why we
believe things, which involve references to our common social
state. For instance, in section 6 of this chapter, I argue that
if we are interested in Hume's explanation of belief, we should
take note of his account of the motivation men have to reason
well. Why do men try and discipline their fancies? The
admiration that successful reasoners gain from their fellows is
part of Hume's answer to the question of how men follow general
rules of scientific reasoning.
I end Part II by discussing Hume's account of our idea
necessity; the question we saw dropped earlier when Hume began
to focus on his attempt to explain belief through the
imagination. I begin, however, by discussing that thesis as it
appears in the Enquiry; and then in the same section I go on to
mention two defences of his thesis which serve, Hume thinks, to
show the generality of his principles of human nature.
55
section 4
the imagination and the First Enquiry; passions and poets
In the Introduction to the present work I mentioned the
fact that there has been little work done on the imagination in
Hume's writings. There seems no doubt that one reason for this
neglect is the influence of Norman Kemp-Smith who seeks to play
down the importance of the faculty for an understanding of
Hume's account of belief. And if the imagination is not thought
to be central to that part of Hume's philosophy, it is hardly
surprising that it is not thought to be central to his work on
the passions, on politics, and on religion. What I now want to
do is to examine and criticise the following conclusion of
Kemp-Smith's, which appears in an appendix to The Philosophy of
David Hume entitled 'Hume's teaching in regard to the
Imagination':
'Thus we seem justified in concluding that Hume's
ascription of primacy to the imagination has no greater
importance in the philosophy of the Treatise than that of
being merely a corollary to his earlier doctrine of
belief' [Kemp-Smith p.463].
The evidence to which Kemp-Smith appeals in support of this
statement is Hume's doctrine of belief as presented in the
Enquiry. (That is to say that he thinks the Enquiry reveals
Hume's real doctrine in the Treatise). Kemp-Smith says of the
'special sense' of 'imagination', which in the Treatise ilume
sometimes refers to as the 'understanding', that it 'does not
reappear' in the Enquiry [ibid p.461]. Indeed, Kemp-Smith
remarks that 'such usage is there...quite explicitly disavowed'
[ibid]. He quotes the following, which, he says, emphasises
that belief is a 'state of mind to the achievement of which the
imagination (in the common sense) is not equal' [ibid p.462]:
I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid,
lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object,
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than what the imagination alone is ever able to
attain...The imagination has the command over all its
ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways
possible...But as it is impossible that this faculty of
imagination can ever, of_itself,_reach_belief, it is
evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or
order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and
in their feeling to the mind...And in philosophy, we can
no further than assert, that belief issomething fETE
the mind, which distinguishes the ias ofjudgment
from the fictions of the imaginaUn' LE I9; first and
last italics are Kemp-Smith's].
But E.J. Furlong rightly points out that Hume says that the
imagination cannot 'of itself, reach belief' [Furlong p.67;
italics mine]. This, Furlong says, suggests only that
imagination is not a 'sufficient cause' of belief [ibid p.68].
This is why we do not believe in giants when reading fables.
This is to say that the ideas of the 'imagination' in this
passage are the ideas of the fancy.
Nevertheless, Furlong is not I think reliable about the
imagination and the Enquiry. He seems to come to the right
conclusion here with a wrong reason. Thus to support his claim
that Hume's account of how belief is formed did not
substantially change from the Treatise to the Enquiry, Furlong
writes:
'Compare Enquiy [p.51], where we are told that
association with an object of the senses or the memory
gives rise to that "steadier and stronger conception"
which we call belief. This, Hume considers, is "a general
law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind".
If this passage had occurred in the Treatise he might have
worded the last phrase "all the operations of the
imagination". So far as the nature of belief is concerned
the difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry lies
in the dropping of a word, not a change of theory'
[Furlong p.67; E I 51].
But the word is certainly not dropped. Hume does employ
'imagination' in a special sense in the Enquiry.
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Both Kemp-Smith and Furlong neglect to notice all those
places in the Enquiry where Hume argues that our common beliefs
are made possible through the imagination; and that such
beliefs are to be distinguished from the products of the fancy.
In the following statement of this doctrine, Hume takes care to
distinguish the two senses by using the term 'fancy':
'Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses,
it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the
imagination to conceive that object, which is usually
conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a
feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of
the fancy' [E I 48].
Elsewhere he is content to emphasise that beliefs and fictions
arise from the same faculty. So in Section VI, in discussing
'the influence' of probability, he writes:
'If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and
stronger conception of an object than what attends the
mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may,
perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The
concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints
the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it
superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the
passions more sensible...' [E I 57].
He is clearly using the term 'imagination' in the second
sentence in a special sense. This, of course, is no verbal
move, but the conclusion to his thesis that the imagination,
and not some extra faculty such as the 'understanding', is
responsible for belief.
The final instance I want to mention of Hume's use of the
special sense of 'imagination' in the Enquiry is found in 'Of
the reason of animals'. Any theory, he argues, 'by which we
explain the operations of the understanding...will acquire
additional authority, if we find, that the same theory is
requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals'
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[E I 104; cf T176]. So how do we explain the beliefs of
animals? Hume's answer is as follows:
'It is custom alone, which engages animals, from every
object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual
attendant, and carries their imagination, from the
appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that
particular manner, which we denominate belief [E I 106].
The pub dog puts his nose in the salt and vinegar crisp bag not
because he has reasoned from past instances that he will be
rewarded with crisps, but on account of his past experience.
Hume explains this in terms of the association of ideas in the
imagination of the animal. He sees the crisp bag; he associates
this with food; and sticks in his nose. (This indeed is one
reason why one should be careful about going dressed as a crisp
bag to a fancy dress party held in a pub).
Thus it seems that Kemp Smith is quite wrong to think that
Hume rejected the imagination as the faculty of belief in the
Enquiry. And that Hume did so reject it, is Kemp-Smith's
argument about what is essential to the Treatise.
*******
Now I suggested in the Introduction to the pre.set
that Hume thought that the imagination is not only at the heart
of Flume's account of belief; but also at the heart of his
account of the passions. I anticipate this subject of the
passions and the imagination here because Hume anticipates it
in the section entitled 'Of the influence of belief'. The
reason he mentions it there is that he believes that his new
thesis that our reasonings are dependent on the imagination
will gain support from evidence that our actions are likewise
thus dependent. So he writes that
'Men will scarce ever be persuaded, that effects of such
consequence can flow from principles, which are seemingly
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so inconsiderable, and that the far greatest part of our
reasonings, with all our actions and passions, can be
deriv'd from nothing but custom and habit' [T118].
For this reason, he says, he will 'anticipate a little' what
would naturally be discussed in the consideration of the
passions [ibid]. This may lead us to appreciate how Hume's
major conclusions about human nature flow from a few principles
of the imagination.
The topics here are the influence of passions upon belief,
and the influence of belief upon the imagination.
As to the first of these, Hume remarks that a coward
readily assents to every account of danger of which he hears.
As, for example, when he hears his sister tell of a
'confrontation' she had with a Rottweiler whilst she was on her
way to rent a video. But why should this be so? Hume writes:
'When any affecting object is presented, it gives the
alarm, and excites immediately a degree of its proper
passion' [T120].
Now a passion for Hume is an impression [T 1]; and this
impression of fear, which readily arises in the coward,
enlivens the idea of the Rottweiler. Though others consider the
sister at best 'unreliable' in her dog reporting, and at worst,
'a downright fibber', the coward immediately believes her. As
in Hume's system, belief is a more vivid and intense conception
of any idea, we can see why he says that the result is belief.
The
'emotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination;
and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting
object, makes us form that idea with greater force and
vivacity, and consequently assent to it' [T120].
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Later I will have cause to examine in greater detail how Hume's
conception of the imagination is at the centre of his account
of the passions as well as that of the understanding. And this
is to say that whenever Hume draws attention to how the
different parts of his theory seem to corroborate each other,
he is in effect drawing attention to the generality of certain
principles of the imagination.
The second matter from 'Of the influence of belief' I wish
to mention is the matter of the 'effects' of belief on the
imagination. Hume notes that poets, 'tho' liars by profession,
always endeavour to give an air of truth to their fictions'
[T121]. They realise that if they do this, their works will be
held to be more satisfying. Hume believes that his theory can
explain this; which suggests, he cares to point out, that this
is 'confirmation' of his 'system' {T122]. He writes:
The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of
relation by being united into one poem...and if any of
these incidents be an object of belief, it bestows a force
and vivacity on the others, which arerelated to it'
[ibid].
What happens, he says, is this:
'The vividness of the first conception diffuses itself
along the relations, and is convey'd, as by so many pipes
or canals, to every idea that has any communication with
the primary one' [ibid].
However, the union of ideas within the imagination is never
complete when poets are speaking. Which is why belief is
w i t hh e 1 d.
In Section 5 I will examine further where Hume thinks the
distinction between the two senses of 'imagination' lies. I will
argue that Flume believes he can show that though we must have
two senses in explicating 'the mind' there is but one faculty
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in view. If any philosopher says that there is a 'real
difference' between, on the one hand, the 'understanding', and
on the other, the 'imagination/fancy', then Hume would attempt
to show that our beliefs in dragonflies, as well as in dragons,
'arises' out of a conjunction of ideas in the imagination. The
real difference lies in the trustworthiness of the beliefs that
human beings believe. It is for this reason that we speak of
the products of the 'understanding' or the 'judgment' and those
of the 'imagination'. Or more accurately: this is all we can
mean by the distinction. And who means more? Only philosophers
are confused here; though, as we shall see, Hume believed that
their picture of rational man had consequences for society on
account of the way tiat it helped underpin the dogmas of
religion.
62
section 5
general rules
What I now want to do is to see how Hume tries to forge a
conception of belief which will allow him to distinguish
between science and superstition. Or, more accurately, to
distinguish between 'the trivial suggestions of the fancy' and
'the general and more establish'd properties of the
imagination' [T267; cf T225]. I shall argue that he thinks that
there is a division between the 'judgment' and the 'fancy', but
it is not the one that has hitherto been accepted. Moreover, he
thinks that his account of the imagination can explain the
genesis of that erroneous view of man as a rational creature
which he wants to combat and replace.
The human race, the species, to paraphrase Chesterton, to
which most of Hume's readers belong, have a propensity to
philosophise. Hume thinks that he can show why it is that they
will come to believe certain things and find it absurd that
anyone should contradict them. For no one is more aware than
Hume of the power of philosophical conceptions ingrained
through custom and education. For which reason he remarks,
propos his theory of belief, that he expects not to make many
'proselytes to my opinion' [T118]. This, he believes, is a
result of 'prejudice', one species of 'unphilosophical
probability'.
These sources of belief that affect philosophy are
described in the section 'Of unphilosophic.al probability'. They
are derived from the same principles as those described in the
section 'Of the probability of causes'. Yet as he remarks, the
former are not received by philosophers: 'they have not the
good fortune to obtain the same sanction' [T143]. Here there is
a significant parallel with what he says about education.
Philosophers, he notes, reject education as on a par with
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experience. But education is founded on the same principles of
the imagination as reasoning from experience. And philosophers
are themselves subject to the influence of education.
Thus 'philosophy' pretends that it is beyond the influence
of these unphilosophical probabilities. It will say that its
principles are founded in reason; whilst the vulgar's are
products of the fancy. What I will now consider is Hume's
attempt to show that this is an error. He thinks that the
unphilosophical 'kinds of probability' are derived from the
same principles as those which are 'allow'd to be reasonable
foundations of belief and opinion' [T143].
The first kind of 'unphilosophical probability' he mentions
is that an argument will be found 'more or less convincing,
according as the fact is recent or remote' [ibid]. This, of
course, cannot be justified by 'philosophy'. But it can be
explained by reference to how a 'greater force and vivacity' in
a recent impression 'naturally conveys a greater to the related
idea' [ibid].
Secondly, an 'experiment, that is recent and fresh in the
memory, affects us more than one that is in some measure
obliterated' [ibid]. This is because a 'lively impression
produces more assurance than a faint one' [T144].
Thirdly, however different in kind are proofs and
probabilities, the 'former species of reasoning often
degenerates insensibly into the latter' through nothing but the
length of the argument [ibid]. It is certain, he says, that
conviction will be stronger if an inference is drawn
immediately from an object. For the vivacity drawn from the
original impression will decay if the 'imagination is carry'd
thro' a long chain of connected arguments' [ibid].
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Two remarks seem appropriate at this point. Firstly, all
these phenomena are presented within his theory of belief. They
are, indeed, progeny of the imagination, disowned, but
uncontroversially ubiquitous. Secondly, their embarrassing
presence should introduce some humility into the learned who
congratulate themselves on the purity of their reasoning when
they contrast themselves with the vulgar. For these
dispositions of the imagination are expressed in the patterns
of belief found as much in the learned world as in any other
part of society. For example, when Hume attacks the myths of
the Whig and Tory writers we see his awareness of the first
unphilosophical probability: recent history will tend to
prejudice .our interpretation of more distant events; for recent
history is based on comparatively vivid impressions. Similarly,
an experiment that is recent will affect us more than one
distant: and so there is an impetus to fashion in the natural
sciences.
But as well as these three 'species of probability' there
is another one in the tendency we have to form 'general rules'.
This is perhaps the most interesting of these dispositions not
least because here we see how tendencies of the imagination can
conflict with one another: conclusions which philosophers
ascribe to the 'understanding' can conflict with those they
ascribe to the 'fancy'. For Hume, though, there is but one
faculty, the imagination, and this is the source of both sorts
of conclusions.
But if the different conclusions have a common heredity,
then why should we give our preference to the conclusions that
the philosophers prefer? Can Hume disagree with the
philosophers'categories and yet still support this preference?
Or does his reduction undercut the claims for his own
'scientific' account?
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What are these 'general rules'? Such general rules 'which
we rashly form to ourselves' are the 'source' of what we
properly call PREJUDICE' {T146]. And so, even when faced with
an intelligent Irishman or a 'solid' Frenchman, we may still
conclude, 'in spite of sense and reason', that the former is a
'dunce' and the latter a 'fop' [T146-7]. Why do we form such
rules? It is a consequence of the same 'principles on which
'all judgments concerning causes and effects depend' [T147]. It
is
'the nature of custom not only to operate with its full
force, when objects are presented, that are exactly the
same with those to which we have been accustom'd; but also
to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as
are similar' [ibid].
As an illustration, Hume presents one of his drinking examples.
One 'who has become a drunkard by the use of red wines, will be
carried almost with the same violence to white, if presented to
him' [ibid].
Sometimes, though, the force of this disposition has 'an
effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment', so
that a 'contrariety' of sentiments will be produced concerning
the same object. A woman, for example, held high over the
streets by Batman, will tremble even though her judgment is
that Batman is utterly dependable. The reason is that, through
custom, she associates falling with death; and the custom goes
beyond the 'instances, from which it is deriv'd' [T148].
But the most striking example of the influence of general
rules appears when we consider the assumptions that we make
about conclusions of the mind. That is, the influence of
general rules explains why philosophers make a distinction
between the 'fancy' and the 'understanding' or 'judgment'. We
can see in this something of the intended scope of Hume's
theory of the imagination. Just as it will later explain why
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philosophers are inclined to believe that efficacy is
independent of the mind, here it explains the reason why
philosophers have arrived at the fundamental categories of
'judgment' and the 'imagination'. More than this: it explains
how the correct theory is itself possible: it is precisely
because we have a natural tendency to form wider and wider
explanatory principles, that a theory of the imagination
becomes an attractive proposition.
So how might the influence of general rules explain how we
arrive at such fundamental categories? The answer seems to be
that we have experience not only of objects and events, but
also experience of our reasoning about objects and events. So
we come to formulate rules about such reasoning.
'By them we learn to distinguish the accidental
circumstances from the efficacious causes; and when we
find that an effect can be produc'd without the
concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude
that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious
cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it' [T149].
Nevertheless, we are still sometimes influenced: there is then
a 'contrariety in our thoughts' [ibid].This causes us to
ascribe the conclusions to different faculties:
'The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being
more extensive and constant. The exception to the
imagination; as being more capricious and uncertain'
[ibid].
Thus the influence of one general rule causes us to reject the
influence of the other. The one that we reject we say comes
from the fancy; and the one we accept we say comes from the
'judgment'. That is, we invent these categories.
The 'sceptics', he says, may take pleasure in this. This is
unsurprising when we consider what has happened. He began to
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explore general rules as a species of 'unphilosophical
probability' starting with the example of prejudices about the
qualities of the Irish and the French. How right, the reader
says, is Hurne to point out that men - perhaps especially the
vulgar? - are not always reasonable! But, as with the
discussion of education that suggested that education is built
almost on the same foundation as reasoning from experience, so
here too Hume attacks the claim that the conclusions of the
'judgment' have a different heredity from those of
'unphilosop'riical probability'. For it is pointed out that the
canons of reasoning on which the wise pride themselves
following are nothing but a consequence of the same propensity
to follow general rules that result in prejudices. So the
'philosophical' rules are founded on an 'unphilosophical'
propensity. Thus the seemingly incorruptible division of the
mind into the faculty of judgment and imagination or fancy, is
merely a consequence that certain general rules are better than
others. Philosophers have alighted on this necessary
distinction and decided that it represents a fundamental
distinction that distinguishes man from the animals.
So in this section we have seen how Hume attempts to reduce
the 'judgment' and the 'fancy' to the 'imagination'. He is
showing that philosophers have hypostatized wrongly talk of the
'judgment' and the 'fancy'. Such talk is necessary for certain
rules are more useful than others.
Naturally, this attack on the idea that reasoning is
independent of the imagination, creates a problem for Hume: for
he not only wants to explain the origin of belief, he also
wants to introduce a normative standard of reasoning. Can a
theory of belief as founded on the imagination embrace
normative standards? This I will discuss in the next section.
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section 6
the wise, and the fanciful
Earlier in the chapter we saw how an essential element in
Hume's project of reducing the faculties of the mind to the
imagination was his attack on the idea that reason has a role
in the forming of judgments about matters of fact. He concludes
at one instance that
'Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with
another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of
their constant conjunction in all past instances' [T92; cf
T91; T139].
Yet Hume does not intend that we should give up our Inductive
procedures; this, of course, would wreck his scientific
project. What he wants to show, I will now argue, is that
though the generality of philosophers are wrong in thinking
that they can offer an ultimate justification for a belief,
this does not mean that we have no reason to prefer one belief
to another; and indeed, I will argue that Hume can consistently
offer 'rules by which to judge of causes and effects'.
This is to contradict W.H.Walsh who argues that Hume is
inconsistent in talking of 'just and unjust inferences':
'Only a being which is in some degree rational can hope to
apply rules and improve his performance in doing so; only
a being with some degree of skill can be in this position.
But according to Hume's official doctrine man is not such
a being: his mind is determined to behave as it does, and
his action and activities, if such they should be called,
are the unavoidable effects of custom and habit' [Walsh
p.106].
So, says Walsh, the 'science of Human Nature', is meant to
explain what occurs. In theory it should have nothing to say
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about what ought to be; 'in practice', though, Hume is as
interested as the next man in distinguishing effective from
ineffective thought' [ibid]
The question, then, is whether Hume has any right to say
that one rule is better than another. If he does not, then how
can he speak of the wise and the foolish? I shall argue that
some rules are to be preferred on account of their success in
giving unity to the ideas of the imagination. Men find these
rules through treating themselves as objects of study: they
find more success in this !.. of reasoning than that. The
progress, the refinement, or the gradual disciplining of
belief, is marked by greater success in reasoning. A person
soon discovers that if he does not follow the rules that, as a
simple matter of fact, have bought him success, and at the same
time discipline certain urges - of the 'fancy' - then he will
not succeed in whatever task or inquiry he sets himself.
An introduction to the reasons as to why Flume thinks that
some rules are more equal than others can be found in the
section 'Of unphilosophical probability'. There Hume writes:
'We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by
which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes
and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of
our understanding, and on our experience of its operations
in the judgments we form concerning objects' [T149].
What happens is that we notice that some of our propensities
must be subordinated to others if we are to find unity between
our ideas. And this is how we make progress in discovering
truths about the world. For example, when we find that an
'effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any
particular circumstance', then we conclude that that
circumstance makes no part of the cause, however often they
have been found together, and however much we may be disposed
to associate them [ibid]. The newspaper vendor may begin his
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cries immediately before the sound of the school bell; but when
we find, that when there is no cry the bell still rings, we
conclude that the call of 'Evening News' does not cause the
bell to ring. The principles implicit in this conclusion are
more useful than the principles implicit in the reasoning of
one who concludes that the call does cause the bell to ring. He
will not go very far; especially, perhaps, in the field of
campanology.
Some principles, then, are recognised as being more useful
than others: these are dignified as coming from the faculty of
'judgment': the others belong to the 'imagination' or 'fancy'.
Thus Flume does not want to deny the distinction; though his
explanation of it was revolutionary. The useful principles are
not useful because they come from the faculty of judgment:_
rather, because they aremore useful, there_said to_come
from the faculty of judgment.
Reflective social creatures like ourselves need such a
distinction between the 'judgment' and the 'imagination'. The
problem arises when philosophers suggest that useful and
useless rules arise from distinct faculties. The philosophic
may want to set themselves above the animals; and this may be
one way of doing it. Or those possessing judgment superior to
the generality of mankind, may wish to define human nature
through reference to the faculty of judgment alone.
The philosophical error involved is entirely natural. Given
the way we have to talk of the 'imagination' and the 'judgment'
or 'understanding', it is hardly surprising that these are
taken for distinct faculties. Yet the error can be dangerous.
If judgment is given an autonomous and defining role, the
theologians will make use of this way of thinking and argue
that reason is of 'divine origin' [cf T413]. As such, this
philosophy may become part of a religious metaphysic; as when a
religion ignores experience in its moral teaching; and so
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function as an excuse for all manner of oppressive practices
[vide Chapter VI below].
When Hume suggests that the rules that he lays out might
have been supplied 'by the natural principles of our
understanding' [T175], part of his meaning is that we need no
philosopher to discover that we will not be able to adapt means
to ends if we ignore, say, the priority of causes. We discover
this; and so we have the categories of wise and foolish.
Because we tend to associate the shout with the bell, we
need to enlarge our reasoning to take into account such a
fallacious tendency of the imagination:
'A...reflexion on general rules keeps us from augmenting
our belief uon every encrease of the force and vivacity
of our ideas [T632].
Similarly, as Lewis White Beck points out, Hume argues that
general rules may correct the varying effects of sympathy in
the moral life [Beck p.73]. Thus Hume says that if a person of
our nature and full grown were suddenly transported into the
world, he would not know how much value to put on things, on
account of the variability of his feelings and a lack of
general rules [T299]. Likewise, we need experience of the
manner in which the imagination works in order to apply the
general rules (formed from that experience) in judging matters
of fact. We need experience, that is, of how principles
describing certain conjunctions lead to success - to a greater
unity between our substantive principles. When we have this
experience, we can compare the principles implicit in the
reasoning of the person who concludes that the shout causes the
bell with the circumstances found in the 'Rules by which to
judge of causes and effects'. We compare it, then,
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'with the more general and authentic operations of the
understanding, Land]...we find it to be destructive of all
the most establish'd principles of reasonings' [T150].
If we ignored, for instance, the fact that the absence of a
shout, as when the vendor is absent with a sore throat, makes
no difference to the bells ringing, we would be undercutting
tried and tested principles of scientific reasoning. So we
reject the significance of the constant conjunction between the
shout and the bell.
In his paper 'Hume's Theory of Mental Activity', Fred
Wilson speaks of a 'feedback process' whereby the mind
regulates itself through knowledge of its own propensities.
Wilson writes:
'The mind, at least sometimes aiming at the truth,
discovers the laws of its own operation, including the
laws describing the process by which it arrives at beliefs
successful and unsuccessful. Using these, and monitoring
its own activities, it can regulate itself by this
feedback process so as more efficiently to gain the truth
so far as it is able' [Wilson p. 118].
Wilson notes that Hume marks out 'psychological types' that are
appropriate to the active search for knowledge. In Book I he
speaks of 'constancy' and 'sagacity' [T175]. And in Book III
mentions how 'industry, perseverance, patience..application..
[and]..vigi lance' give us advantages in the 'conduct of life'
[T610-611].
However, just as we do not form our moral dispositions in
isolation, nor do we form our general rules about judging
matters of fact in isolation. And if we want a fuller picture
of the active mind that Hume presents, we should, I think,
consider the significance of the social dimension of human
nature for explaining how the 'authentic' rules of the mind are
arrived at. What we can see is that through simple inductive
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methods we can discipline ourselves, not least due to the
motivation we receive through identifying successful reasoning
with gaining the esteem of others.
When Hume speaks of how man attributes some conclusions to
the 'imagination' and some to the 'judgment', he evidently does
not mean that each person arrives at such a distinction by
himself. Man, for Hume, is nothing if not an imitative
creature. This is one reason why Hume draws our attention to
the way that our reasoning may be upset by group prejudices
such as the thought that a particular Irishman cannot have wit.
Yet this general rule, so destructive of a successful
assessment of Irishmen, is countered by a prejudice in favour
of weighing up the evidence according to previously successful
canons of reasoning. Now just as we can take from others racial
prejudice, so too can we be brought up to follow successful
standards of reason. Indeed, the unphilosophical species of
reason acts as a parody of the 'authentic' language of
causation.
So from our earliest years we learn elements of the true
canons of reasoning; this happens partly through imitating
others. Naturally, as we progress, we will tend to imitate the
even more successful - such persons that have the esteem not
only of their children, but of society. To be sure, matters may
be askew. Thus Hume writes of 12th century England in the
following terms:
'The spirit of superstition was so prevalent, that it
infallibly caught every careless reasoner..[and]..those
who preserved themselves untainted by the general
contagion, proceeded on no principles which they could
pretend to justify; they were more indebted to their total
want of instruction, than to their knowlede if they
still retained some share of understanding 	 H I 33].
False prejudices, then, will not be able to overcome the basis
of successful reasoning, as they are parasitic upon it. So Hume
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can speak of the 'natural principles of our understanding'
[T175]. Nevertheless, as intellectual ambition increases,
superstition can prevail. Not least on account of the esteem
that the priests engineer for themselves and their modes of
thinking.
When Hume distinguishes between the principles of the
imagination which are 'permanent, irresistible, and universal'
and those which are 'changeable, weak and irregular', he notes
how mankind recognises that the latter principles 'are observ'd
only to take place in weak minds' [T225]. This observation will
have its effect on our effort to discipline our dispositions,
for the opinion of others about ourselves is of enormous
concern to us [ef T316]. Who indeed wants to be thought of as
having a weak mind? In the Enquiry Hume says that love can
subsist under treachery and malice, but is immediately
extinguished upon a perception of stupidity [E II 240].
We are now, I think, in a better position to assess Walsh's
criticism.
This 'self-observation', Walsh might say, is all right as
far as it goes, but it must not be pretended that it is
consistent with the 'official doctrine' that we are determined
by the association of ideas to react. The 'sheer weight of past
experience' is not enough, Walsh says, for all Hume wants the
imagination to do. Hurne himself, he says, recognises that
sometimes we may 'attain the knowledge of a particular cause
merely by one experiment' [T104]. Hume writes:
'tho' we are here suppos'd to have had only one experiment
of a particular effect, yet we have many millions to
convince us of this principle; that like objects, placed
in like circumstances, will always produce like eEfecE'
[T105j.
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This explanation, says Walsh, is 'hardly convincing'. What is
needed here is an 'ability' not a habit; and whilst habits are
acquired through conditioning, abilities are acquired through
'good fortune' and 'intelligent response'. But Hume's 'official
doctrine', he continues, cannot cope with the need for an
'ability':
'learning from experience does not consist in surrendering
oneself to determination by external causes as Hume seems
to suggest. On the contrary, it involves picking and
choosing among phenomena, setting some aside as
'distortions' or 'mere apearances' and pointing to others
as 'significant' or 'real ' [Walsh p. 109].
The first thing I want to say about these remarks is that
Walsh ignores the import of the fact that on Hume's
understanding of human action, 'picking and choosing' and
'setting aside' some phenomena are, like habitual actions,
actions which are determined by external causes. The scientist
is aware that some things may only be appearances, and that we
may be 'taken in' by these appearances. Now would not Hume want
to say that this is provided by the way that we can reflect on
the success of our causal predictions? Through our failures, we
may come to realise that we need to learn not just to react
'habitually' by throwing water when we see fire. We need to be
able to distinguish between unwanted fires and gas fires. Walsh
seems to forget that we have experience of mistakes. We are
not, that is, only determined by the constant conjunction of
particular objects under study, but we are also determined by
other factors such as the observation of past attempts at
reasoning. Moreover, we will imitate successful reasoners who
have the esteem of society. We are aware not only that if we
reason incorrectly we cannot adapt ends to means, but also that
such failure evokes not the esteem, but the contempt of our
peers. This latter point about the social context of knowledge
is easily missed, for it is easy to think that in Book I of the
Treatise, man is to be considered a solitary creature. Yet the
76
motivation is an essential part of the causal story that makes
Walsh's criticisms redundant.
******
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To summarize the argument of this section: because we can
find no ultimate reason for any belief, this does not mean that
we should consider all beliefs as on an equal footing. Yet,says
Walsh, is this not an unwarranted move from the descriptive to
the normative? For if we are merely determined to follow one
rule rather than another, then 'science on the one hand and
superstition on the other hand will stand on the same footing':
each will be, in effect, an operation of the imagination, where
that term is taken to cover something essentially sensual
rather than rational' [Walsh p.107]. In answer to this it was
suggested	 that we naturally learn from the results of
following different rules: we are self-disciplining creatures.
And the finest fruits of this self-disciplining are philosophy
and science.
From there the causal story was broadened. If we have given
up the project of founding experimental beliefs upon reason, we
can, without circularity, use experimental findings in order to
explain how we can successfully extrapolate from resemblances
using certain rules. And why should not such an explanatory
enterprise employ findings from a study of man in his natural
social state?
A greater awareness of the possibility of being misled by
the fancy becomes more widespread as 'philosophy' gains a
predominant position [cf E I 10]. From this point of view, the
very certainty, with which we employ the favoured general
rules, is to be explained not only through our experience of
constant conjunctions, but also by our attitudes to successful
reasoners. And these persons are not only buoyed up 	 by the
immediate advantage of their reasonings - they also consider
that they are thus given a 'new lustre in the eyes of mankind,
and are universally attended with esteem and approbation'
[T620]. As we have imitative minds we are led to imitate their
methods in difficult cases; and thus the socially significant
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distinction between them and those who follow the wayward
suggestions of their fancies - like the ignorant and the young
- serves to motivate us in our efforts to discipline our
imaginations.
Another suggestion of this section may serve as an
introduction to the next. Philosophers err when they speak of
the 'understanding' as a separate faculty from the
'imagination'. That the error is entirely natural is seen when
we consider that life depends on making a strict division
between tried and tested ways of associating resemblances and
dispositions to associate resemblances in other circumstances.
Because this is a necessary division there is nothing at all
wrong in speaking of the 'understanding' and the 'imagination'
as if they were separate faculties. The question is that of the
logical status of such a division. Error only arises when an
attempt is made to draw philosophical conclusions from such
language. As for example when it is held that reason is
autonomous and the defining mark of man. In the following
section on necessity, important elements in this false
conception of man will be examined. Once again we will see how
Hume's explanation of philosophical error plays a central role
in his study of human nature.
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section 7
necessity
The chief purpose of this section is to consider how 1-lume
explains our idea of necessity. But there is another theme. We
have seen in the previous sections how Hume's reduction of the
study of 'logic' to the study of the imagination goes hand in
hand with an account of how philosophers misinterpret our talk
of the 'understanding' and the 'fancy'. In the present section
I begin to examine Hume's explanation of another, closely
related, error. For Hume clearly values his picture of how the
imagination allows us to reason beyond present impressions, on
account of how that picture enables us to explain why
philosophers should be led to think that necessity lies in
objects.
It is precisely the propensities of the imagination which
make reasoning about matters of fact possible, that lead us to
think that certain ways of thinking are 'natural'. Such as, for
example, the thought that efficacy lies in the objects. In
general, it may be said that such explanations of error
comprise one of the themes that unify his theory of the
imagination through its diverse applications.
Now that we have seen how Hume believes it is the
imagination that makes us infer particular effects from
particular causes, we can return to the question 'dropt'
earlier: viz., what is our idea of necessity when we say that
two objects are necessarily connected together? But why is Hume
so interested in this question? After all has he not already
introduced a revolutionary explanation of belief, as founded on
the imagination rather than reason? One answer is that he has
not yet shown the impression of necessity as demanded by his
first principle. However, as Barry Stroud explains, there is
another reason:
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'we come to believe, not just that a B will occur, but
that it must. We have the idea, not just of an event of
one sort always following the event of another sort in
certain circumstances, but of there being a necessary
connection between events of two sorts in certain
circumstances' [Stroud p.78].
Hume repeats the argument that led him to re-examine belief
and, eventually, to reduce the understanding and the fancy to
the imagination: we cannot conceive a power or efficacy by
which objects are united. This would amount to the 'absolute
impossibility' of one object not following another. But this is
possible in thought and we have no a priori reason to believe
it impossible in fact. He then draws from this argument the
following conclusion:
'that when we talk of any being...as endow'd with a power
or force, proportion'd to any effect; when we speak of a
necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that
this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with
which any of these obects are endow'd; in all these
expressions, so apply d, we have really no distinct
meaning, and make use only of common words, without any
clear and determinate ideas' [T162].
What must be emphasised here is precisely that which Hume
italicises: he is only suggesting that philosophical
expressions that imply such theses as, for example, that bodies
'operate by their...accidents or qualities' have no meaning
[T158]. This implies that the case is not the same with the
ordinary use of expressions such as 'the door causes the
noise', or 'the weight has a powerful affect'. So it is more
probable, he says,
'that these expressions do here lose their true meaning by
being wrong apply'd, than that they never had any meaning;
'twill be proper to bestow another consideration on this
subject, to see if possibly we can discover the nature and
origin of these ideas, we annex to them' [T182].
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With this distinction in hand we can now consider how
Hume's view about the origin of the idea of necessity is based
on an understanding of the function of ordinary causal
statements. We give, he thinks, a special status to certain
constant conjunctions when we say that that event must occur.
When we postulate between two objects this particular relation,
we are in fact informing others of our feelings of expectation;
and at the same time informing them of our experience of
certain events.
What makes this possible are propensities of the
imagination. This can be seen if we ask how we make the
transition from feelings of expectation to talk of objects in
the world. The beginning of Hume's answer is seen in the
following:
''Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great
propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to
conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they
occasion, and which always make their appearance at the
same time that these objects discover themselves to the
senses' [T167].
What happens is this: the objects that we find always following
each other determine the mind to expect that B will follow A.
This gives us the 'internal impression', or 'impression of
reflexion'. But this is not the only impression around: there
is also, of course, the impression of the A and the B. We soon
come to associate the internal impression with the impressions
of A and B. And so we naturally behave as if necessity is
independent of the mind and residing in the objects themselves:
'Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to
attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine a
conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and
qualities, tho' the qualities...really exist no where'
1T167].
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Thus Hume is postulating a propensity of the imagination in
order to explain our causal thinking. And this propensity is no
ad hoc principle, but a natural consequence of his doctrine of
the association of ideas.
So we do not gain the idea of necessity from an impression
of any particular object in the world; rather, the idea is
arrived at through the mind's being determined by past objects.
In other words: we do not believe that Y will follow X because
we can see a necessary connexion between them: but because we
believe that Y will follow X we say that there is a necessary
connexion
'Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and
is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a
determination to carr' our thoughts from one object to
another' [T165].
The object cannot be the 'model' of the idea of necessity,
because a series of resembling instances cannot produce a new
quality in the object. However, 'the observation of this
resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its
real model' [T165].
But how can we make sense of this account? If the
'determination' is the same as the power or efficacy, then it
seems that if we speak about a connection between objects, as
in everyday language, then we will be speaking without meaning.
For, of course, we speak as if necessity is a quality in the
world: not as if it is, in some sense, a property of our minds.
Perhaps, then, we ought to see the theory as showing up
confusion in our ordinary talk?
This can be denied if we find Hume showing some natural way
that the truth of causal statements can be judged. Of course,
they are not going to be true on his official theory of truth:
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'Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or
disagreement either to the real relation of ideas, or to
real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is
not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is
incapable of being true or false, and can never be an
object of our reason' [T458; cf T448].
For I-fume has shown to his satisfaction that there is no quality
in the world that could correspond to the idea we have of
efficacy or power.
The core of his alternative account is simple: we are led
to assume a connection between objects; and so we reduce our
noticed resemblances to scientific principles. In other words,
attributions of necessity are to be considered as regulative.
Philosophers and the vulgar philosophising err if they treat
them as constitutive - if they think that they represent
something in the object. Thus whilst necessity cannot function
as an idea which legislates a priori, it allows us to see that
some principles of resemblance override others. Unless we
suppose that some resemblances are more important than others,
we would not be able to proceed in the task of reducing
resemblances to the fewest possible principles. The cat seeks
the shade; the child avoids the candle; we assume that there is
a necessary principle uniting these events when we progress
towards explaining why the philosopher springs from the hot
radiator.
A similar distinction was seen in the previous chapter:
talk of the 'imagination' (or 'fancy') and the 'understanding'
is necessary: but we are mistaken if we think that such talk is
grounded in real and distinguishable faculties. We also saw the
pressures that lead us to hypostatize them - to deny that is,
that philosophical and unphilosophical probabilities have the
same heredity. And so with causation: we can only reason about
objects because of a particular propensity of the imagination
that leads us to create a particular 'place' for efficacy -
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that is, 'between' objects. So no wonder, then, that people are
led into error when they philosophise about causation.
Such assumptions of necessity as we make when, for
instance, we are studying human nature, are misinterpreted if
they are understood in a 'realist way'; which is indeed the
constant temptation. That is, if the principle that 'every
effect must have a cause'; or 'men always seek society' are
considered to involve reference to some mysterious 'power'.
Usually of course we do not stop to consider what is
involved in talking about necessity. We feel certainty in
saying that the flame will be followed by heat - although
reason cannot justify this certainty. Instead, as we saw in the
previous chapter, justification comes from our having followed
the rules correctly when gathering our evidence.
Perhaps the sun disappears for eight days: philosophers,
Hume says, 'ought to search for the cause whence it might be
derived' [E I 12811. Here we would be assuming that there is a
principle (or principles) which would draw together different
parts of our knowledge. And unless we find one which the more
we employ it, the more it explains, we will not think of it as
possessing a necessary connection, but think of it as a
necessary sequence.
Thus we do not gather the idea of necessity from an
impression of any particular object in the world; rather, the
idea is gained through the minds being determined by past
objects. So we do not believe that Y will follow X because we
see a necessary conriexion between them: but because we believe
that Y will follow X we say that there is a necessary
connexion. Thus statements about connections between objects
are not true because they correspond with some quality in the
world: we have no idea of such a quality. They are true because
some objects, rather than others, 'discover themselves to the
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senses' at the same time as we have the feeling of expectation.
Of course, they may riot be true: but then they are false, not
because of the absence of some quality, but because the
succession is not regular on future occasions. In such cases we
have paid insufficient attention to the circumstances - such
circumstances as are set out in the section 'Rules by which to
judge of causes and effects'.
I have argued, then, that Hume can explain how standards
are possible, even though the impression of necessity arises
from feelings of expectation. A particular propensity of the
imagination that associates our feeling of expectation with
external objects allows us to inform others of a similar
constitution that such and such objects are to be found
together. Furthermore, we can be sophisticated about our
feelings of expectation and subsume some regularities under
others. Thus do we reduce our prtc.p1es o 	 to
manageable form.
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Chapter II
Scepticism
in troduc t ion
If there has been little work done on Hume and the
imagination in recent years, there has been a good deal of
interest shown in the relation of 'Hume's scepticism' to the
science of man. Indeed, Terence Penelhum has been led to remark
that the question of whether Hume is a sceptic, and if he is,
what sort of sceptic he is, 'is probably the most vexed problem
of the subtle subscience of Humeneutics' [Peneihum p.253]. Can
a study of what Hume says about the imagination help?
Even before tackling Part IV of the Treatise, entitled, 'Of
the sceptical and other systems of philosophy', the reader has
already reason to think that it might. For, as we saw in the
previous chapter, in attempting to find in the imagination a
new and startlingly economic explanation of belief, Hume has
the ghoul of scepticism at his elbow. The problem is that he
has to find some way of separating off the claim that the moon
is made of green cheese, from, for example, the conclusions of
a scientific study of the effect of the moon on poets. If he
cannot do this, then we have no reason not to believe the
poets' claims. This problem, I argued, is approached by Hume in
terms of the two senses of 'imagination'; that is to say, that
he thinks he can show that we can make good the claim that the
imagination is responsible for both sorts of belief, and at the
same time explain why men make the distinction and choose to
talk of the 'fancy' and the 'understanding'. He makes a
dis tinet ion
'in the imagination betwixt the principles which are
permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the
customary transition from causes to effects, and from
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effects to causes: and the principles, which are
changeable, weak, and irregular' LT22511.
However, we shall see in this chapter that when Hume turns
to the question of the existence of body, scepticism returns
anew - and it never leaves him. Until this point he is
confident; afterwards, he has a new understanding of his
project and a new understanding of scepticism.
It is well known that at times Hume succumbs to scepticism;
but it is not understood that in so succumbing Hume is
following a consequence of his theory of the imagination. Which
is to say of course that that theory is potentially self-
destructive. Wondering why he should go on to study the
passions, he says in the Conclusion to Book I of the Treatise
that he can no longer find any reason to believe in his theory:
'After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can
give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing
but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in
that view, under which they appear to me' [T265j.
Yet he does carry on. He is curious. He enjoys philosophy. He
gives the same answer to the question 'why carry on?', that
Cod, in Joseph Heller's Cod Knows, gives to David's question
'Why me?' - 'Why not?' He discovers that he will submit to the
attractions of pen and paper; just as he discovered that he
will believe that the billiard ball will move when hit by
another. He discovers, therefore, that he is sceptical about
his scepticism:
'I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in
submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this
blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical
disposition and principles' [T269J.
So on the one hand, his work on the imagination tells him there
is no theoretical answer to the sceptical doubt; on the other
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hand, the nature of the imagination gives him a practical
answer. And this practical answer overrides the (permanent)
opposition between principles of the imagination:
'Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily
determin'd to live, and talk and act like other people in
the common affairs of life' ibid].
He discovers that nature is too strong for excessive
scepticism: he discovers, in fact, that he is taken to a more
moderate scepticism.
Now I argued in the previous chapter that Flume's
explanation of belief can better be understood if we read it in
conjunction with portions of Book II of the Treatise; for his
full explanation of our reasonings about matters of fact
involves an attempt to explain why men are motivated to judge
as they do. In the present chapter I likewise argue that
extended references to Book II are necessary for understanding
the nature of the moderate scepticism at which Hume' arrives.
For example, I shall argue that the reasons Hume offers - in
the Conclusion to the first Book of the Treatise and in Part
XII of the Enquiry - for welcoming a moderate scepticism are
informed by certain principles of the imagination that are
outlined in Part III of Book II of the Treatise.
In the previous chapter, I also began to discuss Hume's
explanation of why men err in their analysis of what is
involved in making judgments about matters of fact. In this
chapter I discuss further his presentation of the genesis of
certain philosophical tenets that he sees as defining a false
conception of man. For he is not content to 'insinuate the
praises' of his own 'system' by decrying those of others [T
xiii]. Decry he certainly does, but he also wants to explain
the intellectual and psychological appeal of tenets upheld by
philosophy in ancient and modern times.
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section 2
reason and the imagination
The hound of scepticism does not appear immediately. In 'Of
scepticism with regard to reason', Hume's purpose is to advance
his theory of belief by showing that only on this theory can we
explain why a total suspension of belief is not possible. He
discovers that the division between dogmatists and Pyrrhonians
has been misrepresented by both parties. There are no real
Pyrrhonians, as one cannot doubt with the completeness that
they pretend to; and there is no sect of dogmatists or
'rational' creatures; that is only a misleading way of
describing certain animals - some of whom are more successful
than others at reasoning.
Whatever their differences, philosophers describe man as a
creature of reason [T413]. And in 'Of scepticism with regard to
reason' Hume turns again to this fundamental supposition. Even
the sceptics, he says, are at one with the dogmatists' belief
that the question of the sovereignty of reason is central. The
latter reject the sceptics' arguments by saying that if such
arguments are strong, then this is proof that reason has
authority; if weak, then they can never be sufficient to
invalidate all the 'conclusions of our understanding'. The
sceptic has a similar conception of reason: he believes that he
has arguments to show that it has no authority.
So what authority do the wise have? Surely, the sceptic
says, we ought to assess the probability of any judgment not
only by taking into account 'the nature of the object'; but
also by assessing the 'nature of the understanding' [T182].
This indeed is reflected in our giving weight to those who have
a good record in judging; and by giving less weight to the
pronouncements of the inconstant. Yet even philosophers can be
so judged:
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'In the man of the best sense arid longest experience, this
authority is never entire; since even such-a-one must be
conscious of many errors in the past, and must still dread
the like for the future' [ibidjj.
And this estimation must also be assessed: perhaps we have made
an error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of
our faculties? We may reassure ourselves: but this conclusion
would also be founded on probability, and so the validity of
our 'first evidence' is further weakened:
'and when I proceed still farther, to turn the scrutiny
against every successive estimation I make of my
faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual
diminution and at last a total extinction of belief and
evidence' T183].
But this does not happen: there seems to be a discontinuity
between the 'rules of logic' and belief.
And this in fact is why Hume is interested in the 'debate'.
He wants
'to make the reader sensible of the truth of my
hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and
effects are deriv'from nothing but custom; and that
belief is more properly an act oft?ie sensitT, than the
cogitatiVe part of our natures'TTT3].
He can attempt to make the reader sensible of this by arguing
that only on his theory can it be explained why belief is not
destroyed by the sceptics' arguments. For if we understand that
belief depends on the imagination we can explain why belief
does not disappear:
'Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and
facility, the same principles have not the same effect as
in a more natural conception of the ideas' [T185J.
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Thus although reason dictates that one ought to assess
probabilities ad infinitum, the mind pursues its own course.
The 'attention is on the stretch': the mind falls back on its
common judgments [ibid]. Hume returns to this issue in the
Conclusion to Book I:
'We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by
means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of
the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote
views of things, and are not able to accompany them with
so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more
easy and natural' {T268].
The effort that the mind expends in following a long train of
reasoning, detracts from the force of conviction: the effort of
thought disturbs the operation of our sentiments on which the
belief depends [T185].
Hume, then, tries to make the reader agree with his theory
of belief, by noting how it can explain aspects of our
experience that are, he thinks, inexplicable upon any other
hypothesis. Philosophical arguments cannot destroy all belief
for any length of time. Therefore, it seems, the dogmatical and
sceptical conception of the place of reason in common life is
utterly misguided. In so far as the wise reach correct
decisions, this is not because their beliefs are the
conclusions of an autonomous faculty of reason. Only, Hume
thinks, on his theory can we make sense of the survival of
belief. For
'if belief...were a simple act of thought, without any
peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of a force
and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in
every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment'
{T184].
Now by arguing that belief is dependent on the imagination,
Hume can detach himself from the issue of the sovereignty of
reason and suggest that the dogmatists and sceptics have
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misunderstood the relation between belief and reason. Any
'authority' that the dogmatists have is not due to rational
insight: it is, as we saw in the previous chapter, merely
because they are more successful than others in extrapolating
principles denoting resemblances between objects from the
myriad of ideas stored in their memory and from the impressions
of their senses. This indeed is to strike at the heart of the
philosophers' conception of themselves as quintessentially
rational beings. The sceptics, however, unwittingly provide
evidence for the theory that belief is founded on the
imagination. And viewing matters from this perspective reveals
that the sceptics too have been bewitched by this false picture
- for they cannot deprive us of judgment through using reason:
'Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has
determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel'
[T183]
Thus the sceptics think that the. cLaicc's c the. 	 te.ts
have no authority because reason has no authority; and, on
account of the crucial premise, they must present their
arguments as inescapably leading to the diminution and
vanishment of belief. But it just does not happen. One
consequence is plain: we have a sect pretending that they do
not believe in the certainty of anything. A fantastic sect has
been created: fantastic because they cannot put into practice
what they claim to believe. In the Dialogues concerning Natural
Religion, Philo does not demur at Cleanthes' description of the
Pyrrhonians as a 'sect of liars' [D137]. On the other hand, the
'dogmatists', are equally confused when they offer their
justification of 'reason'. So there is a certain harmony in
their ill-considered debate:
'The sceptical and dogmatical reasons are of the same
kind, tho' contrary in their operation and tendency'
[T187].
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Hume's purpose, then, in examining the dispute between
dogmatists and sceptics is far from being merely eirenic. Both
mistake the relation of reason and belief. That the dogmatists
make this mistake is not on the face of it surprising; but that
the sceptics do, shows the power of the false picture of
rational man. Hume wanted to sweep this away. So before the
publication of the Treatise, he wrote in a letter that
'Those who are accustomed to reflect on such abstract
subjects, are commonly full of prejudices; and those who
are unprejudiced are unacquainted with metaphysical
reasonings. My principles are so remote from all vulgar
sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place,
they would produce almost a total alteration in
philosophy: and as you know, revolutions of this kind are
not easily brought about' EL I 26].
In later chapters the import of his revolutionary approach
will be considered in relation to other issues, in morality, in
politics, and in religion. And there too we will see how he
believes that the issues have been misunderstood on account of
the dominance of a picture of man as a rational creature.
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section 3
Of scepticism with regard to the senses
At the beginning of 'Of scepticism with regard to the
senses', Hume says that the sceptic cannot doubt the existence
of body. Though we may well ask 'What causes induce us to
believe in the existence of body', but that there is body 'is a
point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings'
[T187]. Yet notwithstanding this early conviction, Humne ends
the section saying that he is 'at present of a quite contrary
sentiment' and is more inclined to 'repose no faith at all in
my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an
implicit confidence' [T217]. What happened?
In brief, what happened is this. The 'implicit faith' with
which Hut-ne begins the section is a necessity which functions as
a virtue. It is a necessity in that he thinks we cannot doubt
the existence of body, any more than, as seen in the previous
section, we can stop reasoning. It is a virtue in that it
allows him to employ an experimental method and ask about what
causes us to believe. However, that inquiry convinces him,
firstly, that the beliefs of the vulgar are false: we cannot be
directly acquainted with public objects. And secondly, that we
owe the opinion about the external world to the imagination. We
owe, therefore, the opinion to 'trivial qualities of the fancy'
such as our tendency to associate resembling perceptions
[ibid]. Doubting that this can lead to a 'rational system' is
doubting that he can make a contrast between 'the imagination'
and the 'fancy'. But as he has already shown to his
satisfaction the inadequacy of reason, the consequence is that
he is doubting we have reason to believe in the external world.
It seems, then, that his science of the imagination is not only
self-destructive - it destroys any reason we have to believe in
the external world.
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Or it would do were it not for another trivial property of
the fancy - the fact that we find it difficult to enter into
the remote views of things.
******
Hurne asks whether it is the senses, or reason,or the
imagination 'that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a
distinct existence' [T188]. It is, of course, the imagination
that he thinks produces the opinion, and it is this that
attracts his greatest interest. I will be proportionately brief
with the other 'faculties'.
The senses cannot give us a 'notion' of a continued
existence of body: they cannot continue to operate, even after
they have 'ceas'd all manner of operation' [ibid]. Nor can the
senses offer their impressions 'as the images of something
distinct, or independent, and external': for all they offer is
a single perception [T189].
Hume also treats the suggestion that reason could establish
the belief in a cursory manner. Philosophy teaches us that all
that 'appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception' [T193].
But the vulgar 'confound perceptions and objects', attributing
'a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they see'
[ibid]. The vulgar are therefore being unreasonable. Thus their
belief must arise from some other faculty than the
understanding [T193]. And if such a belief does not come from
the senses, then it follows, he thinks, that it must be owed to
the imagination.
Now not all impressions are dignified with the property of
a continued and distinct existence. The pain from a dog bite is
an obvious example of an impression not so dignified. So the
qualities of impressions that make us attribute to them such an
existence must arise, he reasons, from 'a concurrence of some
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of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination'
[T194]. We should look, therefore, for those circumstances that
lead us to attribute a continued and distinct existence to
impressions [T194].
Hume quickly alights on two characteristics observable in
the impressions to which we attribute a continued and distinct
existence. The first is that unlike, say, impressions of fear,
impressions of mountains and trees always appear in the same
order after the shutting of the eyes. They can be said to have
a constancy in this respect. But, of course, trees and even
mountains, change their shape. Even then, however, they show a
coherence with other impressions. We are accustomed o find
trees changing: we compare with past tree impressions and find
a coherency with our new impressions.
Hume speaks of the minds finding coherence as a 'kind of
reasoning from causation' [T195]. We saw, when we examined his
account of causation, that the mind is programmed to postulate
a connection between objects; and that it is in this way that
it reduces a myriad of impressions to a few principles. Now it
seems that arriving at a conclusion about the world 'as
something real and durable' can proceed upon the same lines
[T197].
The connections can be seen in the following example. As I
sit at the desk I hear on a sudden a clattering noise of the
telex. This gives rise to many new reflexions. First, I have
never observed that this clattering could proceed from anything
other than the telex. I therefore conclude that the present
phenomenon is a contradiction to all experience unless the
telex machine is still in the adjoining room. More than this,
when I turn to the telex and find my bookmaker's account printed
therein, I cannot explain this phenomenon unless I spread out
in my mind the continued existence of telegraph wires and
bookmakers, previously espied and stored in my memory. And so
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it seems that I am naturally led to 'regard the world as
something real and durable' [ihidlJ.
Yet such an attempt o the mind to reduce past and present
impressions to a few coherent principles is not, he thinks,
completely analogous to reasoning from causes to effects. The
reason is this: if we become accustomed to seeing the second
billiard move when hit by the first, we will draw a like
conclusion when presented with the experiment. But the case of
perceptions and objects is different. The whole point of
supposing that objects have a continued existence is to bestow
on them a greater regularity than observed in our perceptions.
This cannot be explained through custom - for we would then be
suggesting that a habit is 'acquir'd through what was never
present to the mind' [T198]. There must therefore also occur
the 'cooperation of some other principles' for the mind to
extend its conclusions beyond the effects of custom and
repetition [ibidil. To which end Hume turns to examine the
manner in which the constancy of certain impressions affects
the mind.
What, then, of the constancy of certain impressions? Will
this help explain how we can arrive at so 'extraordinary an
opinion' as the belief in the distinct and continued existence
of body? At this stage, still confident for his account of the
imagination, Hume thinks it will. He has, that is, already
discovered principles to which he can now turn. Thus in Part II
of Book I Hume had noted that of the three relations of
association, that of resemblance is 'the most fertile source of
error' [T61]. And now he repeats his 'general rule' that
'explains' why this is so. It is, he says, a principle 'of
great moment' that resemblance not only causes an association
of ideas, but that
'whatever ideas place the mind in the same disosition or
in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded [T203].
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And he finds it very easy to apply this maxim in the
present case. On the one hand, there is the disposition of the
mind that views any object that preserves a perfect identity:
no new image or idea is produced. On the other hand, there is
the experience of watching a succession of related objects: the
same disposition is found. In the latter case, the passage
between the 'related ideas' is so 'smooth and easy' and it
seems so like 'the continuation of the same action', that the
cause of the action is attributed to the same object:
succession is confounded with identity [T204]. Reason tells us
that the first impression of any object is annihilated on the
shutting of the eyes: but we naturally consider .
	 the sea at
Ti to be the same perception as -the sea at T2. The
contradiction is overcome by, 'supposing that these interrupted
perceptions are united by a real existence' [Ti99]. So the
existence of one relation, that of resemblance between
perceptions, leads us to add another resemblance between
objects; and so the postulation of the external world appears.
As I say, this is contrary to reason: the perceptions that
occur when we watch a succession of related objects are not the
same, however difficult it is for us to notice this. The mind,
therefore, attempts to dispel the contradiction through a
fiction of the continued existence of bodies. On this
'hypothesis', the perceptions are at once distinct and yet of
the same thing.
However, our tendency to confuse resembling perceptions is
not the only prior principle of the imagination which Hume
employs in the discussion. We saw when discussing his account
of belief that while the association of ideas makes reasoning
possible, it can also lead to error. For instance he thinks
that readers will reject his denial that necessity lies in the
objects. Why? Because we habitually conjoin the internal
impression of expectation and the external impression of the
appearance of the objects.
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'Nor is this all. We not only turn our thought from one to
the other upon account of their relation, but likewise
endeavour to give them a new relation, viz, that of a
conjunction in place, that we may render the transition
more easy and more natural' [T237; cE T167; cE T469].
And, of course, the place where necessity is supposed to 'lie'
is between the cause and the effect. We are not conscious in
our everyday life of this act of the mind:
''Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way of
thinking, to imagine they perceive a conriexion betwixt
such objects as they have constantly found united
together' [T223].
Nevertheless, it is in this way that 'fictions' are created.
Later, more examples of these fictions will be discussed; for
instance, the idea that there are 'occult qualities'. Such
notions are contrary to reason; they are the work of the
imagination.
Who believes this false doctrine about body? The
unphilosophical part of mankind, that is, all of us at one time
or another [T205]. There is, however, another theory, a theory
which he deriominates a 'palliative remedy' - the doctrine of
the simultaneous existence of perceptions and objects. This
though, is worse.
Hume says of the theory of double existence, or the
'philosophical system', that it is
'the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are
contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by
the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each
other' [T215].
What are the two principles? The first is the vulgar system,
the impetus to which has already been discussed. The second is
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the thought that resembling perceptions have no more a
continued than an independent existence. If the former is a
natural error, due to the effect that resemblance has upon us;
the latter opinion is available after only a 'little
reflection' [T214; cf E II 15211.
All sects bar the sceptics, hold to this system. But it is
absurd. As regards reason, the idea that we can draw a
conclusion about the cause of our perceptions is perfectly
hopeless. For all that is ever present to the mind are
perceptions - never body [T67-8; cf Chapter I, section 1]. So
we never bave any experience of a conjunction between these two
categories. And as regards the imagination: why should the
imagination proceed to a belief in 'another existence' merely
because it is faced with resembling perceptions? [T213].
Now what Hume has been doing in this section is 'reviewing'
'systems' about external existence in the hope that these
systems will reveal further truths about the nature of the
mind. This can be put in another way: he has been examining the
creation of opinion about the external world with the idea of
developing further his science of the imagination. In section 1
of Chapter I, it was mentioned that Hume examines the creations
of poets with the same aim. There is of course a major
difference. Studying poetry revealed the influence of the
association of ideas within the imagination: that there are no
winged horses is a premise of the study. Studying the causes of
our belief in the external world likewise reveals principles of
the imagination. But then we reflect that these are trivial
principles, and that the belief in the external world is
possible only because we falsely believe that objects and
perceptions are one and the same thing. Hume, then, began in a
cool scientific fashion; he ends by thinking that the
imagination is inadequate to the task. And if the imagination
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is inadequate, and reason is inadequate, then what reason do we
have to believe in body? Science leads to scepticism.
'at then can we look for from this confusion of
groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and
faishood? And how can we justify to ourselves any belief
we repose in them?' [T218J.
So after uncovering what he sees as contradictory
principles of the imagination, though he does not pretend to
rid himself of a belief in the external world, he reports that
he is at least 'inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my
senses, or rather imagination' [T217]. And this is an
expression of a scepticism that only 'carelessness and
inattention' can remedy [T218]. It is not only the sciences
that are founded on the imagination; paradoxically, as Manfred
Kuehn has suggested, so is scepticism [Kuehn p.40]. In section
5 I will discuss further this issue of the relation between
flume's scepticism and his explanatory ambitions.
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section 4
still more errors
In the previous section we saw the tangled webs we weave -
we saw more, that is, of how men are led into error, on account
of the way the imagination works. Such error occurs when
philosophers attempt to present man as a rational creature in
the traditional sense, distinguished from the animals through
his reason. In this section I want to discuss further Hume's
charting of this picture.
We can start with his explanation of particular concepts of
'antient philosophy' by noting his appeal to a projective
quality of the imagination. In Chapter VI we will see that the
same propensity enters into his explanation of the development
of religion. This latter point is not merely still more
evidence of the central role that Hume accords to this
propensity. For we shall see that Hume believes that religion
plays a powerful role in strengthening the hold that the false
conception of rational man has upon us.
Hume begins 'Of the antient philosophy' by making it clear
that he is not interested in arguing that 'substances and
substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities' are
fictions: he can introduce them as such {T219]. Rather, he is
interested in showing that however 'unreasonable and
capricious' such fictions are, they have 'a very intimate
connexion with the principles of human nature' [T220]. More
precisely, they have a connection with the principles of the
imagination.
It is important to note that the fiction of, say,
substance, however unnecessary in itself, arises from necessary
principles of the imagination. This is why it is at once
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'capricious' arid yet at the same time intimately linked with
the principles of human nature. What happens is this. When we
perceive 'several distinct successive qualities of objects' we
perceive no more of a change than if we had 'contemplated the
same unchangeable object' [T220]. The interrupted progress of
thought
'readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an
identity to the changeable succession of connected
qualities' [ibid].
When a philosopher considers the issue, a contradiction becomes
apparent. If the object is examined at two distinct periods,
the hitherto insensible variations become sensible 'and seem
entirely to destroy the identity' [ibid]. Thus there is a 'kind
of contrariety' according to point of view from which we survey
the object. In order to reconcile the contradiction,
'the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and
invisible, which it supposes to continue the same under
all these variations; and this unintelligible something it
calls a substance, or original and first matter' [ibidj.
Here, then,is a case of a creation of a fiction through our
thinking that the impression of identity has its origin, or
correlate, in the object.
Note that the explanation of the projective disposition
begins with an account of the resemblances: an ascription of
identity is possible because the mind does not discriminate
between successive points of time. It is only when we begin to
inquire that we realise how 'thought...readily deceives the
mind' [ibid]. But such discrimination provokes a contradiction:
and this seems to be solved with the feigning of an
unintelligible something called substance.
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Similarly, as we saw in the previous chapter, Hume explains
the prejudice against his doctrine of causation through the
inability to discriminate between the 'internal' impression of
expectation and the 'external' impression of the objects
themselves. The consequence is that we are led in our
reflections to 'imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt
the objects and the qualities' [T167].
Another idea that Hume seeks to explain in 'Of the antient
philosophy', is that of 'occult qualities'. When the vulgar
reflect on objects they have always found together, they
naturally 'imagine they perceive a connexion' between them
[T223]. Philosophers, however, proceed to 'search for the
qualities, in which this agency consists' [ibid]. They are
fated not to find the impression of necessity in the objects -
but this contradiction they seem to resolve through the
'invention of the words faculty and occult quality' [T224].
Once again a contradiction hidden by a fiction of the vulgar,
is brought out and seemingly resolved by another fiction. And
so the projective propensity explains the errors of the vulgar
as well as those of philosophers.
Hume's systematic employment of a few principles of the
imagination is also found in his discussion of the
'Peripatetics" error in believing that nature abounds with
'sympathies, antipathies, and horrors of a vacuum' [T224].
Generally, such errors are a consequence of being 'guided by
every trivial propensity of the imagination' [ibid].
Particularly, Hume speaks of
'a very remarkable inclination in human nature, to bestow
on external objects the same emotions, which it observes
in itself' [T224].
So here is another instance of the disposition to project. But
this time instead of our postulating a quality in the world as
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a consequence of our feelings - as with causation - man
sometimes goes so far as to confuse persons with objects and
give to objects attitudes. Such an absurdity, he says, is
indeed 'suppress'd by a little reflection' - it only takes
place 'in children, poets and the antient philosophers' [ibid].
This particular propensity can be suppressed. But the drive to
find an ultimate cause is so powerful that there is a
'prodigious diversity' of proffered accounts [T158]. The world
seems to Hume inhabited by a variety of ghosts of postulated
entities and properties.
Throughout the present work I have been trying to show how
Hume thinks that he can show how men construct a false
conception of themselves. The fiction of rational man, it
appears, is constructed out of various other fictions, such as
the idea that we have the 'capacity' to know 'powers'. Another
component is found in the claim 'of some philosophers' that we
are intimately conscious of what we call our SELF' [T251]:
'From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or
nature is simply to think, and which does not require any
place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist.
Accordingly, this 'I' - that is, the soul by which I am
what I am - is entirely distinct from the body, and would
not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not
exist' [Descartes (2) p.1271.
Hume thinks quite otherwise. Once again he sees the confident
assertions of philosophers about 'selves' as the consequence of
a natural mistake. Why is it a mistake? Though others, he says
ironically, may 'perceive something simple and continu'd',
'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I
call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love
or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at
any time without a perception' [T252].
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There is indeed no place for a permanent 'self' in Hume's
philosophy of mind; for as he says earlier in the Treatise:
'what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection
of different perceptions, united together by certain
relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with
a perfect simplicity and identity' [T207].
And in 'Of personal identity', he says that mankind are
'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions'
[T252].
What leads men to make the mistake? Why do we have so great
a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive
perceptions? Generally, it is the same mistake that is made
when discussing the identity of vegetables or animal bodies;
and indeed the same that we saw above in discussing
'substance': viz., we confuse a succession of related objects,
with identity:
'This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and
mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity,
instead of that of related objects' [T254].
We 'run into the notions of a soul, and self, and substance, to
disguise the variation' [ibid].
The question of personal identity, then, is unpacked in
terms of the imagination. How do we generate the fiction? Given
that we cannot 'observe some real bond' between perceptions,
the fiction must arise 'because of the union of their ideas in
the imagination, when we reflect upon them' [T260].
In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume withdraws this account.
He confesses he is bewildered, and cannot explain how we arrive
at a notion of identity [T633-636]. On the above account, what
this confession implies is that the principles of the
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imagination, which he thought could explain the creation of the
traditional picture of rational man, are inadequate to that
task.
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section 5
excessive and moderate scepticism
Hume, I suggested in the introduction to this chapter,
arrives at moderate scepticism by way of excesive scepticism.
He finds that he cannot doubt as the Pyrrhonians claimed they
could. What happens? He continues to philosophise: he is driven
by nature to philosophise, and if he can find no reason to
philosophise, he can find no reason not to philosophise. What
could be more pleasurable than a festival, asks Bayle, with
bitter irony, in suggesting that Catholics are ruled by their
passions [Bayle (2) p.276 ]. What can be more pleasurable, for
some, than philosophy, says Hume, without irony, in seeking to
show how he is ruled by his passions. But the sceptical crisis
to which his study of the imagination drove him is not indeed
without value; though, from now on, that value can be defended
only on the basis that that is how it appears to him. For he
discovers that the moderate scepticism consequent upon
excessive scepticism, and thus consequent to his study of the
imagination, is entirely suitable to the narrow capacities of
man.
I now want to discuss these matters in greater detail,
beginning with the contradiction that Hume seems to have
discovered between the senses and reason. I note that, as
Manfred Kuehn argues in his paper, 'Hume's Antinornies', this
contradiction should 'allow of being explained in terms of a
contradiction of the principles of the imagination' [Kuehn
p.33].
Philosophy tells us that unless certain ideas were enlivened
beyond others, we could not assent to any argument, nor believe
in the existence of external objects when absent from the
senses. However, this 'scientific' conclusion seems to lead us
to scepticism. The operation of the mind that leads us to
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believe in the existence of body is founded on the same
principle as that which enables us to reason from cause to
effect. But if we examine the former conclusion by the rules of
experimental reasoning, the rules, that is, pertaining to the
latter habit, we find no reason to support it. As he says:
'tho' these two operations be equally natural and necessary in
the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly
contrary' [T266]. One operation of the imagination contradicts
the other.
Hume refers us to 'Of the modern philosophy' in order to
illustrate his point. If secondary qualities, the great
'discovery' of 'modern philosophy', cannot have an independent
existence, then how can primary qualities have such an
existence? The idea of motion depends on an idea of a body
moving: it must thus depend on extension or solidity; it is a
compound idea, and so must at last 'resolve itself' into parts
that 'are perfectly simple and indivisible' [T228]. Either
these parts are coloured or solid or they are non-entities.
Colour is excluded from real existence - so we are left with
solidity.
But what idea can we have of solid bodies that is neither
that of coloured bodies nor that of extension or motion? It
cannot be dependent on these latter ideas, for they are
dependent upon it: that would be to reason in a circle. So they
must be coloured. This, though, is excluded by modern
philosophy. The conclusion is that we have no satisfactory idea
of solidity. Hume writes:
'Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our
reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt
those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those
that persuade us of the continu'd and independent
existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect,
we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell
have a	 and independent existence. When we
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exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in
the universe which has such an existence' [T231].
As well as this argument, there is the argument already
discussed in section 4 above drawn from 'Of scepticism with
regard to the senses'. Both arguments reappear in the Enquiry
where there is not the slightest attempt to weaken the force of
the scepticism. The chief difference is that in the later book
Hume does not present the problem in terms of the operations of
the imagination, and the enlivening of ideas. Instead Hume
rests content with speaking of a 'powerful instinct' that makes
men suppose that the image of the objects which they have are
copies of those objects [E I 151]. But such an opinion is 'soon
destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that
nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or
perception' [E I 152]. Yet how then can one prove that the
perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects? His
summary is blunt: if the opinion of external existence
'rested on natural instinct, [it] is contrary to reason,
and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural
instinct, and at the same time carries no rational
evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer' [E I
155].
In neither book, as Kuehn remarks, is a philosophical way to
avoid the 'manifest contradiction' even hinted at [Kuehn p.35;
T266]. In the Treatise, carelessness and inattention are
described as the only remedy [T218]. In the Enquiry he says
that
'This is a topic...in which the profounder and more
philosophical sceptics will always triumph' [E I 153].
And in the Treatise, he says that 'We have, therefore, rio
choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all' [T268].
Naturally, no guidance can be given about this 'choice' - much
less a definite answer. Yet in one sense, the 'solution' still
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lies in the imagination, though it is not indeed a theoretical
solution:
'For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the
present case. I can only observe what is commonly done;
which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought
of; and even where it has once been present to the mind,
is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression
behind it' [T268].
They do not have an influence; but we cannot establish that
they should not have such an influence. For this would be to
appeal to the very principle that seems to undermine all our
reasonings.
Thus whilst scepticism may haunt science, it is, in one
sense, itself founded on scientific investigations. Indeed, it
seems that the colonial aspirations of the theorist of the
imagination know no bounds: all conclusions, and now, in a
manner, all doubts, seem to return, by one road or another, to
the faculty of the imagination.
I now want to discuss another way in which scepticism is
founded on science or a study of the imagination.
The causes of the immoderate thought, that moderate
scepticism attempts to counter, have their fullest Humean
explanation if we take on board certain doctrines in Book II of
the Treatise. For instance, I will argue that Hume's thoughts
on man's social nature is relevant to understanding his work on
scepticism; and what is also relevant are certain general
principles of the imagination that can help explain the causes
of immoderation, including immoderation in philosophy.
Here, Malebranche's Search After Truth is relevant. For in
that work Malebranche discusses the causes of immoderate
thought and impediments to the progress of knowledge. I shall
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argue that Nlalebranche was a crucial influence on [-lume's
understanding of the value of scepticism. Needless to say,
however large is Hume's debt to Malebranche as regards
psychology, his epistemological conclusions are more than a
little different from those of that zealous defender of truth.
The chief point here is that a study of the sources of
dogmatism and immoderate thought provides reasons for thinking
that a moderate sceptical attitude is both useful and natural.
In particular, it can counter two tendencies of man which can
wreck, or at least impede, the sciences.
Firstly, we have a great desire for new objects. This, of
course, is also the origin of 'true philosophy'. Unless,
though, that propensity is moderated through a recognition of
our limits, and the self-knowledge that we always need to be
aware of those limits, we may be led into dangerous nonsense.
Whilst philosophy:
'contents itself with assigning new causes and principles
to the phenomena, which appear in the visible
world... [ superstition ] ...opens a world of its own, and
presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which
are altogether new' [T271; emphasis mine].
E{ere it seems likely that Eume was prompted by Malebranche's
work on learning and novelty. Malebranche had argued that
because man was made for a good that 'contains all other goods
within itself' - that is, God - we are never content with the
goods we have [Malebranche p.269]. Certainly a curiosity about
truth and the good is to be praised, says Malebranche; better
that 'than to remain in a state of false satisfaction by being
content with the illusions and false goods with which we
normally feed ourselves' [ibid p.278]. But what happens is that
we become tired of ordinary opinions and quickly confuse
novelty with truth. Men, he says,
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'attach the ideas of novelty and truth so closely that the
one can never be represented to them without the other;
and the more novel always appears to them as truer and
better than the more ordinary and common' [Malebranche
p.283].
The influence of Malebranche's pathology is also discernible in
the Enquiry:
'The imagination of man is naturally sublime, delighted
with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running,
without control, to the most distant parts of space and
time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has
rendered too familiar to it' LE I 162].
Now this appeal to the attractions of novelty has also a
theoretical foundation in Hume's own work on the imagination.
In Part III of Book II he argues that when the
'soul applies itself to the performance of any action, or
to the conception of any object, to which it is not
accustom'd, there is a certain unpliableness in the
faculties' [T422].
This is the source of wonder and surprise, and of all the
emotions that arise from novelty. As it enlivens the mind it is
agreeable in itself; moreover, the pleasure that it evokes is
transferred onto the passion that it attends. This is a
consequence of a principle to which I alluded in the
Introduction: 'that every emotion which precedes or attends a
passion, is easily converted into it' {T423]. I discuss this in
the following chapter, and we shall see how it enters into many
aspects of the Science of Man. As regards novelty, the
consequences of the principle are plain:
'Hence every thing, that is new, is most affecting, and
gives us either more pleasure or vain, than what, strictly
speaking, naturally belongs to it [T423].
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Men rush to welcome a new theory, a new notion, even a new
phrase. It is hardly surprising, then, that they should welcome
the new world that superstition reveals.
Here, then, is an instance of how a scientific study of the
imagination can provide reasons for thinking that scepticism is
useful and natural for the reflective person who wishes to
guard against error. For a moderate scepticism may discipline
us to withstand such inevitable pressures:
'While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we
believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will
fall or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves
concerning any determination, which we may form, with
regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of
nature, from, and to eternity?' [E I 162].
There is another non-rational factor, or rather set of
factors, which can disturb the process of enquiry almost as
much as the superstition. This set of factors gives us the
second main reason why a moderate scepticism should be seen as
useful and natural.
In the model of the imagination that is only fully revealed
in Book II of the Treatise, Hume says that 'opposition' can
affect a passion in two ways. (And belief, for Hue, is a kind
of passion). Where the opposition is perceived as
insurmountable, belief can be destroyed. An example of this
tendency is found in the Conclusion to Book I:
'All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho'
such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen
and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the
approbation of others' [T264-5].
Yet where it is perceived that the opposition is not
insurmountable, the passion may become more violent. For the
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'efforts, which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle,
excite the spirits and inliven the passion' [T421].
Moreover, in some dispositions the mind actually seeks
opposition,
'and throws itself with alacrity into any scene of thought
or action, where its courage meets with matter to nourish
and employ it' [T435].
Amongst the learned, the effects of these principles are
predictable:
'Disputes are multiplied, as if everything was uncertain;
and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth,
as if every thing was certain' [T xiv].
On the one hand, men are 'apt to be dogmatic' and throw
themselves precipitately into principles, to which they are
inclined' [E I 161]. On the other hand, the opposition which
they find increases this dogmatism in accordance with the
principle mentioned above: opposition makes the scholars
uneasy,
'and they think, that they can never remove themselves far
enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and
obstinacy of their belief' [E I 161].
Clearly, this is not a state of affairs that is very helpful to
the discovery of truth. Far from these scholars forwarding the
reason which they profess to hold so dear, they in fact bring
learning into disrepute. The 'rabble without doors' gather that
'all is not well within' [T xiv]. Hume concurred with their
judgment. He also thought that because of the arrogance and the
dogmatism of these scholars, it was not surprising that there
is a 'common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all
kinds' [ibid].
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Moderate scepticism, however, can discipline the scornful
scholars:
'could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the
strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its
most perfect state...such a reflection would naturally
inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish
their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice
against antagonists' [E I 161].
Moderate scepticism, then, can counteract, firstly, the
propensity we have to try and escape the drabness of life
through superstitious belief; and, secondly, the propensity to
dogmatism that can make learning unproductive and unpleasant.
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section 6
small world
The fact that Hume enjoys philosophising is an essential
part of his attitude to scepticism. For why should he give up
the innocent activities he enjoys? What is distinctly
unenjoyable, the sceptical crisis, is relieved by his
amusements. In a famous sentence, he says that he dines, he
plays a game of backganinion, he converses with his friends, and
when he returns to his speculations, they seem so 'cold, and
strain'd, and ridiculous' that he finds it impossible to
continue with them [T269]. Yet though Hume is well known (and
well loved) for thinking that, in life, philosophy is not
enough, he also thought that, for some, general amusements are
not enough. In the dramatic way of the Conclusion to Book I of
the Treatise, he explains how once again he feels attracted to
study. This time, though, he has learnt his lesson:
'Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have good
reason for my resistance; and will no more be led a
wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages,
as I have hitherto met with' [T270].
This time it is not into the 'subtlities and sophistries' of
scepticism into which he will plunge. It is the matter of
deciding on the passions, morality, art, and politics. He wants
to instruct mankind and make a name for himself in these
things: he wants, that is,to continue with the science of man.
From now on, his philosophy will take into account his
social and moral nature. Certainly, he will not pretend that
excessive scepticism can procure any benefit for his fellows.
'For here is the chief and most confounding objection to
excessive scepticism, that no good can ever result from
it; while it remains in its full force and vigour' [E I
160; cf T270].
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Hume wants to employ his philosophical talents for the good of
all. On the one hand, this orientation towards society will
save him from falling into the trap of excessive scepticism; on
the other hand, he has something to contribute to his society.
Such a contribution is partly a moral duty: it is precisely on
account of the superstitious bigotry of so many of the learned
that superstition has such a hold on many of the unlearned [cf
L I 48].
Now moderate scepticism can help.
Firstly, moderate scepticism changes the subject matter of
reason, from the 'intangling brambles' of metaphysics, to human
life. And only with such a change can scholars expect the
conversible world to take an interest in their work.
Secondly, a philosophical attitude that combats the
unpleasant dogmatism may thus decrease the impolite behaviour
that so often accompanies dogmatism. Who wants a philosopher in
their salon who not only hates his opponent's beliefs, but
hates his opponents as well? Hume hardly needs to make the
connection between these two hatreds, but he does [E L 161; L I
36 0]. Certainly, boorishness, arrogance and rancour are not
going to gain any respect from the conversible world. Moreover,
if the dogmatism is moderated, then even
'The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the
learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and
reflection, are commonly still diffident in their
determinations' [E I 161].
And even if the philosopher lives 'remote from business',
'the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by
several must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole
of society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art
or calling' [E I 10].
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Thirdly, a moderate scepticism may improve philosophical
prose. For their clannish and dogmatic dispositions lead
philosophers to believe that nothing is important other than
their own subject. The consequence is drawn in the essay 'Of
Essay Writing': because philosophy became 'shut up in cells she
not only became chimerical in her conclusions', but
'unintelligible in her style and manner of delivery' [G IV 368;
cf G I 243]. Her purveyors had no taste for life or manners'
and were without that liberty and facility of thought or
expression which can only be acquired by conversation [ibid].
Now Hume's desire to point out that inquirers should listen
to the arguments of others is a product of his own dialogue
with many thinkers; many of whom argued from premises which he
held in abhorrence. Perhaps the best sign of his willingness to
listen is found in the fact that many of his notions about what
it is that tends to hold up advances in knowledge come from a
Catholic priest.
•	 I argued in the previous section that Hume's highlighting
of the desire for novelty as a cause of error, is foreshadowed
in Malebranche's writings. What I will now argue is that Hume's
view of dogmatism as the other chief impediment to the
advancement of knowledge also owes much to Malebranche.
The general problem for Hume cannot be described as the
'passion of dogmatism'. Rather, certain dispositions lead to,
and express, dogmatic attitudes that are wholly inappropriate
for the advancement of knowledge. He speaks of the 'pride' of
the learned; their 'haughtiness'; their prejudice against
antagonists; their lack of modesty; the 'obstinacy of their
belief'; their lack of 'diffidence', 'reserve', 'caution' and
patience [E I 161-2].
For Malebranche seems to have been the first writer before
Hume to attempt to give an extended 'psychological' analysis of
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the causes of error. Certainly, in arguing for moderate
scepticism, Cicero had explained that men are all too likely to
follow the doctrines of their masters. People:
'in the first place are held in close bondage placed upon
them before they were able to judge what doctrine was the
best, and secondly they form judgments about matters as to
which they know nothing at the most incompetent period of
their life...[and]....
	
cling as to a rock to whatever
theory they are carried to by stress of weather' [Cicero
Academica ii: iii].
Nor, Cicero adds, is it just the effect of early learning that
leads men to ignore evidence. Men will 'defend tooth and nail
the system for which they have come to feel an affection'
rather than	 lay aside 'obstinacy' and	 seek oit the 'cttost
consistent doctrine' [ibid].
Montaigne also attempts to cure man of his dogmatism and
his 'passionate sectarianism' [Montaigne (1) p.70]. But he does
not attempt to study their causes in a systematic way.
Malebranche, as we shall now see, thought that learning is
held back on account of certain dispositions. And though he
does not address himself to the question of the opinion of the
polite world, he makes little secret of how he despises many of
his fellow scholars:
'how can we justify the passion of those who turn their
head into a library of dictionaries? They lose track of
their duties and affairs for the sake of a few useless
words' [Malebranche p.401].
Sometimes he admits to feelings of righteous anger:
'I cannot remain cairn at the thought that certain
universities...have become cliques that boast of studying
and defending the views of certain men' [ibid p.383].
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To be more systematic: in order to understand why Malebranc.he
considers that the learned are under particular temptations
which lead them into error, I will examine three books in
Search After Truth: 'The Imagination', 'The Natural
Inclinations', and 'The Passions'. Search After Truth of
course, is not only concerned with the errors of the learned,
but they - diligent, and not so diligent, travellers in dark
woods - go further in their errors than the rest of men [ibid
p.t37].
In speaking of the 'Imagination', Malebranche describes how
scholars can be so taken with another's opinion, that they
forget to worry whether that opinion is true. At bottom, the
cause of this is self-love:
'They draw their glory from the praises they give to these
obscure authors because they thereby persuade others that
they understand them perfectly, and this is a source of
pride to them' {ibid p.14.3; cf IbId p.1471.
Secondly, a person with a 'strong imagination' may be led to
dogmatism, as once he has 'imagined a system with a certain
probability', one 'cannot disabuse him of it'. These people
'jealously retain and preserve everything that can serve
in any way to confirm the system; and...they can hardly
perceive any objections brought against it' [ ibid p.152].
The third cause of ignoring the evidence, that Malebranche
offers in Book II, is the effect that those with strong
imaginations have on others. He speaks of the power some
authors have of 'persuading without arguments' [ibid p.173].
The prize, Hume was to say, is gained by eloquence and not
reason' [T xiv].
In Book II, 'The Natural Inclinations', Malebranche extends
his examination of the forces behind dogmatism. The first of
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the three natural inclinations, that he says we have, is the
inclination towards good in general. This appeared in the
discussion on novelty in the previous section. The second
natural inclination is that of self-love. One chief expression
of this is a love of grandeur [ibid p.228]. And it is not only
virtue and riches that seem to raise us above others; learning
seems to have this effect as well. However, the 'desire to
appear learned', writes Malebranche, not only makes men 'more
ignorant, but seems to subvert their reason'. In conversation
these 'counterfeit scholars' are apt to suddenly 'fly so high
that almost everyone loses them from sight, and often they
themselves do not know where they are' [ibid p.299]. They have
little interest in truth, but only in their opinions:
'they never speak with more ardour and conviction than
when they have nothing to say';
and the 'stronger and more judicious' opposing arguments are,
'the more it irritates their aversion and pride' [ibid p.300].
The third 'natural inclination' increases the sorry effects
of all the above factors. This inclination is our 'friendship
for other men' [ibid p.330]. This inclination is given us by
God so that our self-love will not 'weaken too much...[that
love ] ...which we have for things external to us' [ibid]. Most
unfortunately, it can have bad effects on learning. If a person
who has done us a favour, or has shown some affection for us,
or is one we believe to be 'virtuous or of significant
station', if such a person 'advances some proposition we
immediately allow ourselves to be persuaded without using our
reason' [ibid p.334]. Our defender of truth remarks:
'Thus do we make sport with the truth, making it serve our
own interests and embracing each other's false opinions'
[ibid p.335].
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In Book V. 'The Passions', Malebranche offers further
considerations on the prejudices and dogmatism of the learned.
The passion of wonder, he says, may cause error in others: the
facial expression of wonder in the listener encourages the
speaker to become quite satisfied with his thesis. The esteem
in which he is held causes him to 'assume a dominant and
decisive bearing'. Such people 'listen to others only by
jeering, they think only in relation to themselves' [ibid
p.378].
Thus their self-love, strengthened by the gazes of their
admirers, prevents them from impartially examining the evidence
for any proposition - so absorbed are they in the fact that
they themselves believe it. Malebranche remarks: 'Pride,
ignorance, and blindness will always go hand in hand' [ibid].
Now from Hume's point of view, the theological assumptions
with which Malebranc.he describes these knowledge thwarting
dispositions is quite out of place. Moreover, the method of
appealing to the 'imagination', the 'natural inclinations' and
the 'passions', Is uneconomic. He agrees that the dogmatist
inhabits a small world: but the construction of that world can
be explained through the imagination and the passions alone. He
agrees that that world wholly consists of those who share his
beliefs and the loathsome fools who do not. However, the
partiality of the learned; their haughtiness and impatience;
their tendency to respond to opposition with immoderate claims
(which may well be couched in unintelligible jargon) as well as
invective (which will probably not be unintelligible); all such
dispositions are to be explained through appealing to certain
principles of the imagination that have a far wider application
than as merely pertains to the life of learning. Certain of the
effects of these principles were mentioned in the previous
section - like the effect of opposition on belief. Later we
will be able to consider the principles in greater detail.
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If his explanation of the problem is completely secular, so
is his answer to that problem. Learning, he says, is held back
not by man's sinful nature, but by his undisciplined
imagination. Indeed, far from it being the case that knowledge
can be forwarded through our contemplation of ourselves as
fallen creatures who must pray for grace to overcome
debilitating faults, the very expression of that thesis
reflects our worst tendencies. Instead of God, Hume offers us
scepticism. So by the attempt to show how paltry the
achievements of reason are, he hopes to introduce 'diffidence',
to 'abate the pride', and'diminish the fond opinion' of
themselves that dogmatists have [E I 161]. The propensities to
dogmatism stand out far more clearly against the background of
doubt and uncertainty, than they do against the background of
theology. And when we have this self-knowledge, Hume thinks, we
may seek to detach ourselves from unhelpful influences such as
the 'authority' of Christian ministers - like Fr. Malebranche.
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section 7
sceptical principles
In this final section I will discuss two things. Firstly,
the relation between the scepticism recommended in the
Treatise, and that of the Enquiry. And secondly, how the
present interpretation differs from those of other
commentators.
So far I have been assuming that the scepticism recomnended
in both books is essentially the same. But according to Terence
Peneihum, Hume underwent a change of mind between these two
books. In both books, he says, Hume argued that 'the beliefs of
common life and the constructions of divinity are devoid of
rational justification' [Peneihum p.260]. But, says Peneihurn,
Hume disagrees with the Pyrrhonians whom he took to believe
that we should try and withhold assent from such beliefs. For
not only is it 'psychologically impossible' for us not to
assent to the beliefs of common life, but, far from producing
unperturbedness, such an attempt results in madness. What we
should do, interprets Peneihum, is to 'indulge our propensity
to philosophical thought to the minimum' [ibid].
It is in the nature of the recommendation, Penelhum says,
that Hume differs in the two books. In the Treatise Hume's only
restriction, as regards philosophising, is a restriction of
time. The restriction
'amounts to a recommendation to indulge in philosophical
speculation only on those occasions where we are minded to
do so' [ibid].
And as to the distemper that philosophy can arouse, Penelhum
comments:
'Its hazards are to be dealt with by making sure that we
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also participate actively in those social pursuits that
will distract us from the rarified doubts and wonders that
beset us in our studies' [ibid].
Whereas in the Enquiry, says Peneihum, the restriction offered
is not one of time, but one of subject matter: we should 'not
attempt to get above ourselves by treating of God, freedom, and
immortality' [ibid p.261].
Against this I would argue that Hume does restrict the
subject matter of the prescribed philosophy in the Treatise. He
wishes that 'the founders of systems' could have 'a share of
the gross earthy mixture' that characterises the minds of many
'honest gentlemen' in England [T272]. These gentlemen - and
here we see his restriction -
'have carried their thoughts very little beyond those
objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses'
[ibid].
They are 'always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing
themselves in common recreations' [ibid]; that is, their
thoughts do not go beyond common life. And it is common life
that provides the boundary in the Enquiry [cf E I 161]. To be
sure, the restriction in the Treatise is not so directly
expressed; but it is a restriction 1 nevertheless.
There are, though, differences between his attitude in the
two books. We saw above that in the Treatise Hume arrives at
his moderate scepticism after finding that he cannot doubt for
long the beliefs of common life, and he cannot give up the
practice of philosophising when he feels so inclined. Hume
discovers that he likes to philosophise; and he discovers that
riis attitude to philosophising will never be the same again
after his crisis. There is, that is, a path from Pyrrhonism to
a more moderate scepticism.
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In the Enquiry the emphasis is different: there is no
dramatic picture of a man struggling against the forces of
nature and then discovering himself to yield. There, the
limitations of human thought are described in a cool and
detached manner. Of the principles of Pyrrhonism he says:
'as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of
the real objects, which actuate our passions and
sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful
principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and
leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as
other mortals' [E I 159].
Nor is there in the Enquiry any description of Hume anxiously
searching for reasons to recommend a scepticism that he has
found himself holding after a Pyrrhonian crisis. But the upshot
is just the same:
'There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or
academical philosophy, which may be both durable and
useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this
Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its
undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by
common sense and reflection' [E I 161].
But whatever the difference of approach, both books suggest
that a moderate scepticism will be consequent to an excessive
scepticism.
An interest in such a progression is what the reader of the
earlier part of Book I Part IV of the Treatise might well
expect. As I suggested earlier in sections 3 and 4 above, Hurne
evidently valued the way his study of the imagination could
explain the evolving of philosophical ideas. The last species
of thought examined in such a manner is scepticism. The reason
it is last is that scepticism is consequent to the study of the
imagination; and though it threatens to undermine the study,
the practical response that arises makes possible a continued
faith in conclusions about such progressions. Without that
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response, there would be no reflection on the path to moderate
scepticism; for without that response,
'All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and
men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of
nature, unsatisfied put an end to their miserable
existence' [E I 16Oj.
The possibility of reflection on scepticism is not the only
result of the progression. Now, fully convinced of our narrow
capacity for understanding, we will be sceptical about our
previous as well as present as well as future conclusions. And
this involves being sceptical about scepticism itself.
Sometimes we should give way to our inclination to be positive:
'Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some
propensity, it ought to be assented to' [T 270].
For Hume, if not for us, this includes his writings earlier in
the Treatise. Thus in the final paragraph of Book I of the
Treatise he says that we should yield to the propensity to be
'positive and certain in particular points, according to the
light, in which we survey them in any particular instant'
[T273]. We should, that is, be sceptical of our sceptical
doubts, and not pretend that we can either deny our inclination
to do philosophy or that we can always doubt. Thus Hurne
discovers in the Treatise, and states in the Enquiry, that
nature is too strong for PyrrhonIan principles.
I will now turn to the question of other interpretations.
As well as Penelhum, I shall briefly discuss Barry Stroud's and
Sir Peter Strawson's accounts.
In Peneihurn's version, Hume's scepticism
'is the main thrust of the epistemological part of the
philosophical propaedeutic to his psychological account of
the sources of our cognitive commitments. Its purpose is
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to show us that it is not because we have good
epistemological reasons to do so that we make these
commitments, since ordinary men do not have such reasons,
and philosophers have been unable to invent any' [Peneihum
p.255].
This seems to me quite wrong. 'Hume's scepticism' is not a very
exact way of speaking; but the scepticism that first arises in
'Of scepticism with regard to the senses' cannot be said to
have a 'purpose'. Indeed, that such 'conclusions' have no
'purpose' is, we saw above, the main objection with which
others present the sceptic. Far from being a preliminary to
higher learning, it is the consequence of his investigation of
the principles of the imagination; and it threatens 'to turn
into ridicule rnall our past pains and industry, and to
discourage us from future enquiries' [T266]. These latter words
of Hume may serve to remind us of his ambitions. It is perhaps
only when we put ourselves in his shoes, and caasLde tL
ambition to found the sciences on a few simple principles that
we can appreciate something of the shock that he discovered in
finding that these principles seem contradictory.
Another influential writer on Hume is Barry Stroud. In
Hume, Stroud's view of the relation between Hume's scepticism
and his 'naturalism', is that the 'powerful negative arguments
have an important positive point': the purpose of the sceptical
arguments about belief in matters of fact, is to show that
'reason, as traditionally understood, has no role n 1numan
life' [Stroud p.14]. If man was the rational creature that he
is traditionally supposed to be, then Hume's arguments would
show 'that no rational man could ever believe anything' [ibid].
But we do believe, and therefore the role of reason in human
life has been radically misunderstood.
Now what seems to me to be completely lacking in this
interpretation is, firstly, a recognition of the seriousness
with which Hurne takes his sceptical views; and secondly, the
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recognition that scepticism is a product of Hume's scientific
or naturalistic endeavours.
One reason for Stroud's downplaying of Hume's scepticism is
the need he perceives to counteract the opinion of Hume as
'the arch sceptic whose primary aim and achievement was to
reduce the theories of his empiricist predecessors to the
absurdity that was implicitly contained in them all along'
[ibid p.1].
Hume's 'theory or vision of man' is much more, says Stroud,
than 'the clever negativism of a man at the end of his
intellectual rope' [ibid]. This is certainly true: but what
seems apparent from the above is that if we attend to the
scientific element in his thought - above all as it is
expressed in his conclusions about the imagination - we find
that we cannot characterize the results in terms of the
'unbounded optimism of the enlightenment' as Stroud does
[ibid]. For to repeat what was said above: the threat of
excessive scepticism is permanent. It is
'a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must
return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away,
and sometimes may seem entirely free from it' [T218].
In Skepticism and Naturalism: some varieties Strawson
argues that 'we might speak of two Hume's: Hume the skeptic and
Hume the naturalist' [Strawson (2) p.12]. Thus Strawson
considers that when Hume remarks, for example, that 'Nature, by
an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to
judge as well as to breath', Hume is taking 'refuge from his
skepticism' [T183; Strawson (2) p.12]. According to Strawson,
'Hume the naturalist' would have us neglect sceptical arguments
'except, perhaps, in so far as they supply a harmless
amusement, a mild diversion to the intellect' [ibid p.13].
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This, though, is to miss the fact that after the sceptical
crisis, Hume argues that
'if we are philosophers, it ought only to be on sceptical
principles' [T270].
His experimental work, Hume now understands, should be carried
out on sceptical principles. It is precisely because he is now
sceptical that he finds no reason not to follow his
inclinations and continue to write the philosophy which he
enjoys. This is no refuge from scepticism: it is the only
effect scepticism can have on him given his passions. Moreover,
the same point applies in common life:
'If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis
only because it costs us too much pains to think
otherwise' [ibid].
It also costs him pains, because he happens to be constituted
so as to care for others, to think that the desire for novelty,
and the temptation of dogmatism, are at once creating misery
through superstition, and ruining progress in the sciences. He
has arrived at, and recommends, a moderate scepticism.
The idea that there are two Humes seems wrong: one is
surely enough. The two Hume idea leads us to miss the point
that Hume now sees his 'naturalism', notwithstanding the
confidence of other inquirers, in the light of sceptical
principles: ultimately, he cannot justify his conclusions. And,
furthermore, to miss the point that he now sees his sceptical
principles, notwithstanding what other sceptics have claimed,
in the light of the fact that he cannot doubt for long and
finds himself drawn to philosophising on experimental
principles. No 'refuge' is needed because, as has been
mentioned, Hume finds himself sceptical about scepticism.
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Chapter III
The Passions
introduction
In this chapter I shall discuss how Hume thinks that the
imagination is central to the most economic account of the
production of the passions. This does not mean, though, that
Book II of the Treatise, 'Of the Passions' and A Dissertation
on the Passions are my only concern. For the role he ascribes
to the imagination in the production of the passions is best
understood in the context of particular issues.
So for example, when I discuss sympathy in sections 2 and
3, I consider three matters. Firstly, the more technical side
of his discussion. The process that he denominates 'sympathy'
occurs when there is a conversion in the imagination of an idea
to an affection. Secondly, I make a very brief comparison
between the way that Hume grounds his doctrine of sympathy on
experimental principles; and the way that Cicero and
Shaftesbury place the social nature of man at the centre of
their philosophies without adhering to experimental principles.
I illustrate the gains that Hume thought an experimental
philosophy bring through noting how he believes such principles
enable him to refute those such as Mandeville who deny the
natural sociability of man.
Thirdly, I argue that the way that the phenomenon of
sympathy is presented in a very different way in the Second
Enquiry, is a reflection of a general change in outlook, but
not a change in principles. I suggest that Hume's conception of
the responsibilities of a philosopher - above all in relation
to religion - made him attempt to overcome the general distaste
for his work that the reading public had shown; and this by
leaving out of the Enquiry many of his beliefs; pre-eminently,
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his beliefs about the role of the imagination. I consider, in
the course of the argument, certain unjustifiable attacks on
Hume's personal integrity.
It is well known that Hume wants to reject the picture of
man whose actions are governed by reason. But little attention
has been given to his attempt to explain variations in actions;
variations which under the rejected picture are explained by
talk of strong or weak reason. He tackles the problem of
variations by means of his account of the interaction between
the imagination and the passions. It is here that I most fully
discuss what I call the Principle of the Conversion of Passion,
which was mentioned in section 5 of the previous chapter. I
illustrate it through reference to arguments that Hume employs
in fields as diverse as commerce, marriage, and art.
1a4
section 1
preliminaries and analogies
The relation Hurne perceives between the imagination and the
passions has been virtually ignored by commentators. For
example, in what has long been the standard book on Hume and
the passions, Pill A'rdal's Passion and Value in Hume's
Treatise, the imagination does not warrant so much as an entry
in the index. An important exception to this neglect is John
Wright's book, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Wright
makes, I believe, some invaluable points. He suggests that if
we want to find what really distinguished Hume's philosophical
outlook from his predecessors and contemporaries, we should
note what Hume says in the Abstract:
'if any thing can intitle the author to so glorious a name
as that of an inventor, 'tis the use he makes of the
principle of the association of ideas, which enters into
most of his philosophy' [A 661-2].
Hume, Wright points out, goes on to note that it is 'by means
of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions' [A
6 62 ]. And Wright writes:
'Reason is the slave of the passions; but Hume clearly
also believes that the passions are themselves the servant
of the imagination' [Wright (1) p.209].
In a moment I want to illustrate the significance of this
belief of Hume's through considering his theory of sympathy. It
is a phenomenon of considerable importance in Hume's writings.
The way in which we 'receive by communication' the
'inclinations and sentiments' of others, Hume says, is the most
'remarkable' quality of human nature [T316]. It is remarkable
in itself: we will see how Hume believes that his discussion of
sympathy and the imagination confirms his conclusions about
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belief. It is also remarkable 'in its consequences' [ibid] : so
in Chapter IV we shall see that our propensity to sympathise
with others is at the centre of his explanation of morality;
and in Chapter V, when we turn to his political writings, we
find that it is the indisciplined sympathetic propensities of
the imagination that threaten, and always will, threaten, to
corrupt political judgment. Again, in Chapter VI, where Hume's
account of the development of religion is examined, I argue
that he places man's cantonising tendency near the heart of that
account.
But what has the 'imagination' to do with the passions? The
answer is that it controls the relations that lead to a
passion. Consider, for instance, his discussion of pride.
The causes of pride, Hume says, can be regarded from two
aspects. On one side there are the qualities that operate.
These, Hume finds, produce the sensation of pleasure or pain
independently of whether anyone is prouã ol t}ierz. So mit
gives us pleasure, 'by its very appearance' 1T285 ']. On the
other side, there are the subjects where we find the qualities.
These, Hume finds, are 'related to self' [T286]. It is the
beauty of	 person that produces pride in me.
Now together with these suppositions about the causes of
pride, Hume presents two established properties. Firstly, the
object of pride is self; and nor can we ever lose sight of that
object when actuated by pride. Secondly, he discovers in the
passion of pride its own 'sensation' - pride is a pleasant
sensation, and humility a painful sensation.
With the above in hand Hume reports how the 'true system
breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence' [T286]. There
is a double relation: on the one hand there is a relation of
ideas within the imagination: the cause of the passion is
related to the object of the passion. For example, the beauty
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of the house I own is related to my self, the object of the
passion of pride. On the other hand there is a relation of
impressions. The sensation of pleasure that the beauty of the
house provokes is related to the sensation of the passion.
It is from this 'double relation of ideas and impressions'
that the passion is derived:
'The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative;
and the one impression into that, which resembles and
corresponds to it' [T286-287].
Here we see breaking in upon us nothing less than the central
role Hume gives to the imagination in the production- of the
passions.
As with judgment, the notion of a conversion is crucial to
his account. One idea is converted into another: and one
impression is converted into another. Hume reminds the reader
of how such a conversion is supposed to take place within the
imagination when he reports how a consideration of 'the nature
of relation' convinces him of the correctness of his account
[T288]. Here the reference is to a 'natural relation'
'that quality, by which two ideas are connected together
in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the
other' [T13].
Now the imagination controls the passions in a manner
analogous to the way that it controls belief. Thus after
introducing the doctrine of the double relation of impressions
and ideas, Hume suggests that the 'great analogy' between it
and his account of judgment is 'no despicable proof of both
hypotheses' [T290]. In each case the imagination is at the
centre of the process: in judgment there is a present
impression and a related idea: the present impression gives
vivacity to a related idea. In the production of the passions
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we find that there is also a conversion within the imagination.
T'tis time, though, there is a double conversion.
Just as Hume finds a 'great analogy' between the production
of pride, and judgments in matters of fact; so does he find a
great analogy between judgment and sympathy. He was evidently
proud tiat he iad reduced seemingly disparate things to the
work of one faculty.
The conversion that occurs in the imagination which makes
sympathy possible is from an idea of an affection to the
affection itself. Hume thinks that what happens is this: 'the
idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately
present with us' [T317; cf T320; cf T34'3]. The vivacity of this
conception will be transfused into any related idea. Now, in
the same way as the laws of association control belief, so they
control tds conversion. This	 ans that 'a aa oi	 to
come to have a passion if we have an idea of a passion in a
person resembling us; or contiguous to us; or in a relation of
cause and effect as when the person is a blood relation. To he
sure, we will not always, as it were, 'adopt' the passion we
observe. For example, Hume notes that anger in another 'throws
a sudden damp' on the observer. Nevertheless, the stronger the
relation is, the easier is the transition within the
imagination. Later, I will try to show how Hume employs such
principles in 'is essays and in the History of England.
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Section 2
sympathy and experimental principles
One way which we can appreciate the originality of Hume's
work on sympathy is by contrasting it with comparable writings
of predecessors who we know he read and valued. What is
particularly striking in such comparisons is how he attempts to
explain sympathy on experimental principles.
In De Officiis, a work ihich Hume, speaking metaphorically
of course, said that he 'had in his eye' during the writing of
Book III, Cicero speaks of the 'brotherhood of the entire human
race'; this is created by thought and speech, communication and
discussion [ L 1 33; De Officiis I xvi 50]. But Cicero also
recognises how men are united through affections. So honour
(honestum) 'kindles a fellow feeling for those whose character
it adorns' [ibid I xvi 55]. Like Hume, Cicero distinguishes
between gradations of fellow-feelinc. There is the tie of 'our
cor-imon humanity'; hut there is a 'closer alliance between those
who belon to the same nation or tribe and speak the same
language: still closer is the tie between members of the same
state'. Yet 'closer still is the union of kinsmen' [ibid I xvi
53].
Hume was to agree in the gradations, and yet make it clear,
(in the Treatise at luast), that such affection depends on a
process of communication. So in Book II of that work he
explains that it is on account of the ease with which we enter
into the affections of our relatives that we love them the most
[T353]. And in Book III, further gradations are shown:
'An Englishman in Italy is a friend: A European in China;
and perhaps a man wou'd belov'd as such, were we to meet
him in the moon' [T482].
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Another predecessor who sought to outline man's social
nature was Shaftesbury. In the 1742-8 editions of 'Essays,
Moral, Political and Literary', Hume draws our attention to
this in a most direct way. He says in 'Of the Dignity or
Meanness of Human Nature' that
'it has been prov'd beyond Question by several great
Moralists of the present Age that the social Passions are
by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the
other Passions receive from them their chief Force and
Influence. Whoever desires to see this Question treated
with the greatest force of Argument and Eloquence, may
consult m Lord SHAFTESBURY'S Enquiry concerning Virtue'
{G I 154n]
And indeed, in response to the writings of Hobbes on the one
side, and the Calvinists on the other, Shaftesbury affirmed the
social affections as the defining mark of human nature. Yet as
we shall see, there is in Shaftesbury no patallel of Rue's
attempt to show that affections are controlled by the
imagination. So whilst Hume recognises that it was Shaftesbury
who first explicitly attempted to found ethics on the
'particular fabric and constitution of the human species' [Eli
169-170], from his own point of view, Shaftesbury's method is
inadequate.
Shaftesbury says that his philosophy is based on
observation, in particular, self-observation, or the 'habit' of
turning 'the eye inwards'. He denounces the 'moon-blind wits
who allow us to 'know nothing beside what we can prove by
strict and formal demonstration' [Shaftesbury (1) I p.286-287].
Against such philosophy, he calls for self-knowledge proceeding
from observation: a plain home-spun philosophy, of looking into
ourselves, may do us wondrous service' [ibid I p.31;c.f.I
p.234]
Shaftesbury conceives of his own philosophy as essentially
practical and orientated towards self-understanding. Just as
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Hutcheson attempted to fill his Glasgow students with a love of
virtue, so did Shaftesbury attempt to inspire his readers.
Philosophy is the 'study of happiness' [Shaftesbury (1) II
p.150]; and happiness can only be attained if we release the
great potential given by our social affections. Shaftesbury has
a Stoical conception of philosophy as the art of life. If
philosophy is the study of happiness, and man is a creature who
is naturally inclined to be happy, it follows, he thinks, that
'every one, in some manner or other, either skilfully or
unskilfully' philosophises [ibid]. And he contrasts this
outlook with philosophers that have 'dealt in ideas and treated
formally of the passions in a way of Natural Philosophy'[Ibid I
p.189]. Such philosophers show, he says, no more self-command
than others; and less, of course, than those who follow the
'self-conversant practice' that he himself recommends [Ibid I
p.190].
For what Shaftesbury is interested in are the ends of man.
He abhors that philosophy which neglects those ends to
concentrate on man as a 'mechanical' creature. This is brought
out in a conceit which begins with a visit to a watchmaker. If
the visitor should inquire about the metal from which the
watches were made, and inquire about the sound,
'without examining what the real use was of such an
instrument, or by what movements its end was best
attained, and its perfection acquired; 'tis plain that
such an examiner as this would come short of any
understanding in the real nature of the instrument' [Ibid
I p.190].
So a philosopher who took to the study of the 'effects each
passion wrought upon the body; what change of aspect or feature
they produced' might be qualified to 'give advice to an
anatomist', but not to mankind:
'since according to this survey he considered not the real
operation or energy of his subject, nor contemplated the
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man as real man, and as a human agent, but as a watch or
common machine' [Ibid I p.191].
Shaftesbury, then, bids us to examine our own passions; but
scorns any reduction of man to an object of scientific study.
The ends that he finds set for man are happiness through
virtue.
But for Hume answers are not to be found in self-
observation. If I attempt to find, he says, answers to
questions in moral philosophy through engineering an
experiment, the
'reflection and premeditation would so disturb the
operation of my natural principles, as must render it
impossible to form any just conclusions from the
phenomenon' [T xix].
Instead, a 'cautious observation of human life' is needed:
knowledge of ourselves, that is, is gained through observing
others [ibid].
Moreover, Hume rejects the teleological thinking that
informs Shaftesbury's work. What is the end of man, he asks in
a letter to Hutcheson. Is he created for happiness or for
virtue; for himself or for his maker? Such questions, ze says,
are endless '& quite wide of my purpose' L I 33T1. They would
not have seemed endless to the Christian Hutcheson.
We can see the explanatory force that Hume finds in his
account of sympathy if we consider how he thinks that it
enables him to overcome the debate between those who consider
man as motivated by selfish desires alone, and those, like
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who consider him as essentially
benevolent.
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Mandeville had argued that society is not made possible
through altruism, but through man's need for survival and
comfort. Those who hold that man is naturally virtuous are, in
a manner, victims of the politicians who invented the language
of virtue in order to better control the passions of the
people. Thus he writes in 	 The Fable of the Bees that
politicians made use of flattery in order to distil from man's
pride a desire of being considered virtuous. They began to
instruct men in the
'Notions of Honour and Shame; representing the one as the
worst of all Evils and the other as the highest good to
which mortals could aspire' [Mandeville p.29].
Hume believes that a study of morality based on
experimental principles will lead us to reject such a thesis as
well as those of Hobbes and the Epicureans. Moreover, such an
account can firmly ground the existence of altruism in a way
that fine rhetoric in defence of virtue cannot.
If we consider how he explains the love between relatives
we can see what distinguishes his work from the attacks of
various other writers on the selfish theorists.
Earlier it was noted how the association of ideas controls
the transition of vivacity in the imagination, and thus the
production of the passions. Now the love of a relation is
generally stronger than that of an acquaintance, and Hume
explains this not by positing a distinct passion but by
considering the factors that tend to excite the passion of
love.
There is the tie of blood. This 'produces the strongest tie
the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their
children' and a lesser degree of the same affection for more
distant relatives [T352]. The relation here is that of cause
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and effect. Other relations, it may be inferred, will also be
relevant. Relatives are more likely to be contiguous to a
person than others; a family resemblance will also facilitate
the production of the passion.These relations make the
transition between the idea of,say, laughter in the relative,
and the idea of oneself, far easier than in the case of a
stranger.
In general, such communication is responsible for the love
that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson considered as explained by a
natural affection between men. But Hume denies, in the
Treatise, the existence of such an affection 1TL81'. If we
prefer the company of men to that of stones and computers, this
is because of particular effects of company. The experimental
method displays man as an object of a certain sort: a
'rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who
communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us
privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us
see, in the very instant of their production, all the
emotions, which are caus'd by any object' [T353].
Such are the effects of company. The consequence is that we
come to love those with whom we can readily syrnpathise 	 in
this manner. And such sympathy is facilitated by the relations
mentioned. It is also facilitated through 'acquaintance': for
custom 'facilitates the entrance, and strengthens the
conception of any object' [ibid].
If we place the tendency that the relations have together
with the phenomenon of acquaintance, we can see why relatives
are objects that will tend to produce the passion of love to a
greater degree than other objects:
'For as the company of strangers is agreeable to us for a
short time, by inlivening our thought; so the company of
our relations and acquaintance must be peculiarly
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agreeable, because it has this effect to a greater degree,
and is of a more durable influence' {T353].
If this is the cause, love is the effect.
So in contrast to those who just affirm the existence of
affections, Hume attempts to explain their production by
appealing to the faculty of the imagination and particular
circumstances. Circumstances, that is, which excite a passion
of love [T351]. And as regards those who want to reduce
affections to self-love, the message of the Treatise is plain:
here is an explanation of affections conducted on experimental
principles.
Thus the thesis of Mandeville is 'not consistent with
experience' [T578]. Politicians, that is, are not the cause of
our sense of morals. If men did not have such sentiments as I
have been noting Hume explaining, they 'cou'd never be excited
by politicians'; indeed, such words as 'laudable' and
'praiseworthy' 'blameable' and 'odious', Hume remarks, would-be
no 'more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly
unknown to us' [T579; cf T500].
In the Second Enquiry, the detailed account of sympathy
that rests on his conception of the imagination is absent. Why
is this so? I will argue that we should not conclude that Hume
decided that his reasonings on sympathy and the imagination
were wrongkBut that he was led to question the propriety of
such speculations. As this matter is of a great importance for
understanding the relation between Hume's earlier and later
work, it seems to deserve a section of its own.
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section 3
Hume the moralist
At the end of Book III of the Treatise, Hume remarks that
even the most 'cold and unentertaining' speculations about
human nature, will, if they are accurate, become 'subservient
to practical morality' [T621]. What does he mean? This question
cannot be properly answered before we examine his moral theory
in full. Nevertheless, we have already seen, in his refutation
of Mandeville's thesis, something of how Hume's often very
technical work has implications for moral practice. 1-lume
believes that he has discovered prinèiples that have
experimental confirmation. Moreover, these principles of the
imagination receive additional support from their utility in
explaining seemingly quite different phenomena, such as belief
and the production of passions. The observations of
Shaftesbury, for all their worth, do not have the same
experimental foundation.
But as I remarked above, there is a difference between the
Treatise and the Second Enquiry with regard to the doctrine of
sympathy. What that difference is, and why there is a
difference is the subject of the present section. We shall see
that these questions cannot be answered in isolation.
Ernest Mossner's article 'Philosophy and Biography'
contains a number of more or less shameful remarks from James
Boswell, John Stuart Mill, J.FLRandall and V.Kruse. Boswell
said of Hume that 'vanity, as a fascinating mistress, seized
upon his fondness, and never quitted her dominion'; Mill
thought Hume 'enslaved by a taste for literature...which
without regard for truth or utility, seeks only to excite
emotion' [Mossner (2) p.8]. V.Kruse argues that this love of
fame led Hume to suppress 'his most radical ideas in order to
be better appreciated by the public' [ibid p.9]. J.H.Randall
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says that his real motives included not only a love of literary
fame, but also a desire for money [ibid].
One is led to gasp at the extent of the biographical
knowledge that the latter two writers seemingly possess. Kruse
refers us to the characters of Kant and Spinoza as helpful
contrasts. Randall contrasts Hume with Spinoza and Berkeley.
But whatever their knowledge of these other philosophers, there
is little evidence that their conclusions about Hume are
grounded on the firmest of evidence.
The case for the prosecution in the question of 'unworthy
motives' includes the claim that the Enquiries represent an
attempt to seduce the public into admiration. In defence of
Hume, it will be argued that his overriding, in the Second
Enquiry, of his earlier views on sympathy and the imagination
is quite consistent with his views on the role of the
philosopher presented in the Treatise.
Moreover, the presentation of the social affections in the
Enquiry, is, whilst different, still consistent with the
content of the Treatise. In the previous section we saw how
Hume claims an experimental foundation for his theory of
sympathy. In the Enquiry too, he suggests that we should
'reject every system of ethics...which is not founded on fact
and observation' [E II 175]. The great difference, though, is
that in the Enquiry Hume decides to present more accessible
general principles than are found in the Treatise. This, I
shall argue, is partly to facilitate the expression of the more
robust moral instruction found in the Enquiry. The slightest
acquaintance with the two books is enough for one to appreciate
that though the repudiation of Christian ethics is implicit in
the Treatise, there is nothing comparable to the revolutionary
tone of the later book.
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This can be seen if we place together the final pages of
the two books. In the earlier one Hume brings out what has been
implicit throughout: that one's 'inward satisfaction' entirely
depends on one's observance of the 'social virtues'; 'and that
a mind will never be able to bear its own survey, that has been
wanting in its part to mankind and society' [T620]. But he
quickly pulls himself up from 'such reflexions', insisting that
though the 'anatomist' of human nature is fitted to give advice
to the 'painter', he ought never to emulate him [ibid]. 'Such
reflexions require a work a-part, very different from the
genius of the present' [ibid]. In other words, the task of the
student of human nature must not be confused with that of the
moralist and preacher - though the advice that the former can
give means that 'however cold and unentertaining' it may be,
such philosophy becomes 'subservient to practical morality'
[T621].
Hume seems to have been fond of the ariatomist and painter
analogy. He uses it in a letter to Hutcheson in 1739 when
responding to Hutcheson's remarks on a draft of Book III. What
affected Hume the most, he says, is Hutcheson's observing 'that
there wants a certain warmth in the Cause of Virtue,which, you
think, all good Men wou'd relish, & cou'd not displease amidst
abstract Enquirys' [L I 33]. Hume suggests that an
'Anatomist...can give very good Advice to a Painter', but just
as the former cannot make the figure graceful, nor can the
'Metaphysician and the Moralist' be 'united in the same work'
[ibid]. A 'warm Sentiment of Morals' would be 'esteem'd
contrary to good Taste'. Nevertheless, he hopes to make a 'new
Tryal' to see if it be 'possible to make the Moralist and
Metaphysician agree a little better' [ibid].
It seems probable that this 'new Tryal' resulted at least
in the addition of the passage from the closing pages of the
Treatise that we have just seen; Hume uses the conceit, that
is, as if Hutcheson was unfamiliar with it. Nevertheless, this
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effect another 'new Tryal', we can see that Hume's practical
stance is there far more clearly delineated. It is the
practical orientation of his work, I shall argue, that should
lead us to reject, with vehemence, the smug moralising of some
of his critics.
Hutcheson's desire to see more 'Warmth in the Cause of
Virtue' is in keeping with what we know of his character and
work. Just as his great teacher Shaftesbury would throughout
his writings eloquently praise the virtuous life, so would
Hutcheson attempt to inspire his students at Glasgow. His
biographer W.R.Scott writes:
'He did not confine himself to the mere teaching of
Philosophy, but aimed at making his students moral men, in
other words his work included more of the art than the
Science of Ethics' [Scott p.64].
Yet however much Hutcheson was a friend of the Moderates, and
however tried he was by the Glasgow Presbytery, his own ethics
were far removed from Flume's attempt at secularization. In 1745
Hutcheson opposed Hume's candidature for the chair of Ethics
and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh [Mossner (1) p.157].
Perhaps this episode was one reason for Flume's being less
prudent in the Second Enquiry; certainly, by 1752 he had given
up the hope of finding a University job. For in the Second
Enquiry the secular character of Flume's thought is far more
pronounced than in the Treatise. Here Flume is warm in the cause
of virtue; but he is not really interested in panegyrics,
anymore than in the Treatise. What is most significant though
is that he is definitely not warm in the cause of Christian
virtue.
When one considers, he says near the end of that work, the
obviousness of the classification of virtue that he has given,
it seems a 'reasonable presumption', if such a simple theory
strikes us as novel, that 'systems and hypotheses have
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perverted our natural understanding' [E II 268-269]. Any doubt
that he is speaking of Christianity is removed a few pages
later. His speculative conclusions, he notes, have practical
implications: what could be more advantageous to society than
the 'philosophical truths' he delivers [ibid 279] ? A
philosophy that represents 'virtue in all her genuine and most
engaging charms, and make her approach her with ease,
familiarity, and affection ? [ i b id ]' . And the enemy is plainly
seen:
'The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and
some philosophers, have covered her; and nothing appears
but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability...She
talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering
and self-denial...And if any austere pretenders approach
her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them
as hypocrites and deceivers; or, if she admit them in her
train, they are ranked, however, among the least favoured
of her votaries' lIE II 279-2803.
Thus the 'enemy' are the 'austere pretenders'. And philosophy
can serve the 'Cause of Virtue' not through panegyrics - though
rhetoric has its place - but by disabusing men of the false
systems of 'virtue' that lead to hypocrisy and misery. As
morality, one can add, is not a conclusion of reason,
philosophy cannot demonstrate that men ought to be virtuous,
but it can show how their natural desires can be better served.
Now if philosophy can serve society by teaching these
opinions, then one committed to such a task will want to make
them as plain as possible. So special attention must be paid to
one's prose style.
Even when writing to Hutcheson before the publication of
Book III, Hurne was already blaming himself for a want of
perspicuity in the manuscript that Hutcheson had seen {L I 32].
And at the end of his life he wrote to his brother:'Of all the
vices of language, the least excusable is the want of
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perspicuity t : words were instituted by men for conveying their
meanings; the employment of words without meaning or with
ambiguity is a 'palpable abuse, 'ihich departs from the very
original purpose and intention of lanuage' EL IT 29]. Thus if
the intention of a work is, for example, nothing less than a
contribution to the intellectual demolition of Christianity,
considered here as the reat malady of society, then it does
not seem an exaggeration to say that there is a moral
r eq11iemei'tt that the philosopher sould write in as plain a
style as possible. It is in this context, I suggest, that we
siould understand Hume's well known life long attempt to
cultivate his style, rather, that is, than see it as the polish
of an upwardly mobile writer.
As wed as the matter of style, there is also the matter of
us development of the essay form. Tis, as licciJas PiiLZr:ison
has argued, represents the influence of Addison and Steele
[P illi)son (1) p. 1 'L l]. To Pnil1i son's remarks, about how the
i fluence of tlose essays in the Spectator was designed to help
men in the pursuit of virtue in an increasingly complex and
commercial society, we can add a conclusion from this study of
Hurne's work on the imagination. Tiis is that Hume's belief in
the inevitability of civilised man asking general questions
about life has its theoretical foundation in his study of the
imagination. As we saw in the previous cha )ter, when discussing
scepticism, he beLieves it is a defInIng characterIstIc of toat
faculty that we should retlessly search for 'new causes and
principles' [T271]. In 'Of Essay Writing', Hume says that we
cannot live on 'idle remarks' alone: we would be
stunn'd and worn out with endless chat
Of Will did this, and Nan did that' [G IV 367].
His emedy is to offer irrv'elf as 'a kind of resident or
ambassador from the dominions of learning to those of
cony
 rsation' [ibid
	 8].
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However, in so marking out certain moral implications of
Hume's desire to reach as wide an audience as possible, I am
not forgetting his remark in
	 Own Life that a 'love of
literary fame' was his 'ruling passion' [M.O.L.239]. This is
not, I think, self-condemning.
Hume says about the love of fame that we take pleasure in
the praise of those we esteem; and are 'mortify'd' at their
disapprobation [T321]. We are, moreover, 'in a great measure,
indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind' [ibid].
The satisfaction received from the praise of others is due not
to vanity, but to the innocent pleasure of having acted well.
But how do we distinguish between being pleased with our having
done the right thing and vanity? In Hume's case this is even
more difficult than usual: in so far as he saw it a moral duty
that he should attempt to make people question superstition,
praise for him was bound up with the success of the task.
However, those who condemn Hume as one who sought fame for the
sake of vanity seem assured that they can here make the above
distinction between satisfaction with worthy deeds, and vanity.
In fact Hume's own words on vanity and virtue seem apposite:
'vanity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the
fame of laudable actions approaches so near the love of
laudable actions for their own sake, that these passions
are more capable of mixture, than any other kinds of
affection; and it is almost impossible to have the latter
without some degree of the former' [G I 156;cf E II 266].
Thus in the Treatise Hume calls vanity 'a social passion, and a
bond of union among men' [T491J. This indeed is an example of
the sort of moral enlightenment that he thought was needed:
vanity in moderation is valuable: the Christian denial of its
place is artificial and inevitably leads to hypocrisy.
The 'laudable action' is the contribution he attempted to
make to the happiness of society through his philosophy. That
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this included a systematic attack on many aspects of religion
is well known. But it also included the attempt to show that
virtue is in the interest of men in this world. It is ironic
that Mill who despised many elements of Christian ethics, and
who was deeply conscious of the responsibilities of the
learned, should be so unpleasant about Hume. For Hume was
attempting to fulfil his civic duty partly through achieving an
elegance of style that made his work more readable and more
effective.
Closely connected with his very evident attempt to improve
his prose, is the question of a substantial change Hume made in
the Second Enquiry. His doctrine of sympathy, and the model of
the imagination that it is based on in the Treatise ,are absent
from that work. With the above discussion in hand we can better
understand that the change does not imply that Hume came to see
his earlier work on sympathy as false or confused or
incoherent.
This latter point is particularly important for the present
work. For later on, attempts will be made to elucidate aspects
of Hume's economics, politics, history, and religion through
appealing to a theory of the imagination that was never again
explicitly stated after the Treatise.
But to return to sympathy and the Second Enquiry: it will
be suggested that Hume did not find his thoughts on the
imagination quite so attractive under the pressure of writing
an accessible secular alternative to Christian ethics; one
which tries to show the reader that it is in his interest to be
virtuous.
In discussing in the Treatise why sympathy should be seen
as the origin of our approbation of the natural and artificial
virtues, Hume draws attention to the requirements of his
methodology. Having concluded that it is because of sympathy
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that certain qualities that tend to the good of society are
those of which we naturally approve; and that qualities that
tend to the detriment of society are those of which we
naturally disapprove; he suggests that we should not look 'for
any other cause of approbation or blame'. This is because it is
'an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that where any
particular cause is sufficient for an effect, we ought to
rest satisfied with it, and ought not to multiply causes
without necessity' [T578].
But in the Enquiry the other pressures that we have noted -
such as the need for an accessible treatise - seems to have led
Hume to rest content with making plain the fact that we are
interested in the happiness of others. He is content with less
general principles in order to argue his case against an
Augustinian vision of man as an irreducibly corrupt being whose
natural desires must be kept in check by an a'xste're rier.
Needless to say, Hume's own thesis also contradicts 'the
theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the
principle of self-love' [E II 219]. Yet this is not to say that
he rejected his earlier work on sympathy as either false or
incoherent. He is determined that man's social affections
should not be explained away: this means emphasising how his
account is based on experience; and arguing against ambitious
theory - even if this might be taken to imply a rejection of
his own earlier theorising. This can be seen from the following
footnote in the Enquiry:
'It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask,
why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It
is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle
in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination
of causes' [E II 219-220n].
He continues in a manner that displays both his determination
to be rid of systems not founded on fact and observation; and
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the possibility that there is more to say than the nature and
purpose of the Second Enquiry will allow:
'It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved
into principles more simple and universal, whatever
attempts may have been made to that purpose. But if it
were possible, it belongs not to the present subject; and
we may here safely consider these principles as original:
happy if we can render all the consequences sufficiently
plain and perspicuous' [ E II 220n].
With the Second Enquiry, I am arguing, Hume embarked upon
an enterprise of a nature which demanded that his earlier hope
of explaining human nature through the imagination had to be
set aside. And maybe, under the pressure of his plan for a
simple and elegant disquisition, perhaps he did doubt the
details (as well as the propriety) of his 2r1ier 2cco2n?t. This
does not mean that he ever doubted that the feelings work
(somehow) in the way he had earlier described.
So the language of the 'chymistry' of impressions and ideas
found in the Treatise, and in A Dissertation on the Passions,
published after the Second Enquiry, is banished. Yet he is at
greater pains to show the limitations of the Second Enquiry,
than the limitations of enquiry. So for example, when he is
discussing the effects on the passions that the fortune of
others have, he remarks:
'I only point out these phenomena, as a subject of
speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral
enquiries. It is sufficient for the present purpose to
observe in general, that power and riches commonly cause
respect...' [E II 248n].
Now in later chapters we will see how Hume's doctrine of
sympathy informs the explanation he gives of particular events
- for example, events discussed in the History of England.
Naturally enough there is no theoretical account of sympathy
offered in the History. There too such an account would clash
with the 'purpose' of the work. But if we consider his earlier
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work we can make more sense of the History than otherwise. This
is one way of appreciating something of the unity of Hume's
work given through his theory of the imagination.
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section 4
Wright; Phillipson; slavery
In this section I want to briefly discuss Hume's
understanding of the imagination and the passions in the light
of two books. The first is John Wright's The Sceptical Realism
of David Hume, which was mentioned in the first chapter, and in
section 1 of the present chapter. The discussion here will
include remarks on the general relation of the book to the
present work. The other book I will discuss is Nicholas
Phillipson's Hume. Certain points I make about Phillipson's
book lead me to consider a question about the influence of
Malebranche on Hume's work.
Wright argues that Hume was working with a Malebranchean
model of the imagination; and that Hume thought that there are
brain states correlative with mental states IWright (1) p.1B9.
Nor, he says, should this be thought surprising. He points out
that when contemporaries of Hume opened up their copies of
Chambers' Cyclopaedia, a standard scientific reference book of
the day, and looked up 'Imagination', they would have read the
following:
'A Power or Faculty of the Soul, by which it conceives,
and forms Ideas of Things, by means of certain Traces and
Impressions that had been before made in the Fibres of the
Brain by sensation' [ibid].
This, Wright notes, is followed by a reference to Chambers'
source: Book II of Search After Truth. Wright says:
'There is every reason to think that the discussion of
impressions and ideas in the opening pages of the Treatise
would have been understood in the context of the basic
theory laid down by Chambers' [ibid].
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Hume, Wright believes, accepted the 'basic outlines' of the
Malebranchean conception that Chambers presents; though 'he
certainly did attempt to modify its details' [ibid]. Wright
writes:
'Hume works within the context of an established
psychophysiological theory and attempts to modify t in
terms of experience. But li'any good theory, it
'interacts' with the data and provides a perspective in
which they are observed' ibid p.191].
However, Wright says that he can only 'hint at the significance
of this interaction and the role it plays in Hume's social and
economic doctrines' [ibid]. For Wright's greatest energies are
spent examining Hume's epistemology in the light of the
psychophysiological writings of Malebranche.
More generally, how does the present work differ? I
concentrate on the question of how Hume actually employ his
conception of the imagination as a way of solving philosophical
problems. To be sure, Wright himself suggests that it is
desirable that we should understand the general role of the
imagination in Hume's Science of Man. More particularly, he
closes his book with some noteworthy remarks on Hume's doctrine
of sympathy. He points out that it is very close to
Malebranche's doctrine; but it differs in that Hume thought
sympathy controlled by the association of ideas in the
imagination.
So, then, I present a rather different sort of thesis than
that found in Wright's book. On the one hand, I consider those
places where the imagination is explicitly at the centre of his
work. Thus, for example, in the later discussion of Hume's
politics I look at Book III of the Treatise. Secondly, I also
consider those places where Hume uses his earlier discoveries
about the imagination. So as regards politics, I consider his
essays and letters. I believe that this makes it possible to
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see clearly certain essential themes in Hume's work. Such as,
for example, religion; and his desire to explain the creation
and sustaining of error.
Malebranche seems also to be at the centre of the story of
Hume's development as told by Nicholas Phillipson in Hume.
Phillipson contradicts at a number of points the account of
Hume's development which I offer in the present work.
Phillipson says that Hume wanted to divest 'modern
philosophy of its theological trappings'; he says that Hume had
Malebranche 'in mind' when he did this [Phillipson (2) p.43].
Whatever that last phrase means, for there is no evidence
offered about Hume's intentions, the next statement is
certainly confused. He says that 'Hume began the Treatise
'by complaining about the constant wranglings of
philosophers about the principles of human nature and
announcing that he would offer a new account which was
based on experimental foundations' [ibid].
Actually, Hume begins the Treatise by complaining about the
constant wranglings of philosophers. No mention is made of
their arguing about human nature. What he thinks is new is the
relation he perceives between a study of human nature and the
sciences. Thus he writes of how
'In pretending therefore to explain the principles of
human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of
the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new'
[T xvi].
He does not, however, consider his use of the 'experimental
method' for the science of man as new: he lists a number of
British philosophers, who using this method, 'put the science
of man on a new footing' [T xvii; cf A 646].
After this introduction, Phillipson says that Hume
159
'wanted to discover whether reason really did have the
power to regulate the passions as Malebranche had claimed.
This distinction seemed to lie at the heart of all
Christian theology; if it stood the test of experiment,
there would be a secure foundation for Christian theology.
If not, Christianity would be exposed as a myth...And myth
is what Hume proved [Christianity] to be' [Phillipson (2)
p.44]
I want to make two points about this paragraph.
The first is that Hurne has certainly not 'proved'
Christianity to be a myth. Nor has he 'shown' Christianity to
be a myth [ibid p.46]. No argument is presented for this
conclusion. And as for Hume's view on the matter, it must be
said that however Phillipson's words are understood, such
language is foreign to Hume's sceptical outlook. This can be
seen, for example, if we consider what Hume has Philo say in
the midst of Philo's most confident period of argument. In
discussing the 'problem of evil' he says that he is 'sceptic
enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all
my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes' as
Cleanthes supposes (o 	 as	 t	 aa, &ca
that he has an argument which only serves to 'silence the most
arrogant bigotry and superstition' (jj 	 1O\. So even i 'we
ignore the unHumean language of 'proof' in this instance - a
'proof' for Hume leaves no room for doubt [E I 56] - a Humean
point of view would have us reject Phillipson's claims.
The second point concerns Phillipson's suggestion that
Hume's well known view that reason is under the dominion of the
passions is in direct contrast to Malebranche; and, moreover,
was a direct response to him. I will now suggest that far from
Malebranche being remarkable for suggesting that reason, in
Phillipson's phrase, has the 'power to regulate the passions',
Malebranche's study of fallen man is remarkable for arguing the
opposite view.
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I will discuss this matter in some detail because, here I
believe, we make contact with a central element in the origin
of Hume's philosophy. If, however, we think, like Phillipson,
of Malebranche as a figure who represents a view of man as a
being who can regulate his passions, we will wholly
misunderstand Malebranche' s contribution.
The genealogy, so to speak, of Hume's claim that reason is
the slave of the passions has been alluded to in recent years
by Peter Jones and Alasdair Maclntyre. In his book Hume's
Sentiments, Jones speaks of how Hume was able to stay
consistent with Cicero's idea that 'seif-rea1isa1io'' and
'progress' are to be achieved through the 'right use of reason'
through 'redefining' the notion of reason 'in his own terms'.
And in making this move, Jones says, 'Hume merely followed
another of his heroes, Bayle. [Jones p.5]. Maclntyre accepts
Jones' history, and states the latter's view about Hume's
famous remark in the following way:
'Hume...was almost certainly following 'Bayle, who in his
remarks about Cicero's views in his dictionary article on
Ovid...describes Cicero as referring to "l'esclavage de la
raison" to the passions in a sentence which became in the
1739 English translation: reason had becomeathe slave of
the passions," a striking anticipation of Hume's own view'
[Maclntyre (2) p.289].
But Bayle, like Hume, read Malebranche. (Indeed, the excellent
Baylean, Elisabeth Labrousse, refers to Bayle as a
'Malebranchist' [Labrousse p.49]). And not only does
Malebranche use the notion, but his thesis about the slavery of
reason is presented in the context of his belief that it is
through thought that the passions act upon us; and that this
happens through the imagination. Unlike Hume, Bayle has no such
thesis. It follows, then, that the connection on this issue
between Malebranche and Hume is much stronger than it is
between Bayle and Hume. Needless to say, I am not attempting to
devalue the general importance of Bayle for understanding the
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development of Hume's work. (Indeed, in Chapter VI, I argue
that Bayle's Miscellaneous Reflections on the Comet is a book
which deserves far closer study than it has received by writers
on Hurne).
However, I shall now briefly discuss what Malebranche's
writings on the passions and the imagination reveal. The
passions, Malebranche believes, have been given to us by God
for our preservation. For example, a man is in trouble: let us
say he is being attacked by a Rottweiler. What happens is this:
'since all men...are in communion through their eyes and
ears, when someone is in a state of agitation, he
necessarily disturbs everyone who sees or hears him, and
he naturally makes an impression on their imagination that
disturbs them and interests them in his preservation'
[Malebranche p.348-9].
The resulting passions in the bystanders, it is to be hoped,
will lead them to rescue the wretched man. Thus the cause of
the passions is the impression of the pain that occurs within
the imagination. However, the rule of the passions is also
apparent in how we judge. If, for example, we are particularly
disposed to the passion of fear, that passion may fix our
attention on the beneficial exercise that the man is
undoubtedly having in thus jumping around. Malebranche writes:
'The passions, then, act on the imagination, and the
imagination thus corrupted combats reason by continually
representing things to it not as they are in themselves,
so that the mind might issue a true judgment, but as they
are in relation to the present passion, so that the mind
might be led into a favourable judgment of it' [ibid
p. 402-3]
The passions thus rule our judgment. And in letting them so
rule, we sin. We should only allow them to rule our body:
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'which, to preserve & keep long a life much like that of
the Beasts we must suffer ourselves to be ruled by our
passions arid desires' [Malebranche (Taylor) Vol. II p.11]
But sinners that we are, we allow our judgment to suffer. Thus,
for example, I outlined in section 6 of the previous chapter
Matebranche's views on how scholars are corrupted by their
passions for this or that writer; this or that teacher; this or
that University. In general,
'the Passions have such a vast & comprehensive Dominion,
that it is impossible to conceive anything in reference to
which it may be said that men are exempt from their
Empire' [ibid Vol.11 p.7].
Both Malebranche and Bayle were Augustinians. It is to the
authority of St.Augustine that Malebranche appeals in the
following:
'We know that before his sin man was not the slave but the
absolute master of his passions and that with his will he
could easily arrest the agitation of the spirits causing
them' [Nialebranche p.339].
What happened says Augustine, is that through God's justice,
'he who had in his pride pleased himself was...handed over to
himself',
'But the result of this was not that he was in every way
under his own control, but that he was at odds with
himself, and lived a life of harsh and miserable slavery'
[Augustine p.575; cf p.578].
Thus the axis of flesh versus spirit with a little rotation
becomes in the 17th century that of passions versus reason. I
will note in a moment Hume's own outlook on the matter, his
rejection of the hypothesis of Grace that for Malebranche is
the only answer to the dominion of the passions. But I want to
mention Calvin, if only for the sake of bringing out how a
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person with an 18th century Scottish upbringing would feel at
home in the (dark) world of Malebranche.
Like Malebranche, Calvin believed that because Adam sinned,
'man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his
supernatural ones withdrawn' [Calvin p.91; Malebranche p..36O].
What is left, says Calvin, is a 'residue of intelligence and
judgment' which places us above the beasts [Calvin p.92]. But
what controls us are our unworthy desires. So though there is
some appetite for truth 'in the human mind', this 'fades out
before it reaches the goal and then falls away into vanity'
[ibid]. The human mind is unfitted to search for the truth
[p.93]. This is because we are under a 'bondage': we are
'enslaved' [ibid p.98].
Now both Calvin and Malebranche believed that it was the
duty of man to seek self-knowledge. For Calvin, this is simply
expressed in terms of our reaching a fuller consciousness of
our sinful nature; and our weakness, so that we turn to God for
help [ibid p.22]. But for Malebranche, this is not enough. We
also ought to study ourselves so that we come to know the ways
in which we are commonly led into error. It is not enough, that
is, to say with Calvin, that 'the whole man is in himself
nothing but lust' [ibid p.91]; and that 'even babies bring
their condemnation with them from their mother's womb [ibid
p.90]. Malebranche believed that we need to 'make the Mind
sensible of its slavery & Dependence on all Sensible things'
[Malebrariche (Taylor) p.2]. And this means, for example,
studying the passions using all the insights that science
allows. Certainly, we must never allow ourselves to be
overwhelmed by the prestige of science; such knowledge alone
will never make us happier or wiser [ibid].
So then, Hume's Calvinist training, in conjunction with his
interest in the methods of natural science which he gathered in
Edinburgh, makes his interest in Malebranche understandable.
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But of course it must be emphasised that for Hume there is no
merit in postulating a pre-lapsarian state of man with which to
contrast passion ruled man. He believed that reason is the
slave of the passions; and it ought to be the slave [T415].
Obviously, if it is impossible that it cannot be the slave,
then an 'ought' makes no sense. What I think he is expressing
by this word here is that the rule of the passions ought to be
honestly recognised. For if we think we can listen to the
dictates of 'reason' we will be deceiving ourselves. This,
needless to say, is his view of the Churches' teaching. It will
just be passion in disguise. Malebranche, in contrast, believed
that we are ruled by the passions; but that we are not so
corrupted that we cannot, for example, understand that reason
directs us to be virtuous. Nevertheless, given our corruption,
we have been given by God passions so as to lead us, if not to
virtue, at least to safety. Thus as we saw with the Rottweiler
example above, Malebranche believes that men are not led to act
through reason, but through the passions. Charles McCracken
explains:
'Reason can show that one being, because more perfect,
merits greater love than another; but reason does not
thereby move our wills [McCracken p.286].
So Malebranche, I am arguing, showed Hume the possibility
of a world where reason is powerless. To be sure, Hume thought
that even this way of speaking is misleading. 'Reason' has no
'power' because 'reason' is not the sort of 'principle' which
can oppose anything: 'we speak not strictly and philosophically
when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason' [T415]. A
little more precisely then: Malebranche showed Hume a world
ruled by the passions and the imagination. And in effect this
is to suggest that our calling Malebranche a 'rationalist' can
be dangerous if one ignores the greater part of his writings
which also attempt to show how we are ruled by the passions
through the imagination. But Phillipson, as I noted above, says
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that Malebranche believed that reason has the 'power to
regulate our passions' [Phillipson (2) p.43]. I have argued
that this is wrong. And I have also suggested that it is
primarily to Malebranc.he, and not to Bayle, as Jones and
Maclrityre believe, that we ought to look if we want to
understand the origins of Hume's thoughts on reason and the
passions. Later I will say more about the relation between the
imagination and the passions in Hume's thought.
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section 5
the principle of the conversion of passion
Hume's inversion of the roles previously accorded to reason
and the passions is one of the best known events in the history
of philosophy. In contrast, his general account in the Treatise
of how the passions interact with the imagination, which, he
thinks, can explain variations in action previously given by
talk of strong or weak reason, has been almost completely
ignored. Yet in this study of the imagination and the passions,
Hume arrived at certain principles that were to inform his work
for the rest of his life.
The manner in which I shall try to display these principles
is as follows: by setting out - their foundation in his model
of the imagination; and then by illustrating how they are
displayed in his later work. Thus, for example, it 'wifl 'te
argued that with a clearer grasp of what he says about the
imagination and the passions, we can appreciate the internal
connection between his thoughts on subjects as different as
commerce and divorce.
This will also function as useful preparation for later
discussions on his writings about politics and religion. So in
Chapters V and VI, Hume's views about, for eKaarple, the effects
of opposition on the passions will be referred to without a
foundational account of the reasoning behind such views being
there presented.
One consequence of Hume's rejection of the idea that the
passions can be controlled by reason is the following: his
thesis that the 'combat of passion and reason' is to be
reinterpreted in terms of calm and violent passions with which
reason and passions have been 'confounded' [T417L It is in
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this way that we can account for the variations in human life
previously thought to be the result of strong or weak reason.
Hume's way of describing his radical thesis is similar to that
attributed to Berkeley by Saul Kripke: 'Rather than repudiating
common sense [he]...asserts that the conflict comes from a
philosophical misinterpretation of common language' [Kripke
p.65]. So Hume writes:
'What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and
sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is
presented, or any object, which, by the original formation
of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By
reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the
former; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no
disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a
mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as
conclusions only of our intellectual faculties' [T437].
But if philosophers have so erred, and reason does not increase
or decrease the intensity of the passions, then how are we to
explain their variations? This question has been ignored by
commentators; yet it is, I believe, of the last importance for
understanding the science of man. Hume thinks that the answer
lies in the particular temper of the person, and in the
situation of the object of the passion [T419].
As regards the first of these factors, he notes that what
'we call strength of mind' does not imply a 'strong' reason: it
'implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent'
[T418]. Such a person, that is, will be more disposed to act in
accordance with certain instincts such as 'benevolence and
resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the
general appetite to good, and aversion to evil' [T417]. He will
be less disposed to be 'ruled' by violent emotions such as
resentment 'independent of all considerations of pleasure and
advantage' [T418].
168
Before turning to the matter of the situation of the
object, another distinction should be noted. The passions do
not influence the will in proportion to their violence. Ecnotion
may attend a 'momentary gust of passion'; but this is no guide
to volition [T4191. Indeed, once a passion has become a
'settled principle of action' custom ensures that everything
yields to it without 'any sensible agitation' [ibid]. For which
reason we must 'distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion;
betwixt a violent and a strong one' [ibid].
We can now note how the situation of the object bears on
the production of the passions. From an observation of the
effect of circumstances on people, Hume arrives at principles
that predict whether a particular passion will be calm or
violent. These are given a theoretical foundation in his model
of the imagination. And it is in this way that he explains the
transition between calm and violent passions (that may be weak
or strong) without having to posit a weak or strong faculty of
reason. A simple example of such a circumstance effecting the
variation in passions is this:
'The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion,
which, when remote, produces only a calm one' [ibid].
The general principle that is at the heart of his
theoretical account of the effect of such circumstances can be
called The Principle of the Conversion of Passion. This is the
principle 'that every emotion which precedes or attends a
passion, iseasily converted into it' [T423; cf T419; cf T424].
Hume illustrates this principle with the following example:
'When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults
and caprice of his mistress, the jealousies and quarrels
to which that commerce is so subject...are yet found to
give additional force to his prevailing passion' [T420].
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This, Hume suggests illustrates the way that one passion may be
converted into another. The man's jealousy is 'converted into
the predominant passion, and enc.reases its violence, beyond the
pitch it wou'd have arrived at had it met with no opposition'
[T421].
He gives a description of the physiological process that he
thinks occurs:
'When two passions are already produc'd by their separate
causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily
mingle and unite'
And what happens is that the
'predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and
converts it into itself. The spirits, when once excited,
easily receive a change in their direction; and 'tis
natural to imagine this change will come from the
prevailing affection' [T420].
Now Hume reasons that since indirect passions, such as love and
jealousy, can be 'naturally transfus'd into each other', so too
can direct passions be changed. This would explain why it is
that if the situation of the object causes any other passion,
other than desire or aversion, then the desire or aversion will
'acquire new force and violence' [T421]. Thus those calm
passions - vulgarly called reason - may be changed so as to
become violent passions. This is how we are to view what had
previously been thought to be a battle between reason and the
passions.
Now one way that an object commonly produces two passions,
is when it produces contrary passions. Each passion finds
opposition. But as one passion will be stronger, the opposition
is represented by the weaker passion. This weaker passion,
according to the principle, will be overcome and converted into
the stronger passion.
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It is worth noting that this effect of increased force to a
passion that occurs as a consequence of a passion overpowering
another will occur whether the 'opposition' it finds ultimately
stems from 'internal motives or external obstacles' [ibid]. In
the jealousy example, the former obstacle is illustrated: the
anger that the man feels is an obstacle to his passion of love,
yet it serves to increase that passion:
'The efforts, which the mind makes to surmount the
obstacle, excite the spirits and inliven the passion'
[ibid].
In the essay 'Of Polygamy and Divorces', we can see some
examples of external obstacles. In the 1742-8 editions of the
Essays, he remarks that 'whoever dreams of raptures and
extasies beyond the honey-month is a fool'. It seems that what
increases the 'amorous passion' to rapture are precisely the
obstacles of 'coldness', 'disdain', and, in general, the
'difficulties' of the courting period [C I 238n].
In fact the Principle of the Conversion of Passion informs
two of the three main arguments Hume offers against divorce in
the essay. To understand the first argument we should note that
it is not only opposition that will tend to lead to a
conversion of the passion, so will uncertainty:
'The agitation of the thought; the quick turns it makes
from one view to another; the variety of passions, which
succeed each other, according to the different views: All
these produce an agitation in the mind, and transfuse
themselves into the predominant passion' [T421].
Now we can see the use Hutne makes of this: the marriage
certificate had better be cased in iron: 'The least possibility
of a separate interest must be the source of endless quarrels
and suspicions' [G I 239]. The union, therefore, ought to be
'entire and total' [ibid].
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As regards the second argument we should note that it is an
implication of his model that despair or security decreases the
passions. Such situations deprive the mind of a necessary
condition of desire.
'The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes;
and in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment
supported by a new flow of passion' [T421-422].
Uncertainty, by giving different views of objects - views which
excite different passions - preserves the ardour of the mind:
security diminishes passions because it removes that
uncertainty which increases them through the succession and
consequent conversion. So where a situation appears inevitable,
rebellion ceases [T422].
This picture informs his second argument against divorce.
Thus he says that divorce ought to be forbidden 'for the heart
of man naturally submits to necessity, and soon loses an
inclination, when there appears the impossibility of gratifying
it' [C I 238]. If divorce is out of the question, one despairs.
And so one will attempt to find what satisfaction one can
within the marriage.
In referring to these arguments, my point is not, of
course, that such arguments can be reduced to a general
principle from the Treatise. It is rather that such arguments
display suppositions about motivation that have a theoretical
foundation in the Treatise. That which diversifies human life
is usually held to be the 'struggle of passion and reason'
[T438]. But Hume holds that it is due to the conversion of calm
into violent and violent into calm passions.
If romance and marriage are not considered important
issues, then what about work and money? An understanding of the
Principle of the Conversion of Passion makes it clear that
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Hume's writings on this topic have a foundation in his theory
of the imagination.
For example, there is his belief that it is wrong to think
that economic activity can be explained by man's love of goods
alone. With this belief, Hume was directly contradicting both
apologists and critics of commercial society who saw avidity as
the breath of economic life. Mandeville is an example of the
former, with his infamous belief that the happiness of society
depended on the greed of men for goods that would set them
above their neighbours. And as for the critics of commercial
society, Tories, Christian moralists, and writers in the civic
humanism tradition sought to show that the desire for gain was
inconsistent with virtue. Hume, however, held that it is the
desire for industry that leads to avidity and not the other way
round. Employment is pleasurable in itself, whatever desirable
consequences it may lead to. There is an analogy here with
Hurne's thoughts on gaming. The pleasure of which, Hume says,
does not arise alone from 'interest'; but nor does it arise
from the game itself, since 'the same persons have no
satisfaction, when they play for nothing' [T452]. Rather, it
'proceeds from both these causes united, tho' separately
they have no effect. 'Tis here, as in certain chymical
preparations, where the mixture of two clear and
transparent liquids produces a third, which is opaque and
colour'd' [ibid].
Avidity, then, is explained in the same manner. Human life is
more a 'dull pastime' than a 'serious occupation': but nature
has deceived us into thinking that it is of 'some importance'
[G I 231; 228]. And one way she has accomplished this is by
producing out of the desire for the employment of the faculties
(that 'foundation of most our passions') and the desire for
gain, a strong passion of avidity [G I 325]. There is, that is,
a conversion of a passion: from a desire for gain to a
passionate avidity.
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Far from work being entered into only for its pleasurable
consequences, a man engaged in some serious pursuit feels no
longer that 'insatiable thirst after pleasure'. Hume continues:
'But if the employment you give him be lucrative,
especially if the profit be attached to every particular
exertion of industry, he has gain so often in his eye,
that he acquires, by degrees, a passion for it, and knows
no such pleasure as that of seeing the daily encrease of
his fortune' [ibid].
As we saw above, for this conversion to be possible, there must
be some opposition to the desire. This is the flip-side of the
desire for employment of the faculties: the opposition that is
overcome by exertion is nothing other than natural indolence
[cf T452; cf 0 209]. And as for the specific day to day
illustration mentioned above, here one can fill in the details
by noting that it is due to the association of ideas and custom
that the passion will be even stronger if the person is
rewarded with gain every time he exerts himself. Such an
observation is borne out, he says, by the observation that we
are more likely to find the frugal, not to mention the miserly,
within the merchant class [ibid].
The analogy that Hume finds between work and gaming has
already been noted. There is also an analogy with the origin of
the passion for philosophy that is found in some people.
The 'most pleasant and agreeable' exercise of the mind is
the fixing of the attention and the exertion of one's genius:
'What is easy and obvious is never valu'd' [T449]. But the
opposition that the mind finds is not enough. There has to be
another passion. This is the desire to contribute to society
truth that is 'useful and important' [T450]. The passion for
their subject that some philosophers show thus proceeds from a
conversion of their desire to serve society into the
predominant passion of a love of exerting their genius.
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There is another way that the Principle of the Conversion of
Passion enters into Hume's account of the transition between
calm and violent passions;
'nothing', he says, 'has a greater effect both to encrease
and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain,
and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition'
[T422].
In what follows I attempt to show how his discussion of
custom in Book II provides a theoretical foundation for an
essential part of his aesthetic theory. Like the examples
above, this is intended to serve as a minor illustration of how
his science of man is dependent on a theory of the imagination.
As is well known, in the essay 'Of the Standard of Taste'
Hume argues that merely because we cannot found aesthetic
evaluations on the understanding alone, we should not thereby
think that there is an 'impossibility of attaining a standard
of taste' [G I 268]. Rules of art may be founded on experience:
though 'we must not imagine that, on every occasion, the
feelings of men will be conformable to these rules' [ibid 270].
What is needed is a 'perfect serenity of mind, a recollection
of thought, a due attention to the object' [ibid 271] -
circumstances which it is by no means easy to attain. But as a
matter of experience we find that some persons have a greater
delicacy than others. And it is clear that nothing tends to
improve their talent more than practice.
Practice is improving because it delivers experience to a
person and so
'his feeling becomes more exact and nice: He not only
perceives the beauties and defects of each part, but marks
the distinguishing species of each quality, and assigns it
suitable praise or blame' [ibid 275].
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Moreover, on the first perusal of any piece
'There is a flutter or hurry of thought which...confounds
the genuine sentiment of beauty' [ibid].
Now if we turn to the Treatise we can see that these
observations are grounded in a theory independent of
aesthetics. And here again we see the employment of the
Principle of the Conversion of Passion.
Upon the first performance of any action or the first
conception of any object, he says, 'there is a certain
unpliableness in the faculties, and a difficulty in the
spirit's moving in their new direction' [T422-3]. This
difficulty is the 'source of wonder, surprize and all of the
emotions, which arise from novelty' [T423]. It is agreeable in
itself for it enlivens the mind. Now on account of the
Principle discussed above, this new emotion of wonder will
increase the force of its attendant passion. Therefore,
'every thing, that is new, is most affecting, and gives us
more pleasure or pain, than what, strictly speaking,
naturally belongs to it. When it often returns upon us,
the novelty wears off; the passions subside; the hurry of
the spirits is over; and we survey the objects with
greater tranquility' [T423].
On the one hand, then, novelty may increase the pleasure to be
gained from an object; on the other hand, it may increase the
pain. So here is a general reason for thinking that a critic
ought to be experienced: such a critic will be able to take
into account the attractions of novelty and not confuse that
novelty with the quality of the work itself. Moreover,an
experienced critic will have knowledge of the genre of which
the work is an example. So however original the work is, not
all will be novelty. Here too is a reason for thinking that a
critic ought to consider the object more than once.
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The third and final way that the 'circumstances and
situations' of objects can change, resulting in a change in the
nature of the passion, is by the 'exciting of the imagination'.
If our ideas of 'good and evil acquire a new vivacity', the
passions become 'more violent' and 'keep pace with the
imagination in all its variations' [T424]. Hume says that he
will not pretend to determine whether this proceeds from the
principle mentioned above, 'that	 attendant emotion is
easily converted into the predominant' [T424]. Instead he gives
examples of this influence of the imagination. I have already
discussed the phenomenon of sympathy, one of these examples.
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Chapter IV
Morality
section 1
preliminaries
One of the burdens of the present work is to explain the
connexions between Hurne's understanding of religion and his
writings on various topics. There are few places where this
need seems more urgent than as regards Hume's writings on
morality. Indeed, it may well be that our knowledge of Hume's
opinions on religion and morality has suffered from his success
at arguing that moral philosophy should be set on an entirely
secular footing.
The chief topic of the present chapter is Hume's thoughts
on why men and women speak of right and wrong. But here and
elsewhere I also attempt to reveal other doctrines which I
believe, allow us to appreciate the depth of Hume's interest in
the relation between morality and religion. So I outlined in
the previous chapter Hume's strident secularism. Later, in
Chapter VI, I will try to piece together his views on the
content of Christian ethics. There I will argue that he
believed that much of the attraction of Christianity can be
explained if we consider Christian ethics as inverting natural
moral precepts. It is precisely its unattractiveness which
makes it so attractive. In that thesis Hume makes use of his
principle which explains the effect of opposition on the
passions, the principle which I outlined in the final section
of the previous chapter.
As with his examination of the 'understanding', Hume begins
Book III by claiming that nothing is ever present to the mind
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but perceptions; and that perceptions are of two kinds,
impressions and ideas. He quickly decides that morality is not
'discern'd' through a comparison of ideas; and nor does it
'consist' in a matter of fact [T457; T468]. Thus if virtue and
vice are not discoverable by reason, he says, then it must be
by means of some 'impression or sentiment they occasion' which
enables us to mark the difference between them [T470].
What are these impressions that mark off virtue and vice?
Hume does not waste time: virtue conveys pleasure, and vice
conveys pain. So to 'have the sense of virtue, is nothing but
to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the
contemplation of a character' [T471].
Yet however straightforward Hume's alternative to
rationalism and common sense thought might seem from these
words, there are in fact great difficulties in determining the
precise nature of his moral theory. I want to discuss three
interpretations.
The first interpretation I discuss is the 'moral realism'
offered by David Fate Norton. This has attracted a considerable
amount of praise [e.g. Maclntyre (2) p.293]. Norton suggests
that Hucne should be seen as part of an 'antisceptical moral
tradition', whose members include Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
Hume's 'moral realism' Norton says, has been hidden by the
'hyperbole' of the comparison with secondary properties that
Hume offers near the end of the first section of Book III
[Norton (1) p.43; p.110]. To be sure, Norton's thesis is not
indeed that Hume is a moral realist in any Platonic sense.
Hume's work in this area, thinks Norton, is primarily directed
towards defending the 'Cause of Virtue' at a time of a 'Crise
Morale', that, broadly speaking, began around the time of the
publication of Hobbes' works. [Norton (1) p.45; p.21]. Hume
undertakes, says Norton, the 'joint tasks of refuting moral
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scepticism and putting morals on a solid, objective foundation'
[ibid p.43].
The second approach I consider is one that focuses on the
'productive', or what M. H. Abrams called a 'projective'
quality of the imagination that the association of ideas and
impressions makes possible [Abrams p.6.3]. Interpretations
focusing on this theme have been offered by John Mackie, Barry
Stroud, and Robert Fogelin [Mackie (1) pp.71-75; c.f Nlackie (2)
p.35; Stroud pp.l8O-l85; F'ogelin pp.142-145]. I noted in
Chapter I that Hume believes that our way of marking off some
constant conjunctions for special consideration has its origins
in the association of ideas and impressions within the
imagination. It is this fact that at once makes possible our
causal reasoning and at the same time leads philosophers to
misrepresent the nature of man. We can now proceed to discuss
the same pattern as it appears in his analysis of our moral
dis tinctions .
The most explicit statement of the view appears in Appendix
I of the Enquiry:
'Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of
taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the
knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the
sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The
one discovers the objects as they really stand in nature,
without addition or diminution: the other has a productive
faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with
the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a
manner a new creation' [E II 294].
We talk of the vice found in an action, but we are wrong if we
think that vice is a property specifiable in the action
independent of an observer.
Now the question is: how does this disposition of the
imagination enter into the rest of his moral theory? The
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outline of the answer to be offered is as follows: when we say
that 'wilful murder is vicious', we are not discerning the
viciousness of murder in the situation, rather we are
expressing our feelings about the action. This is possible
because we share our basic sentiments with others. As we share
sentiments, the expression can impart information on something
we have found. So we add to the richness of the perceptions of
others. We stain and gild the world. Others know that if they
contemplated the facts of the matter, which do not of course
include any non-natural facts, they would suffer the same
feelings of pain.
The third interpretation is the naive subjectivist
interpretation. This can be found in, for example, Philippa
Foot's article, 'Hume on Moral Judgement'. Foot's view is that
Hume thinks that when a man says that an action is vicious, he
is talking about his own feelings [Foot p.77; cf C.D.Broad
pp.85-86]. She quotes from the Treatise:
'...The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider
the object. You can never find it, till you turn your
reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.
Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling,
not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object'
[T468-9].
I will argue that this interpretation is quite as wrong as the
theory itself.
It is the second of these interpretations that I will
attempt to develop. I shall also argue that whilst Norton is
quite correct to reject the naive subjectivist interpretation
mentioned above, there is quite a problem in discerning the
difference between Norton's own position on Hume and the most
plausible variant of the 'productive' interpretation. It is
concluded, however, that there is a real difference between the
latter interpretation and that which Norton offers; and that
181
certain unsatisfactory aspects and implications of Norton's
thesis should make us conclude that an eirenic position is not
enough.
One reason for thinking that a	 'productive', or what is
often represented as a 'projective' interpretation, ought to be
favoured is that it seems to confirm the view of Hume offered
in the previous chapters. Book III of the Treatise begins with
a claim that emphasises the continuity Hume finds between
morality and the preceding part of his Science of Man. He
expresses the hope that his treatise on morality 'will
corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding
and the passions' [T455]. In the light of the preceding
chapters we might therefore expect Hume to present man as
determined by the passions which are themselves guided by the
imagination. And this, I will argue, is what we indeed find.
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section 2
'moral realism'
I begin with a discussion of Norton's thesis. After this I
will criticise the 'naive subjectivist' interpretation.
Finally, I will argue that both these interpretations hide a
continuity found in Hume's philosophy given through the
employment of the faculty of the imagination. The imagination,
he says, associates 'internal impressions' with impressions of
the senses. This 'productive' idea, I argue, is as central to
his moral theory as it is to his analysis of necessity.
Norton believes that, hitherto, Hume's 'moral realism' has
been 'hidden' [Norton (1) p.110]. I will now argue that this is
confused. What plausibility Norton's picture of Hume has
(leaving aside his description of that picture as one of a
'realist') proceeds from a contrast Norton arranges with a
picture of Flume as a naive subjectivist (such as given by the
interpretation we saw above from Philippa Foot).
When Norton calls Hume a 'moral realist', he emphasises
that he does not mean to suggest that Hume believes that
'virtue and vice are qualities of action per se' [ibid p.116n];
that virtue and vice are not 'objects in the ordinary sense
(physical objects), or that they are transcendently existing
qualities of some kind' [ibid p.11ln]. Instead he presents Huine
as believing that values are 'objective correlates of
sentiments' [ibid p.111]. There seem to be two aspects of
Norton's use of this notion worth noting.
Firstly, Norton means by 'objective correlates' merely the
qualities, such as kindness, to be found in the person who
acts. He quotes from a letter to Hutcheson:
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'Actions are not virtuous nor vicious; but only so far as
they are proofs of certain Qualitys or durable principles
in the Mind' {L I 34; ibid p.113].
And from the Treatise:
'if any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as
a sign of some quality or character' [T575].
Moreover, Norton says, Hume expresses in the Treatise
'precisely the same view' 'at least half a dozen different
ways' [Norton (1) p.113].
Now this gloss on 'objective correlates' is not going to
provide any sense of realism, as Kenneth Winkler says about
Norton on Hutcheson, that would bother any subjectivist (other
than, one should in fact add, the naive subjectivist) [Winkler
p.180]. Any theorist other than the naive subjectivist will
want to insist that when two people disagree about a moral
issue, they are speaking about the action or principles
involved, rather than their own attitudes. R.M.Hare has said
that it is a very common mistake to think that naive
subjectivism, or what he calls 'old-fashioned subjectivism',
exhausts the varieties of subjectivism [Hare p.76-77]. The
consequence of this mistake for Norton's thesis suggests, to
borrow a pun, that this is not splitting hairs. In short, it is
uncontroversial to report
'that Hume takes virtue and vice to have a reference to
items beyond the psychological states of those who utter
them. Virtue and vice also refer to the real qualities of
agents and their actions' [Norton (1) p.115-116].
For this is implicitly recognised in, for example, Kemp-Smith's
rion-cognitivist interpretation. To emphasise, as Kemp-Smith
does throughout The Philosophy of David Hume, that Hume's moral
theory assimilates the moral sense to taste, means that he
recognises Hume's view that there must be external causes of
184
our sentiments. The same point may be made about Mac.kie's and
Stroud's and Fogelin's accounts of what they call Hume's
'projectivism': the point of such accounts is to explain how
from an input of beliefs about real events in the world, arise
moral attitudes. [Mackie (1) p.74; Stroud (1) p.184; Fogelin
p.143].
To ignore the causal element is to destroy the projectivist
theory and, a fortiori, the interpretation. Surprisingly,
Norton does not discuss either of these interpretations.
Thus in order to attempt to grasp a real alternative to the
above projectivist interpretations, we must turn to the second
element in Norton's understanding of Hume's 'moral realism'.
This is a more ambitious thesis. Put it is never made clear;
and Norton falls back on the claim that Hume's 'ontology of
morals is elusive' [ibid p.116n].
One of Norton's articulations of a 'realist' position comes
through a comparison with a biological theory called
'Emergeriticism'. It is in this way that he seeks to present
Hume as thinking that there are irreducible moral qualities
which cannot be accounted for by a description of the
observer's psychological state and the conditions in which he
finds himself [ibid p.116n1. And, using the example of an
et-nergenticist theory, Norton unpacks Hume's model as describing
how 'moral qualities will arise that are unique and
discontinuous in the sense that they are not merely
epiphenomena which can be reductively accounted for by these
conditions' [ibid].
In effect, then, Norton has Hume saying that the most
economic explanation of our moral behaviour must posit a
'distinguishable class of things' that cannot be reduced to
natural facts [Norton (2) p.3]. However, when Norton tries to
describe the details of this, he becomes unstuck. He admits
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that he sees no real hope of pinning Hume down on just how
'natural entities' are transformed into 'moral entities'. Hume,
he says,
'did not develop the complex ontological terminology to
describe this matter accurately and unambiguously' [Norton
(1) p.117n].
Nevertheless, says Norton, 'Hume's language gives some
credence' to this idea that he believed in 'moral qualities
that are unique and discontinuous' [ibid p.17n; 116n]. He
quotes from Hume's essay 'The Sceptic':
'Now, it is evident, that this [moral or aesthetic]
sentiment must depend on the particular fabric or
structure of the mind, which enables such particular forms
to operate in such a particular manner, and produces a
sympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects.
Vary the structure of the mind or inward organs, the
sentiment no longer follows, though the form remains the
same' [ibid p.117n].
Hume's interest in this essay is to disabuse those who think
that we can discern through the intellectual or 'cogitative'
part of our natures moral or aesthetic qualities. Rather, these
distinctions depend on the 'sensitive' part of our natures. It
is for this reason that he wants to argue that if our
consititution was different, we might not, for example, have a
notion of cruelty. And even if we did, there might be a
different range of actions which would be considered 'cruel'.
Thus there is a clear analogy with taste. Hume compares the
principles of what he calls 'mental tastes', such as moral
principles, with the principles of cooking and perfumery. The
only relevant difference here is that human beings vary more in
their taste as regards the latter two activities [G I 217].
Other species, that are less social than human beings, might
not vary more about food. For example, we can quite easily
imagine a Unicorn philosopher writing a parallel essay in an
attempt to convince other Unicorns that the 'sweetness' of the
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particular sort of grass that unicorns favour is not, in one
sense, a quality of the grass; and in the process referring to
how his species have a greater unicornity in their likes and
dislikes about eating than they have in morals. However, there
would be no reason to think that such an essay is in any sense
an expression of a 'realist' 'moral ontology': this would be to
lose sight of the point of the contrast with matters of fact,
and what the comparison with gustatory propensities implies.
So it seems that the sense of 'moral realism' and
'objective correlates' that Norton attributes to Hume is either
imaginary, as when he 'alludes' to what is 'elusive' or not
'developed' in Hume's theory; or else it is taken for granted
by all those cocimentators who see Hume as attempting to explain
the nature of our moral and aesthetic commitments, not through
reason, but through impressions of pain and pleasure.
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section 3
objectivity and 'a productive faculty'
I suggested above that what leads Norton to argue in the
above manner is his dissatisfaction with the 'naive
subjectivism' interpretation. He seems justified in rejecting
that interpretation. For Hume wanted to justify thoughts such
as these: the correctness of any moral judgment does not depend
on either the opinion of the individual or the opinion of
society; there is such a thing as moral improvement, and not
just a change of attitudes. Foot would have Hume reject such
thoughts.
That he held that moral distinctions do not depend on the
individual is clear from the following:
'The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the
pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any
sentiment or character; and as that pleasure or pain
cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows,
that there is just so much vice or virtue in any
character, as every one places in it, and that 'tis
impossible that we can ever be mistaken' [T546-7; emphasis
minej.
Thus, for example, it is certain, Hurne says, 'that there is a
moral obligation to submit to government, because every one
thinks so' [ibid].
There is another belief of Hume's which makes impossible
any crude subjectivist interpretation. This is his belief in
the possibility of moral improvement. It was argued in the
previous chapter that a powerful impetus behind Hume's
introduction of experimental reasoning into moral subjects was
his desire to set out the immorality of much of Christian
ethics. But can Hume consistently favour one set of attitudes
over another without having recourse to the rejected view that
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morality is a characteristic of actions in their own right? Or
else the rejected view that it is discernible through reason?
An answer to this will soon become apparent if we consider
a crucial element in the story of the genesis of a moral
attitude. This is the manner in which we sympathise with a
person or those whom his actions affect. It is this process
that makes possible the common point of view that allows shared
moral sentiments [T591]. (The great problem of Christianity,
Hume thinks, is that it subverts this natural habit by
introducing considerations extraneous to the question of the
happiness of others). Herein lies the importance for Hume of
conversation and social life. If virtue is discernible by
reason, then social intercourse could hardly be a necessary
condition of moral progress. If, however, moral distinctions
are arrived at through placing oneself in another's shoes, then
it becomes natural to suppose that comiere with otht's iir
our discernment through a greater awareness of points of view.
On the one hand we thus gain more experience of human beings,
and those things that will give them pleasure and pain [cf C IV
368]; on the other hand, the capacity of detaching ourselves
from our own point of view that is necessary for all talk
[T603], must inevitably increase our capacity to do this when
other people's happiness is at stake [cf chapter VI].
This talk of sensitivity gives us a notion of how we may be
fallible. We realise, for example, that in the past, perhaps
through the force of the education, or the influence of our
peers, we have not taken the interests of women into sufficient
consideration. We may have been blind to the experience we have
had; and also not have sufficiently searched out enough
experience. So we can 'go beyond saying of our moral
sensibility that it might change, to saying that it might
improve' [Blackburn (2) p.175].
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The naive subjectivist cannot justify this element in
morality. And nor, a fortiori, can the Hume of the naive
subjectivist interpretation. The thought that the latter model
is misguided becomes even stronger when we notice how Hume
emphasises that the morality of an action depends on facts
about the principles of the mind of the agent - not, that is,
on any facts about the spectator:
'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard
only the motives that produced them, and consider the
actions as signs or indications of certain principles in
the mind and temper' [T477; cf T575].
This should not, as I have mentioned, make us think that Hume
is in any way a 'realist'. For unless there are outward
criteria by which to assess an action we could never agree or
disagree about approval or disapproval.
I now want to argue that the most illuminating way of
thinking of Hume's moral theory is along projectivist lines.
And from this point of view, Norton's admission that he finds
'Hume's ontology of morals...elusive' [Norton (1) p.116n] is
unsurprising. For he neglects the role Flume attributes to the
imagination in associating external objects with internal
impressions.
Norton in fact notes that Hume uses a secondary quality
analogy. But he does not develop the point. What he says is
this: to say that virtue and vice are analogous to secondary
qualities, 'is not necessarily to commit oneself to a complete
subjectivism regarding these qualities' [ibid p.112n]. Flume's
'position in morals', he continues,
'appears to be analogous to that of the modern philosopher
who maintained that our perceptions of secondary qualities
have objective correlates, or are in fact affective
responses to publicly available aspects of the world'
[ibid].
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However Norton does not consider the significance of the fact
that Hume also uses a comparison with secondary qualities in
his account of necessity. This I shall now briefly do.
There are illusions and illusions. In Chapter II, for
example, we saw Hume explaining the genesis of the illusion
that objects have 'occult qualities'. Such an illusion, or
fiction, belongs to philosophers; though, as his explanation
makes plain, it has its origin in principles of the imagination
that are 'changeable, weak, and irregular' [T225]. Thus however
common such principles are, their conclusions ought to be
resisted. In the same way, one
'who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension
of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps,be said to reason,
and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the
same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as
arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to
health, the most agreeable and most natural situation of
man' [T225-6].
The question is: are ascriptions of goodness and bravery like
the false claims that there are ghosts in the dark?
The most recent answer to this is given by Robert Fogelin
in Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. After
arguing for a projectivist interpretation, he writes:
'Hume is fond of attributing endemic false beliefs to the
plain man. The plain man believes that colors, tastes,
scents, etc., reside in objects, but that is false...We
are now told that the same species of falsehood infects
all of his moral beliefs' [Fogelin p.144].
Fogelin, then, would give a positive answer to the question.
However, it is worth pointing out that Hume never says that all
'moral beliefs' are false; indeed, he does not speak of 'moral
beliefs' at all. But then nor does he say that all moral
'pronouncements' are 'false' or 'untrue'.
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It is better, I think, to hold fast to the distinction
between ordinary moral language, and statements about such
language. (This is a comparable distinction to that between
ordinary causal language and claims about 'ultimate powers'
discussed above in section 7 of Chapter I). What the
distinction amounts to is this. On the one hand, all moral
agents will tend to associate 'internal' impressions of
pleasure with 'external' impressions. Thus it seems to all that
such and such an action is different from another, and is to be
preferred. On the other hand, there are philosophers,
sophisticated and naive, who take it upon themselves to account
for this appearance by suggesting that there is a 'real'
quality of 'goodness' that is assimilable to matters of fact.
On this reading, the former group, by saying that 'X is
good' do not thus show that they are holding false beliefs. For
they may not be holding any beliefs at all about the relation
of moral attributes to tX-ie ori; they
uninterested in such discussions. And why should we attribute
to them a definite (false) view about the logical status of
moral attributes? The person who cries out that there is a
ghost in his dark room is making a more or less definite claim
about what, he fears, can be found in his room. But the person
who says that Alexander is brave, because it appears to him
that Alexander should be distinguis)7ed from others, Js not
committing himself to any theory about the status of that
quality. Therefore they cannot be accused of making a mistake.
Philosophers also make moral distinctions. A philosopher
may, for example, want to explain a pronouncement that 'X is
kind' when he sees X stop in the street and, he thinks, 'pass
the time of day' with a lonely old widow. He may want to
explain his pronouncement in terms of the Humeari theory under
consideration. He conjoins, he explains, an internal impression
with an external impression; and he says that upon having an
impression of X's action with an impression of pleasure, he
192
expresses his feelings using a language which informs others of
what they would feel if they viewed X thus. Accepting this
'productive' theory, no mistake would be made, no false belief
held, unless he had misunderstood, perhaps through naivete, the
action, as when, for example, he thought X was 'saying a kind
word' when really, she was giving a signal to a mugger around
the corner.
On this line of argument, the only makers of mistakes would
be either those ho hold erroneous philosophical theories about
why Alexander is brave or why swallowing goldfish alive is
cruel, or else tiose who for one reason or another do not
appreciate the pain or pleasure consequent upon certain
actions.
Now I have already said that one point of discussing the
role of the imagination in the science of Man is that it is the
best way of finding the unity within that project. This is
ap)arent when we consider together his account of virtue and
vice with his account of necessity.
We saw in Chapter I how Hurne explains the idea of necessity
through the effect that the constant conjunction of objects has
on the mind:
'Necessity...is the effect of this observation, and is
nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a
determination to carry our thoughts from one object to
another. Without considering it in this view, we can never
arrive at the most distant notion of it, or be able to
attribute it either to external or internal objects, to
spirit or body, to causes or effects' [T165].
Thus we do not get the impression of necessity from our senses;
so Hume reasons that it must arise from an 'internal
impression' or an 'impression of reflexion'. And the only such
impression, in his phrase, 'which has any relation to the
present business', is the propensity to pass from an 'object to
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the idea of its usual attendant' [ibid]. In this way, then, we
are able to reason about 'causes and 'effects'.
Now his account in Book III of the genesis of our ideas of
virtue and vice is remarkably similar. Here too he begins by
saying that
'nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions;
and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging,
loving, hating and thinking, fall under this
denomination' T456].
And, just as his argument in section vi, Part III of Book I is
designed to show that reason fails to explain our inference
from cause to effect, so too in the first section of Book III
does he attack the claim that moral distinctions are founded in
reason. Likewise, nor is there an impression to be found
through the senses: if you consider a vicious action, he says,
'in which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions,
motives, volitions and thoughts' [T468]. Thus as he puts it in
the Enquiry:
'The approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the
work of the judgement, but of the heart; and is not a
speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active
feeling or sentiment [E II 290].
And in the Treatise, he writes of how you can never find the
vice
'till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you,
towards this action' [T468-9].
Now this 'internal impression' of disapprobation, always makes
its appearance together with the 'external impressions' of the
action; without the latter, of course, there would not be the
former. In the same way, the 'internal impression' of necessity
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always makes its appearance with constant conjunctions. In each
case, the imagination conjoins impressions; and so actions, for
example, are considered as 'good' or 'bad'; and events are
considered as 'necessary'. This, then, is what Hume means by
speaking of the tendency of the mind to 'spread itself on
external objects' [T167].
I think it is worth noting a similarity that has been
brought out in the discussion of Norton's approach and that of
the 'projectivist' to Hume's theory of morals. Both contradict
the naive subjectivist interpretation and emphasise that some
form of objectivity is available. But how, in each case, is
this explained? Norton argues for a perception of
interdependence between sentiments and values:
'In Hume's opinion, there is some kind of objective moral
standard to which our moral judgments can be made to
conform more or less closely, but he apparently does not
think that this standard has an existence independent of
human beings or that our moral judgments are right or
wrong only as they correspond to some extrahuman reality'
[Norton (1) p.309-3lO].
But what is meant by that 'made to conform'? This indeed is
one problem with Norton's interpretation. That is, he has not
shown how Flume thinks that men can arrive at such standards.
Norton seems content to find Hume describing the fact that
human beings make moral distinctions without noting Flume's
account of their genesis in the imagination.
If, however, we have this genetic account in hand, we can
see how Flume thinks that human beings can reach 'objective'
decisions in the field of morals. Yet how can this be so? How,
from the peculiar fact that some internal impressions are
united with external impressions, can any degree of agreement
be reached? The answer, he thinks, lies in the way that men
learn to detach themselves from their own point of view, and to
judge instead by means of impersonal standards. This may not be
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easy, and I may not always feel the verdict which I pronounce.
For example, I may have no personal connection with a victim of
an attack	 which I am told about. However, because of the
resemblance of this person with others, I extend to his case
the 'concern' that I have for these others {T603]. Without this
ability to act upon general rules, we would indeed be at the
mercy of capricious tendencies of the imagination.
'The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and
conversation, makes us form some general inalterable
standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of
characters and manners. And tho' the heart does not always
take part with those general notions, or regulate its love
and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse,
and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on
the theatre, and in the schools' Li-bid; cf E II 272].
This searching for rules may sound familiar. In the first
chapter of the present work, I noted how Hume relies on our
ability to act upon general rules in order to explain how we
regulate our judgments about causes and effects. Some such
account is needed, for Hume wants to say that 'all reasonings
are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no
influence, but by inlivening the imagination, and giving us a
strong conception of any object' [T149]. If this is the case,
then how do we explain those instances where judgment and
imagination seem to be contrary? As, for example, when we
happen to be hanging in an iron cage out of a very high tower.
This difficulty, says Hume,
'we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing
the influence of some general rules' [i-bid].
We attribute the fear to the imagination; the belief that he
will not fall to the judgment. The belief, in fact, is
attributable to the influence of general rules through which we
regulate our judgment.
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So too with morality. Here there is often an 'opposition'
between our 'feelings' and our moral commitments. Here too
there is a need for general rules to make social life possible.
It is impossible, Hume writes, that
'men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments and judgments,
unless they chose some common point of view, from which
they might survey their object, and which might cause it
to appear the same to all of them' [T591].
Such a point of view can only be found, Hume thinks, by
considering the 'interest or pleasure' of the character under
examination; or that 'of persons, who have a connexion with
him':
'such interests and pleasures...are alone admitted in
speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They
alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on
which moral distinctions depend' [ibid].
This, then, is how the 'internal impression' of disapprobation
is arrived at; and it is difficult, to see how this account
could be presented without placing the imagination at its
centre. But if we do this, we can have a far more complete
interpretation of Hume's moral theory than the one given by
Norton. Norton, that is, believes that Hume's 'moral ontology'
is 'elusive' [Norton (1) p.117n11; and so Norton in effect
assumes an interdependence of values and sentiments. He thus
misses the chance to show how Hume advances a theory which
explains, through the use of a few simple principles, how 'the
productive faculty...raises in a manner	 a new creation' [E
II 294]. In this way men have moral (and aesthetic) standards
which are as objective as they need.
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section 4
dangers
I want to end by discussing where Hume thought that the
danger to morality lies.
Firstly, I will argue that Hume wants to redefine the
sources of danger to morality, moving from the philosophical
arena, as represented by the selfish theorists, to religion.
Integral to his considered view on the philosophies of Hobbes
and Mandeville is his attempt to dissociate himself from those
who think that their philosophies are dangerous. This in fact
is to contradict Norton's thesis that Flume's moral theory
developed in response to a moral crisis introduced by Hobbes
and Marideville.
Secondly, Hume wants to assure the reader that a theory,
such as his own, that denies, as we have seen, common
prejudices about the objectivity of morals, will have no direct
effect on practice.
Finally, I argue that the projective propensity of the
imagination plays a crucial and thematically unifying role in
explaining the genesis of false (and dangerous) views about
morality.
We can begin with the first point. Norton presents Hume as
responding to a 'Crise Morale': this 'crisis' Norton suggests,
was due 'in no small way' to Hobbes, the 'Terror of Malmesbury'
[Norton (1) p.13]. Hume's response, he says, is to be seen as
attempting to place ethics on an 'objective' foundation and so
refute the 'moral scepticism' of Hobbes and Mandeville [ibid
p.43]. Hume is a member, he says, of an 'antisceptical
tradition' the principal
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figures of which are Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and which
included Ralph Cudworth, George Turnbull, and Lord Kames.
Shaftesbury, Norton says, found the 'scepticism of Hobbes and
Locke' more than ridiculous. He paraphrases:
'They are a threat to the whole fabric of morality; they
threaten to undermine moral concern because they deny the
objectivity of morals' [ibid p.36].
Hutcheson too, he says, 'finds the egoism of Hobbes a real
threat to the well-being of mankind' [ibid p.63].
The adequacy of Norton's analysis of Shaftesbury's and
Hutcheson's fears cannot be examined here. What I will now
consider is Hume's understanding of the relation between the
theories of the 'moral sceptics t and practice.
There are reasons I believe for thinking that Norton has
overestimated Hume's anxiety about the claims of the 'moral
sceptics'. This is not to say that Norton ignores other issues
in determining the shape of Hume's intentions in ethics - he
rightly emphasises the problem Hume discerned in religion [ibid
p.151; cf ibid p.246-249]. Nevertheless, Norton passes from the
anxiety of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to answer the sceptics, to
Hume, without remarking on the great difference between the
thoughts of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and Hume's own beliefs
about the effects of 'moral scepticism' on common life.
The question is not whether Hume disagreed with the
conclusions of the 'moral sceptics'. The question is: should
one present Hume as part of an 'anti-sceptical moral
tradition', even with the proviso that he belongs to other
traditions as well [Norton (1) p.43]. Relatedly, should we say
with Norton that Hume's theory of morals 'developed in
response...to...a moral crisis' [ibid p.9]? Norton's thesis,
then, is not just that Hume is a de facto member of an 'anti-
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sceptical moral tradition', in the same way perhaps, as a
suffering Wagnerian might consider her grumbling husband as a
de facto member of an anti-Wagnerian tradition. The analogy
would instead be with a husband whose aesthetic principles are
based on his rejection of Wagner.
But the major problem with this idea is that Hume did not
consider the 'moral sceptics' dangerous. We shall see that he
goes out of his way to dissociate himself from the common view
that the 'selfish theorists' are dangerous.
Evidence that Norton calls on, to present Hume's moral
theory as a response to a moral crisis, includes the letter
Flume wrote to Hutcheson in 1739, which was briefly discussed in
section 3 of the previous chapter. In that letter, Hume
comments on Hutcheson's words on a draft of Book III of the
Treatise, and he says that it 'affected him' that Hutcheson had
noticed little 'Warmth in the Cause of Virtue'. Now, Norton
claims that this is a reference to a supposed neglect of the
issue of 'moral scepticism'. But if we look carefully at the
Treatise, Norton suggests, 'we can see that he did think of
himself as defending the cause of virtue'. Moreover,
'we can also see against whom he was defending that cause,
and that at least as early as 1738-9 he was beginning to
identify [Hobbes' and Mandeville's] views as sceptical'
[ibid p.45].
Yet if we place the 'warmth' sentence in a fuller context it
appears quite impossible to interpret it in Norton's way. Hume
writes of Hutcheson's worry about the want of
'a certain warmth in the Cause of Virtue, which, you think
all good men wou'd relish and wou'd not displease amidst
abstract Enquirys' EL I 32].
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Surely we are not to think that Hume is distinguishing between
the philosophy of Hobbes and Mandeville and 'abstract
Enquirys'? Furthermore, Norton's understanding of the 'warmth'
phrase would make totally mysterious the reason that Hume
offers Hutcheson in defence of his approach:
'Any warm Sentiment of Morals I am afraid, wou'd have the
Air of Declamation amidst abstract Reasonins, and wou'd
be esteem'd contrary to good Taste' EL I 33J.
How could he have worried, that the sort of arguments displayed
in the Second Enquiry about the selfish theorists, could have
an 'air of declamation'? Far from being maidenly outbursts
against wicked men, his rejection of their theories is based on
observation [E II 214-218; E II 295-302].
In the essay 'Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature',
Hume notes how on the one hand there are 'those who represent
man as a kind of human demigod'; and on the other hand, there
are those who: 'insist upon the blind sides of human nature,
and can discover nothing, except vanity' [G I 151]. But Hume is
not content with stating these opinions and thereafter
assessing them. He also wants to explain why one person should
prefer one side of the question to another.
Employing a typical approach, Hume begins the essay by
drawing our attention to the way that philosophers, poets and
theologians, have divided over the issue. It is not, he notes,
always possible to chart the influence of these sects: the
learned may act through the force of sympathy without anyone
being aware of this; nevertheless, such pressures have a large
influence on the content of a philosopher's beliefs:
'though some times...[thes e s ect s]...come not to an open
rupture, they give a different turn to the ways of
thinking of those who have taken part on either side'
[ibid 150].
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Ultimately, however, the divisions on the issue of the dignity
of human nature depend on the individual constitution of its
members. For against the vulgar view about, say, Mandeville,
that he was an evil man with evil intentions, Hume refers us to
the psychological causes that lead to the views of the selfish
theorists. Thus the 'views' of Mandeville, or such a
philosopher, are explained by reference to his predominant
passions and the forces of cantonization. So if his
'turn lie towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws
himself into the party of those denigrating man' [ibid].
On the other hand, those who 'possess the talent of rhetoric
and declamation' will be more likely to exalt man and represent
him as 'a kind of human demigod' [ibid].
What of the influence of these sects? As to the selfish
theorists, Hume says that he is 'far from thinking, that all
those, who have depreciated our species, have been enemies to
virtue' and have acted with any 'bad intention' [ibid]. Indeed
a 'delicate sense of morals' may lead to a 'disgust of the
world' and so the belittlement of motives [ibid]; one might add
that Swift would seem a suitable example here.
Nevertheless, Hume is of the opinion that the sentiments of
those 'who are inclined to think favourably of mankind are more
advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles'
'When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank
or character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour
to act up to it, and will scorn to do a base or vicious
action, which might sink him below that figure which he
makes in his own imagination' [ibid].
But such secular philosophies have little effect on practice.
Hume thinks that there is a 'dispute of words in the
controversy': it is impossible for one to be so 'selfish, or
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rather so stupid' as to have no preference for certain people
or qualities. One who claims that all benevolence flows from
self-love will in fact distinguish between injury and kindness
[ibid 154]. In brief, whatever the causes of our sentiments,
the practice remains the same. So one, Hume writes in the
Enquiry, who imagines that tiose who profess a philosophy of
self-love cannot possibly feel the sentiment of benevolence,
will 'find himself, in practice, very much mistaken' . Thus we
find, for example, that Hobbes and Locke lived 'irreproachable
lives' [E II 296; cf H VI 153].
Yet the case is not the same with other propounders of the
view that man is a mean creature. Such as certain religioniists:
these form 'a new and secret comparison between man and beings
of the most perfect wisdom' [G I 153]. This is an element in
the way it corrupts the heart of man. Religion is an inconstant
force, and sometimes this perfect being is feared, and man
enters with gratitude into the austere regimen that the priests
prescribe; sometimes, however, this fear is forgotten, and
religion functions as a cover for the pursuit of worldly goods.
Thus religion makes contact with the passions and interest in
the way that speculative views alone cannot. (Though with this
added impetus, it is perhaps hardly surprising that secular
'selfish' philosophies such as those of Hobbes and t1andeville
appear). Hume's views on the nature of religious belief are the
subject of the final chapter; for the moment the argument can
be noted that it is against religion, rather than against the
'moral sceptics' that Hume wants to defend the 'Cause of
Virtue'.
The second point I consider is the way that Hurne attempts
to reassure his readers that a belief in the subjective source
of our moral sentiments will not of itself have any influence
on practice.
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Hume did not believe that by itself belief in a subjective
theory of morals would lead to the neglect of one's moral
duties. If we place the well known comparison of values with
secondary qualities as given in the Treatise and 'The Sceptic'
in a larger context we can see his interest in this issue. In
the former he writes:
'this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is
to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the
speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little
or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real or
concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and
uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and
unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the
regulation of our conduct and behaviour' [T469].
After presenting the comparison in 'The Sceptic', Hume writes:
'This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the
reality of the latter qualities than from that of the
former: nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or
to moralists. Tho' colours were allowed to be only in the
eye, wou'd dyers or painters ever be less regarded or
esteem'd?' [C I 219n].
The reason is that we act on account of the impressions we
receive. Moral life, in fact, is only interrupted when
philosophical theories serve to cover the activities of certain
sectional interests.
And this leads me to the third and final point about danger
and the gilding imagination. In Chapter II we saw Hume's view
that the propensity of man to hypostatize necessity plays an
important role in the construction of the false view of man as
a creature of reason. This conception of man as distinguished
from the animals naturally supports a religious metaphysic, not
least through presenting man as uniquely equipped to find the
secrets of the universe. Now the same pattern is found in
morality. It is
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reason that is thought to guide man in his conduct. The error
begins with our mistaking calm passions for determinations of
reason. Thus speaking of calm passions such as feelings of
benevolence, or the aversion to evil, flume writes:
'When any of these passions are calm, and cause no
disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the
determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from
the same fac.ult, with that which judges of truth and
falshood' [T417j.
Because of this it becomes natural to suppose that the
viciousness of a murder is something, crudely, that the mind
discovers. Either this is on account of our supposedly
'discovering' the viciousness 'in' the act; an illusion due to
the way we associate certain acts with viciousness - the way we
'gild' the world; or it is due to the manner in which our
faculty of reason is thought to discover eternal relations of
morality.
Thus on the one hand flume attacks such views; on the other
hand, he explains, through appealing to the faculty of the
imagination, their development. But the attack on this picture
of rational man has a theological significance which provides
an essential counterpart to his work on miracles, and his
attack on natural theology. Prudent in the Treatise, this is
well brought out in a letter to Hutcheson written in 1740:
'I wish from my Heart, I coud avoid concluding, that since
Morality according to your opinion as well as mine, is
determin d merely by Sentiment, it regards only human
nature & human Life...If Morality were determind by
Reason, that is the same to all rational Beings: But
nothing but experience can assure us, that the Sentiments
are the same. What experience have we with regard to
superior Beings? How can we ascribe to them any Sentiments
at all?' EL I 40].
Hutcheson, of course, believed that through revelation we have
had experience of superior beings.
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Hume believes,I have argued, that the danger to morality
lies in religion, and not in any form of scepticism. The former
can make contact with the passions of man; the latter cannot.
In the final chapter I argue that he believed that not only do
the clergy invert the proper relation of reason and the
passions in order to create a supernatural sanction for their
morality; but the content of Christian morality is arrived at
through inverting natural moral precepts. Instead of serving
society, Christian precepts serve one section of society, that
is, the clergy. However, before then, I will turn to consider
the way that Hume founds his science of politics on the
imagination. Here too, we will find Hume's interest in religion
playing a crucial role. What we are beginning to see, then, are
some of the practical as well as the theoretical implications
that Hume believes his work on the imagination has.
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Chapter V
Politics
introduction
The family motto of the Homes was 'True to the End'. The
motto is peculiarly fitting to Hurne's beliefs. To be sure,
after the publication of A Dissertation on the Passions, Hurne
wrote no more of the imagination; but letters, essays, and the
volumes of the History, written after this date, all show Flume
employing principles of human nature that he had attempted to
explain in terms of the imagination in the Treatise. In the
final chapter I will examine in detail instances in the History
where these conclusions inform Hume's thought. But in the
present chapter, which is about how his work on the imagination
underpins his political writings, the continuity in his thought
is illustrated mostly through reference to letters and essays.
In studying Hume's political writings, Duncan Forbes has
taught us to make the distinction between the political amateur
observing the scene, and the philosopher whose 'chief business'
it is 'to regard the general course of things' [Forbes (1)
p.l25; G I 288]. In the first two sections of this chapter, the
argument supports the idea that the opinions of Hume the
amateur on certain political episodes that occurred in the last
twelve years of his life, have their intellectual foundation in
the Treatise. For what we can see is that in the 1760's and
1770's, Hume began to conclude that the English did not possess
the required ability to discern the public interest. Certain
episodes, perhaps above all the Wilkes affair, led him to
conclude that here was a country rapidly falling back to a
barbarous state. He found evidence for this conclusion in the
way that the English were allowing themselves to be ruled by
the primitive disposition to serve the interests only of their
own clan - which in eighteenth century England, often meant
207
serving the interests of their political party. They did not
seem to possess, that is, the civilised training that teaches
men to rise above such dispositions and to take an impartial
view of matters. Certainly, responding to the interests of
friends and fellow Whigs or Tories is natural in one sense of
the term. Because the imagination works as it does, we are more
affected by the beliefs and desires of those 	 whom we are
near, those to whom we are related, and those to whom we
resemble. But it is also natural for men in a larger society to
be able, in a manner, to detach themselves from such feelings.
The savage or barbarian cannot do this; the citizen of the
civilised society must. And when he is a member of a society
which has a delicately balanced constitution, the matter
becomes all the more pressing, and all the more difficult.
In the third section I note that a constant theme in his
late letters about the English is that they had neglected the
arts for the delights of faction. What is the significance of
art for the growth of political wisdom? I suggest that Hume
conceived an important part of the training necessary to take
complicated political decisions, as consisting in the
cultivation of an interest in the arts. To appreciate a work of
art, Flume argues, one has to detach oneself from one's own
desires and interests, and find the point of view that the work
requires. One consequence is that the more practised one is at
appreciation, the more one can have 	 of oneself'; and
so ignore, in the examination of questions, the irrelevant.
Elume is quite explicit about art strengthening our powers of
judgment in general: in this section I attempt to draw the
political consquences. I argue that he thought that art
provides for the many that process of discipline which
philosophy provides for the few.
One effect of art, then, can be the dampening of the
violent passions that so disturb judgment; and which, given the
social nature of political activity, and man's susceptibility
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to share the passions of others, disturb political judgment in
particular.
In section 4 I turn attention to another genre, the essay.
Once again we see Hume's earlier conclusions shaping his
thought. Here the subject is his conception of the role of the
philosopher in political life, as it is discussed in the 1741/2
essays. An important element in this role is found in Hume's
commitment to the virtue of'rnoderation'. I argue that here we
see Hume employing his theory about how the passions and the
imagination interact that was discussed in Chapter III. More
specifically, I suggest that his analysis of the causes of
immoderate behaviour in party life is founded on certain
assumptions that have their foundation in Book II of the
Treatise. Above all, I try to bring out the importance of the
Principle of the Conversion of Passion.
The final two sections concentrate on Hurne's analysis of
party or faction.
The finely balanced British Constitution made it
imperative, Hume thought, for men to understand that they could
best serve those they most cared for by serving the interests
of all. It was also necessary to see how men can be misled,
perhaps even so far as to endanger the Constitution itself, by
their factious behaviour.
So in section 5 the subject is Hume's analysis of how
parties evolve reasons which seem to their members to justify
riding roughshod over the claims of justice. This analysis
provides Hume with an analysis of factious behaviour of far
greater subtlety than the common Augustan conclusion that party
men are merely hypocrites. For he shows how, approved by
members of their own party, men come to believe that their
sectional acts are praiseworthy. The party thus benefits by the
way that man is adapted for social life.
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In section 6, I discuss Hume's analysis of why men gather
into political parties. It is argued that his 'scientific'
explanation is founded on the way that men associate certain
ideas in the imagination. Finally, I turn to his examination of
the parties of his day. What he thinks is revealing about the
Whigs and the Tories is the way that they have produced
philosophical reasons to cover their real motives. These
reasons are in fact religious reasons. And it is precisely the
religious element in British political life that explains the
peculiar and dangerous immoderate behaviour of the parties. The
very weakness of religious belief leads men, on the one hand,
to desire to bolster it through the support of the like minded;
and on the other hand, to hate those whose lack of belief
weakens their own belief.
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section 1
judgment and prejudice
One aim of this chapter is to bring out Hume's view that in
a modern polity, man needs a certain sort of civic training if
his judgment is not to be perverted through dispositions more
suitable to a 'barbarous' age. The thesis will be developed
through examining on the one hand, a series of letters written
late in his life; and on the other hand, his theoretical
writings. So I begin by comparing his comments on the Wilkes
affair of 1768-1771 with his comments on two other events: the
'Popish Plot' of 1678, and the Douglas Cause of 1763-9. Later
in the chapter I will attempt to show the foundations for his
views in his philosophical writings.
But what were these events? In 1764 John Wilkes fled to
France after being expelled from the House of Commons for
printing an obscene parody of Pope's 'Essay on Man', called
'Essay on Woman'. Wilkes, however, had annoyed the government
in the months previous to this scandal. He had infuriated
George III through a bitter campaign against the Treaty of
Paris that ended the Seven Year War in 1763. In fact he went so
far as suggesting in his newspaper, the 'North Briton', that
the King should not profane St. Pauls by attending a service of
thanksgiving there [Plumb p.106]. His subsequent arrest was
followed by a claim of innocence; the successful suing of
Halifax for damages done to property during his arrest; and for
the first time the cry in the streets of 'Wilkes and Liberty'.
From the evidence of the letters all this seems to have
disturbed Hume little: we can only find him remarking on
Wilkes' apparent conversion to the anti-Scots prejudice of
London political life. Wilkes' 'national Reflections', he says
in a letter to Andrew Millar, 'are low, vulgar, & ungenerous'
[L I 383]. In contrast, four years later, after Wilkes had
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returned to London, Hume at times expressed the bitterest
sentiments.
What happened? Troubles began when Wilkes stood as a
parliamentary candidate for Middlesex and gained massive
support. The government, under the Duke of Grafton, prosecuted
him for obscene libel and he was jailed for eighteen months.
Yet the people re-elected him; and went on re-electing him when
the House declared his election illegal. The electors of
Middlesex believed that he had been hounded by the government
for political purposes; and that the House of Commons was a
'complaisant tool of the royal will' [Plumb p.106]. Over the
next few years, Wilkes became the focus of radical opposition
[Pocock p.8l].
It is true, Hume's anxiety during this period cannot be
wholly explained through reference to Wilkes. That stich. at.
affair, one fit to be ridiculed when it began [L II 197],
should take a hold on the political life of Britain, was an
indication, Hume seems to have believed, of a deep cultural and
political malaise. The country seemed by the autumn of 1769 to
be divided. Indeed, writing to Strahan in October 1769, Hume
went so far as to wonder whether the discontent on the streets
would infect the army EL II 2101. On the one side there were
the Wilkites and the mob shouting for liberty - without, says
Hume, knowing what liberty they want: they are
'without any Grievance, I do not only say, real, but even
imaginary; and without any of them being able to tell one
Circumstance of Government which they wish to have
corrected: They roar Liberty, tho' they have apparently
more Liberty than any People in the World; a great deal
more than they deserve' EL II 180].
On the other side, there was the King and Lord Grafton. It is
difficult to think that Hume had a high opinion of the former;
and though he thought well of Grafton, he remarks, in
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the letter to Strahan already quoted, that 'Youth deprives him
of Experience arid still more of Authority' [ibid 210]. I dare
not venture, he adds, 'to play the Prophet, but think you are
in great Danger' [ibid].
As I mentioned above, Hume compared the Wilkes affair with
two other events.
Writing to Hugh Blair in March 1769, Hume makes the
comparison between the 'madness about Wilkes' and the
'absurdity of Titus Oates and the popish plot' - the latter
being the illusion that there was a Catholic plot to oust
Charles II. In fact he thought that the folly of the former
exceeded that of the latter. The
'popish plot...being derivd from Religion, flow'd from a
Source, which has, from uniform ?rescription, acquirà a
Right to impose Nonsense on all Nations & all Ages' ilL II
197].
Now the reason for his comparison can be found in the History.
In his discussion of the 'plot', Hume remarks at one point:
'In this disposition of the nation, reason could no more
be heard than a whisper in the midst of the most violent
hurricane' [i-i VI 342].
Such was the power of the passions, aided and abetted, as it
were, by the 'mutual contagion of the sentiments', that men
'reasoned more from their fears and their passions than from
the evidence before them' [ibid 340].
The very idea that there was a 'popish plot' reduced Hume
to astonishment at the credulity of the people. But such was
the 'torrent...of national prejudices ' that 'even some later
historians... { were ] ... swayed by the concurring judgment of such
multitudes' [ibid 347]. What was lacking was the detachment
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necessary to apply 'reason and argument and common sense' [ibid
33 3 ]. For example, it was clear to Hume that it is 'an obvious
principle, that a witness, who perjures himself in one
circumstance, is credible in none' [ibid 347; cf T522]. And
yet, the 'tremendous fictions' of the 'infamous villain' Oates,
were believed by the people [H VI 343; 345].
Hume saw similar forces at work in the affair of the
Douglas Cause. This was a dispute between the guardians of the
Duke of Hamilton and those of James Edward Steuart over the
inheritance of the Duke of Douglas, who died in 1761. Archibald
Steuart was claimed to be the nephew of the late Duke; but the
guardians of the Duke of Hamilton, who included William Mure
and Andrew Stuart, close friends of Hume, disputed Steuart's
lineage. In 1769, to Hurne's great dismay, his friends lost
their case in the House of Lords.
Hume perceived passion, partiality and prejudice in the
support that many gave to this 'obviously' wrong judgment. The
same factors, that is, that he perceived as wrecking judgment
in the case of Wilkes. It was not a lack of intelligence that
was the problem; but the want of a detached application of the
understanding. Unfortunately, he said, writing to Blair,
'the public..are perfectly pleas'd with the Sentence;
being sway'd by Compassion and a few popular Topics' [L U
198].
The arguments accepted by the Law Lords were 'scandalous';
alas,
'all was good enough for their Audience, who, bating their
Quality, are most of them little better than their
Brethren, the Wilkites, in the streets' [ibid].
Hume also wrote to Mute about the affair. Two years previously
he had cause to congratulate Mure on the Court of Session's
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judgment in favour of Hamilton. In that letter he expressed his
belief that there was 'little Chance' that the Law Lords would
reverse the decision EL II 153]. This mistake may explain his
interest in providing a full analysis of their Lordship's
supposed error, just as, perhaps, it may itself be explained by
the factors of passion and partiality that figure in that
analysis. As in the letter to Blair already quoted, Hume
reports how he sees this as a battle lost against 'Prejudice,
Clamour and Nonsense'. Lord Mansfield, the victorious
protagonist in the Lords won because he trusted the 'Prejudice
of the Public' who never sought to understand the details of
the case, and who were 'sway'd by Compassion' [L II 200].
Here, then, is another instance of the failure of judgment
as a consequence of prejudice. And this is why Hume compares
the 'Audience' at the Lords to the 'Wilkites in the Street';
and the Wilkes affair to the 'popish plot'.
However, to appreciate the causes of Hume's anxiety, we
must go deeper than the comments of Hume the amateur political
observer. He understood, I suggest, the causes of the
'approaching crisis' in terms of the defence of the rules of
justice against the consequences of the primitive disposition
to gather into groups. Or, in the political arrangements of a
civilised nation, factions. Ultimately, it is only through
considering his beliefs about the dispositions of the
imagination that we can explain his view that	 sound
political judgment is possible only if man has been trained to
detach himself from such forces of prejudice. For that is a
condition for the establishment of justice; and that is also a
condition for sound political judgment.
Here the factions were the King and his ministers and
Wilkes and the opposition. Hume's hope was that the rule of law
would be upheld against the forces of faction, and that Grafton
would act with vigour:
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'This frenzy of the people, so epidemical and so much
without a Cause admits of only one Remedy, which however
is a dangerous one, and requires more vigour than has
appeard in any minister of late' {L II 210].
So he thought that the 'Niatter will only be worse, i there be
no shooting or hanging next Winter' [ibid]. Four months later
he told Strahan that
'Open Violence gives such a palpable Reason for the severe
Execution of the Laws, a thing much wanted, that it ought
immediately to be laid hold of, and it will have a very
salutary Effect' {L II 213].
And in March 1770 he wrote:
'There must necessarily be a struggle between the Mob and
the Constitution...I wish...(I cannot say I hope) that
vigorous Measures will be taken; an impeachment
immediately voted of the Mayor...and Habeas Corpus
suspended till next meeting of Parliament' EL II 218].
Now we shall see later that Hume was not alone in fearing the
effects of faction. But what is striking is how his analysis
has a foundation in the view, presented thirty years before,
that justice is always under the potential threat of faction on
account of the way that the imagination works. Not to put too
fine a point on the matter: reasons of justice are only
'satisfactory to man in his civilis'd state and when train'd up
according to a certain discipline and education' [T479]. Only
then will he submit to the authority of established government,
and not endanger the rules of justice. Otherwise, he will be
motivated by partial demands of a clan - or faction. And so the
question for Hume was: how 'c.ivilis'd' were the English? Or
would they destroy the rules of justice through their factious
behaviour?
We have already seen, in Chapter III, the theoretical
foundation in the imagination of a phenomenon integrally
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related to this threat. This is the phenomenon of 'madness'. It
is related in that it is sympathy which makes possible that
'prejudice' which defines a faction where a point of view is
shared by all its members. This happens through the
communication of sentiments. This 'contagion' of thought,
however, sometimes has the effect that a person will be wholly
under the influence of the beliefs of a faction and thus quite
unable to judge the evidence with the detachment necessary for
an objective point of view.
It is in this context that we should understand the
language of madness and faction that Hume uses in letters
during the 1760's and 1770's. Thus he comments to Strahan in
March 1770, with reference to the Wilkes affair, 'Good God!
What abandon'd Madmen there are in England!' [L II 218]. For
Adam Smith, a month earLier, he had described the Engfls1i as
'wicked, abandon'd Madmen' [ibid 214]. In the summer of 1770,
he wrote to Strahan:
'The Madness and Wickedness of the English (for do not
say, the Scum of London) appear astonishing, even after
all the Experience we have had. It must end fatally either
to the King or Constitution or to both' [ibid 226].
Indeed, his perception of the madness and factiousness in
England is reflected in his attitudes towards his own projects.
In January 1772 he tells the Comptesse de Boufflers that he
will write no more history or philosophy: he does not want to
'expose [himself] to the censure of such factious and
passionate readers as this country abounds with' [ibid 255; cf
ibid 209, 214]. Two weeks later he remarks to Benjamin
Franklin:
'So factious is this country! I expected, in entering on
my literary course, that all the Christians, all the
Whigs, and all the Tories, should be my enemies. But it is
hard that all the English, Irish and Welsh, should be also
against me' [ibid 258].
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Strahan, meanwhile, soon receives a reminder that the English
are 'factious Barbarians' [ibid 261]; and then in January 1773
he is told that Hume will not be continuing his writing not
least because of the prejudices of a stupid, factious Nation',
with whom Hume is 'heartily disgusted' [ibid 269].
It certainly seems to be the case that Hume was keenly
aware of the phenomena of faction, prejudice, and madness. A
clue as to the reasons behind this concern may be found in a
remark of February 1774 made to Smith, a fellow observer of the
English scene, and of the 'general course of things' [G I 260].
Hume remarked that 'Faction, next to Fanaticism, is, of all
passions, the most destructive of Morality' [ibid 286]
How does his earlier work on the imagination help us in
understanding these sentiments? Perhaps we can begin to answer
this question if we turn to see how he thinks that the rules of
justice develop.
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section 2
justice and government
Faction, it seems, is capable of upsetting judgment. I now
want to turn to the theoretical description of this danger
found in his account in the Treatise of how man acquires the
capability of discerning the public interest. I begin with the
formation of the conventions of justice.
Man does not enter into the conventions of justice out of
benevolence, but from interest [T489]. Yet that interest is not
adequately described through reference to his owh desires: if
we 'consult common experience' we will find that whilst it is
rare to meet with one who loves any person more than himself,
it is also rare
'to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken
together, do not over-balance all the selfish' [T487].
This narrow orientation towards a few would not, however,
render a union with others precarious were it not for the
scarcity and insecurity of external goods [ibid]. Such a
conjunction of temper and circumstances seems incommodious and
even dangerous to the union. The remedy arises from artifice,
'or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in
the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and
incommodious in the affections' [T489].
But it is not that our desire for the welfare of ourselves and
family is somehow lessened by reason. This would be to
contradict Hume's famous thesis about reason and the passions.
Rather reason shows man how to achieve his desired end [cf
T414]. So it guides the passions away from their 'partial and
contradictory motions'. We discover that
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'Instead of departing from our own interest, or from that
of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the possessions
of others, we cannot better consult both these interests,
than by such a convention' [ibid].
So in order to maintain the society that is necessary for 'the
well being and subsistence' of both ourselves and those we
love, we find that we must train ourselves so as to guide
certain other natural tendencies of the imagination. For the
rude savage cannot understand the notion of justice as a
principle 'capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct
towards each other' [T488; cf E It 247n]. This is because
praise or blame depends on the usual force of the passions
[T488; cf T483]. And in the 'original frame of mind' the
strongest attention is to ourselves, and then to our family,
and then to acquaintances.
'From all which it follows, that our natural uncultivated
ideas of morality, instead of providing a remedy for the
partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves
to that partiality, and give it an additional force and
influence' [T489].
Ultimately this is due to dispositions of the imagination.
Because of their familiarity and the fact that they are
connected with ourselves, there is an 'easy transition' from
the idea of ourselves to the idea of family and friends. And so
these 'objects' are conceived in more 'lively manner' than
others. Thus the normal invigorating effects of company are
increased; consequently, we gain an affection for them [T353;
cf section 2 Chapter IV ].
This, then, is why in one sense of the term, justice is not
natural. Far from a rude savage being satisfied with a rule of
justice as a reason for action, he would not 'understand the
Meaning of them, independent of Society' [LG 32]. If he gains
satisfaction, then this is on account of his having served the
interests of his clan.
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Hume's account of how we acquire the capacity to make
plitical judgments proceeds on similar lines. Here too we must
see beyond the immediate interests of our family or clan. And
again, government is necessary not because of the weakness of
reason, but because of the situation we find ourselves in with
regard to external objects. And if it is the circumstances and
situation that renders a passion calm or violent, and we cannot
change our passions, then we had better - as with justice -
change our situation with regard to those objects. For
'men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and
proportion their affections more to the light, under which
any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic
value' [T534j.
So here too Hume founds his account of political obligation
through drawing consequences from his theory of the
imagination. What happens is that we will prefer that good
which strikes us more forcefully to the greater good. \e 'yield
to the solicitations of our passions, which always plead in
favour of whatever is near and contiguous' [T535]. This
characteristic of man is made more dangerous through the
disposition we have to imitate each other. Your (bad) example
'pushes me forward by way of imitation' as well as showing me a
new reason for contravening the rules of justice [ibid]. Again,
Hume is using an insight displayed elsewhere to bolster his
(Hobbesian) point that if you ate uot 	 tc obj t
then I have no reason to either; the insight is of the
imitative aspect of human nature that is one aspect of the
phenomenon of sympathy [cf section 2 Chapter III].
The remedy is government: as we cannot change our passions,
'the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and
situation, and render the observance of the laws of
justice our nearest interest' [T537].
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So we render the observance of justice the immediate interest
of those we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers'
[ibid]. These persons, our 'governors or rulers', enforce the
dictates of justice [ibid]. And this is the first advantage of
government.
There is another function of government in the deciding
about controversies between parties according to the rules of
justice. This may be highlighted by comparing his account with
what Locke has to say about this need for impartiality. Locke
thinks that one of the principal reasons that man has for
entering political society is that the Executive and
Legislative power that nianpossesses in the state of nature,
will lead to quarrels that can only be resolved by civil
government. For
''tis easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to
do his Brother an injury 1 will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it' [Locke (2) para. 13].
Hume, though, employs an inference from his 'experimental'
account:
'As violent passion hinders men from seeing distinctly the
interest they have in equitable behaviour towards others
so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself' [T5381.
But the indifference that the magistrate has to 'the greatest
part of the society' will result in a more equitable judgment
than 'every one wou'd in his own case' [ibid].
In this way, then, government is founded and men are made
to perceive their interest in supporting a 'composition',
which, though composed out of men subject to 'all human
infirmities', is 'in some measure, exempted from all these
infirmities' [T539].
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Evidently, though, there can be disputes not only about a
theft of acorns, but about the extent of the government's own
powers. Such was the case with the Wilkes affair.
Hume, we saw in the previous section, viewed the result of
the Douglas Cause as symptomatic of the prevalence of harmful
factious prejudice. But if Hamilton's loss was not as dangerous
as the Wilkes affair, that affair can in turn be distinguished
from the 'popish plot' as being an 'Extravagance peculiar to
Ourselves' [L II 197]. This singularity was on account of the
particular nature of the British Constitution. Where a part
republican, part monarchical government is combined with great
liberty, the opportunities for factious behaviour are great. It
is precisely because of this fact that those living under the
British Constitution will have to acquire, if the constitution
is to survive, two different sorts of knowledge. On the one
hand they will have to acquire an understanding of their own
peculiar constitution, and this will naturally be more
difficult than for a people Urig uwXer a siip'ie costfl.on.
On the other hand, they need to have an understanding of their
own natures and the forces at work that can corrupt their
judgment; especially, the causes and the effects of faction.
Ruder arrangements allow ruder people to live within them, but
that delicate political balancing act, the British
Constitution, needed a high degree of political wisdom from the
political classes. Hume's fear in the last years of his life,
as shown by his comments on \ilkes aria the Douglas Cause was
that the English did not possess such wisdom. He saw the
prejudice and the partiality as more fitted to 'savages' than
to members of a civilised society. Though of course, the modern
English savage does not belong to a tribe - our 'barbarian'
belongs not to a clan, but to a faction.
On this interpretation we should see his political
essays,as well as his letters, as a contribution to the
necessary educative process. The English must be taught about
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their constitution, and about the forces that disturb political
judgment, such as man's peculiar sensitivity to the claims of
faction. As has been seen, Hume believed that justice and
political agreement originated through men desire to serve the
interests of those with whom they had a close union. In the
process, their dispositions are disciplined and their interests
come to be better served. The paradox for Hurne in the last
years of his life was that those very tendencies to loyalty,
that are in fact a consequence of man's social nature, now
covered with fallacious theory, threatened to take man back to
a state previous even to the establishment of the rules of
justice. The cantonising disposition in man that made the
establishment of justice and government possible, now
threatened, through its expression in faction, to lead to civil
war.
If the term 'factious' is Hume's favourite epithet for the
English during this period, his second favourite is
'barbarian'. What I now want to suggest is that this is a clue
to understanding his view that a vital element in the acquiring
of the political knowledge required for civilised man, is the
cultivation of the arts. And a chief cause of the lack of
political understanding in the English was the neglect of the
arts.
Six months before his death, Hume remarked to Gibbon of the
'Fall of Philosophy and the Decay of Taste' in England. Like
Swift and Pope in the previous decade, Hume, increasingly,
thought of the English as having neglected polite letters for
the satisfaction of baser pleasures. He continued in the letter
to Gibbon,
'your Countrymen, for almost a whole Generation, have
given themselves up to barbarous and absurd Faction, and
have totally neglected all polite Letters' EL II 310].
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Ten years before, he suggested to Horace Walpole that the only
admissible difference between one age and another is their
'different progress in learning and the arts'. Of his own age
he says,
'Our enemies will only infer, that we are a nation which
was once at best but half civilised, and is now relapsing
fast into barbarism, ignorance, and superstition' [ibid
lii].
Such a thought ran counter to the optimism of the Philosophes.
In a letter to Turgot of June 1768, Hume tries to throw doubt
on that writer's faith in the gradual perfection of society.
Hume argues that 'Events in this Country', by which he means
the 'Disorders' of the Wilkes affair, suggest that Turgot is
being too optimistic in hoping to avoid 'the usual Returns of
Barbarism and Ignorance' [ibid 180]. Five years later, Hume is
more conclusive. No Englishman could continue his History, for
'that Nation is so sunk in Stupidity and Barbarism and
Faction that you may as well think of Lapland for an
Author' [ibid 269].
He names Trislam Shandy as the 'best Book, that has been writ
by any Englishman these thirty Years'; adding, 'bad as it is'
[ibid].
Now in section 1 I drew attention to the themes of
prejudice and faction in Hume's late letters. In this section I
have gone on to suggest that such thoughts may be better
understood in the light of Books II and III of the Treatise:
the peculiar workings of the imagination mean that we are
prejudiced in favour of the group to which we belong. Only if
man is trained can he overcome those aspects of his social
disposition that cloud his judgment. After this I suggested
that a chief part of this education is given by the pursuit of
the arts. Evidently, though, more must be said about this. What
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is the connection between factiousness and the neglect of art
and philosophy? Why does Hume think that learning and the arts
have a fundamental role in political education?
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section 3
politics and the arts
In the essay 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion', 1-lume
writes ofaspecies of temper which results in immoderate
reactions to the ordinary events of life. A person who has a
certain 'delicacy of passion' is a person, Hume seems to
suggest, who is under the sway of violent passions. Passions
that is, which are characterised by their emotional intensity.
He says of such persons that
'Any honour or mark of distinction elevates them above
measure; but they are sensibly touched with contempt' [G I
91].
When a person who has this 'sensibility of temper' meets with
any misfortune,
'his sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him,
and deprives him of all relish in the common occurrences
of life' [ibid].
It might be said that such a person is 'ruled by his passions';
or that he is too 'passionate'. Strictly speaking this is
wrong. The error comes from confusing the calm passions with
reason [cf T417]. More accurately, then, a man of delicate
passions is one who is disposed to respond with violent
passions. Thus, says Flume, he will have 'pungent sorrows'; and
'lively enjoyments'. The smallest misfortune will give him a
'piercing grief' Elibid].
Now Hume believes that the cultivation of a delicacy of
taste will help cure men of this incommodious delicacy of
passion. If we consider the reasons he has for this belief, we
can progress towards understanding the relation he perceives
between the arts and political wisdom.
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'Taste', properly understood, involves reason as well as
sentiment:
'In order to judge aright of a composition of genius,
there are so many views to be taken in, so many
circumstances to be compared'
that only one possessed of the 'soundest judgment' will ever be
a tolerable critic in such performances [ibid 93]. Precisely
because of this involvement of reason, we have in the arts an
activity that will refine our judgment. Thus here is 'a new
reason for cultivating a relish in the liberal arts', a reason
over and above the great pleasure of that activity:
'Our judgment will be strengthened by this exercise: We
shall form juster notions of life: Many things, which
please or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous
to engage our attention: And we shall lose by degrees that
sensibility and delicacy of passion, which is so
incommodious' [G I 93].
Yet Hume does not want to say that an increased capacity
for judgment has the consequence that we are anaesthetised to
life. He says that he has 'gone too far' in saying that the
cultivation of one's aesthetic sensibilities 'extinguishes the
passions' [ibid]. Rather, he thinks that it 'improves our
sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions', and
'renders the mind incapable of the rougher anc more bostero'us
emotions' [ibid].
In support of this belief, Hume offers two considerations.
One of these is the thought that the improvement in one
judgment that is consequent upon appreciation of the arts,
disposes us to care for a few like creatures. A cultivated
person 'feels too sensibly, how much all the rest of mankind
falls short of the notions which he has entertained' [ibid 94].
Love and friendship are served, for because his affections are
confined in a narrow circle, they can be carried further. This
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idea, has not, I think, any obvious political implications,
which might help us, for example, in understanding the
connection between the factiousness of the English, and their
neglect of the arts. But the other consideration that Hume
offers in the essay may do just that.
This is the idea that the appreciation of the arts fosters
the 'soft and tender' passions because the attention that is
necessary for understanding and enjoying the object involves
detaching oneself from 'interest' and 'business'. Only if the
object is regarded with a disinterested frame of mind can it be
appreciated. Thus in 'Of the Standard of Taste' Hume says that
it is necessary for appreciation that there should be 'A
perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due
attention to the object' [G I 271]. We will find it more
difficult to be disinterested if we know the artist involved:
this may 'diminish the applause due to his performance';
likewise, 'jealousy' and the influence of 'authority' may
obstruct true judgment 11ibid.
The pursuit of the disinterested point of view, that the
work of art demands, is described in 'Of the Standard of Taste'
as an attempt to bring the 'fancy to a suitable situation and
disposition' [ibid]. Now it may easily be imagined that this
exercise, this pursuit of the required point of view, will have
effects on our dispositions outside the gallery or the theatre.
When the matter is discussed in the Treatise, it is seen, in
fact, that the attempt is of the utmost relevance to knowledge
of oneself. It is difficult, he says,
'for a man to be sensible, that the voice of an enemy is
agreeable, or allow it to be musical. But a person of a
fine ear, who has the command of himself, can separate
these feelings, and give praise to what deserves it'
[T472].
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Now one who is practised in ignoring considerations that are
irrelevant to the work of art - one who, as we say, has
developed his critical faculties - will be more able than
others to view his own temper and actions with a critical eye.
And he will be more disposed to try to rid himself of
immoderate passions, than one who has only the natural refining
effects of the moral life from which to benefit. Why? He is at
once in the habit of criticism and at the same time keenly
aware that immoderate passions disturb, and may perhaps even
destroy, firstly, his happiness; and secondly, what is a part
of that happiness, his enjoyment of music or literature.1
If he is successful in self-criticism, then he will find
that he will be more able to live a life with others: he will
not immediately think, for example, when someone happens to
laugh at him that that perso'n despises im a'nd 'is pet 1naps a
vicious enemy. He will no longer be 'transported beyond the
bounds of prudence' [C 1 91]. This is because he is no longer
so subject to those passions that disturb calm reflection. And
nor of course is it only in social life that his prudence
improves. Perhaps he will no longer reach for the bottle when
he gets a parking ticket. Secondly, as he now has 'command of
himself', he will now be able to attend a performance of King
Lear without weeping bitterly, and so increase his enjoyment
(and in this instance, the enjoyment of those around him).
Thus when such a person, and we are all such people to some
extent, is helped, through art, to view himself as an object,
he will find that he insensibly decreases the influence of
'boisterous' emotions. His mind becomes quite 'incapable' of
experiencing them; and his life is given over to the 'tender
and agreeable passions'. The beauties of poetry, eloquence,
music or painting, then,
'give a certain elegance of sentiment to which the rest of
mankind are strangers...They draw off the mind from the
hurry of business and interest; cherish reflection;
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dispose to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable
melancholy, which, of all dispositions of the mind, is the
best suited to love and friendship' [G I 93].
Understood in this way, the arts provide for polite society
what philosophy provides for the few. Thus the language that
Hurne uses elsewhere in writing of the effects of study is
strikingly similar. A 'serious attention to the sciences and
liberal arts' he says in 'The Sceptic', 'softens and humanizes
the temper' [G I 223]. Again, the practice of thinking with a
disinterested frame of mind, has its effects:
'The bent of his mind to speculative studies must mortify
in him the passions of interest and ambition, and must, at
the same time, give him a greater sensibility of all the
decencies and duties of life' [ibid].
Evidently, it is not the content of these subjects that changes
the 'disposition of the mind', or affects the imagination, it
is the habit of detachment necessary for their study. Because
of this, it appears that even chemistry may be beneficial to
its students, quite apart from any advantages brought by its
particular discoveries.
In short, the arts and sciences civilise us; and a person
who is subject to a delicacy of the passions is uncivilised. He
will be unfitted for society as he has not his passions, as we
say, under control; or, properly speaking, he is too disposed
to react with violent rather than with calm passions. His
judgment, therefore will be partial and confused.
We can now return to the problem that precipitated the
above enquiry into Hume's thoughts on how learning and the arts
can train the mind. The problem, that is, of explaining why
Hume couples his observations on the 'artistic' ignorance of
the English with observations on their political wilfulness and
factiousness.
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It was suggested that learning (for the few) and art (for
the many) strengthen the critical faculties by disposing the
person to leave his particular situation and consider the
object, or evidence, on its own terms. (Moreover, the habit of
self-criticism is also thus strengthened.) A work of art, in
order 'to produce its due effect on the mind', must be surveyed
from the point of view it requires: it is quite irrelevant to
an appraisal of a piano sonata that the composer is black.
Similarly, with regard to to any philosophical or scientific
problem: it is quite irrelevant to a proper appraisal of the
results of an experiment that they do not seem to forward the
award of a research grant.
But in political questions the wicked fairy that wrecks
judgment is likely to be the influence of faction. And a person
of heady passions is more LikeLy o ôe under tfie say of a
faction than one ruled by the calm passions. The former will b
too influenced by the opinion of others, the opposition of
others, the anger, sorrow, hatred, revenge, fury of others.
This is, of course, on account of the phenomenon of sympathy.
Even a 'normal person feels such passions more from
communication than from his own 'natural temper' [T317]. Only a
trained and discriminating mind can hope to withstand these
effects, and identify his interest not with those who, for
example, are related to him, but with the public interest. Of
course, this is difficult; just as it is difficult to withstand
the 'trivial' propensities of the imagination that lead to
error in philosophy [cf T224; T123]. Naturally, the more
delicate the political problem, the easier it is for the
passions to prompt plausible ruses; the easier it is for us to
be satisfied with what we are sure will in any case serve our
own interest. Similarly, the more delicate the problem in
natural philosophy, the more 'constancy' and 'sagacity' is
needed 'to choose the right way among so many that present
themselves' [T175]. No constitution could be more delicately
balanced than the British: so no constitution needed more able
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players.
In the next section I want to turn to Hume's earlier attempt
to educate the English about their complicated, and potentially
dangerous constitution.
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section 4
faction and moderation
In the previous sections we have seen something of how
Hume's early work on the imagination informs his observations
about faction. I want to continue the discussion through
enquiring into his conception of the role of the philosopher in
political life.
In the Preface to the original edition of the 1741/2
essays, Hume expresses the hope that the reader 'will approve
of my Moderation and Impartiality in my Method of handling
POLITICAL SUBJECTS' [G I 41]. He hopes that his work will be
considered free from 'PARTY-RAGE'; this he has 'endeavow'd to
repress, as far as possible' [ibid]. I shall shortly consider
how his work on the imagination underpins such sentiments.
I want to begin by turning to the third essay in that
edition, 'That Politics may be Reduced to a Science'. This
starts with the popular and topical question as to whether
every form of government may not become good or bad, according
to whether it is well or poorly administered. If that is the
case, then 'Zeal for one constitution above another, must be
esteemed mere bigotry and folly' [G I 98].
Hume's first step in arguing against such a sorry
conclusion is made by distinguishing between 'absolute' and
'free and republican' governments. In the former case, the
quality of the government must indeed depend on the
administration. So here it matters whether the ruler is strong
or weak, benevolent or cruel. But the distinguishing feature of
the latter form of government, is that 'checks and controuls'
make it the interest 'even of bad men, to act for the public
good' [ibid 96].
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His second step is to argue that the wisest legislators
will not rely on the hope that the ruler will be good. Rather,
they 'ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the
administration of public affairs to the latest posterity' [ibid
105]. Thus he finds reasons to uphold 'those forms and
institutions by which liberty is secured, the public good
consulted, and the avarice and ambition of particular men
restrained and punished' [ibid 106].
But it is the third step that is the most interesting from
our point of view. For we now begin to see his understanding of
how men construct 'reasons' for action. In another age, he
suggests, the philosopher seeking to serve the public good,
might rest with the task of finding reasons for favouring free
government. Yet, by the 1740's, the British Constitution was
not so much widely accepted as widely revered. And the problem
now arises that the zeal for the constitutiou aud th 	 tc.
good becomes a cover for the interests of faction. This is
Hume's diagnosis. Jhat he thinks necessary in such
circumstances is a lesson in 'moderation'. This lesson, we
shall see, is made possible through his employment of
principles that describe certain dispositions of the
imagination. It was suggested in Chapter III that Hume employs
common principles of the imagination, based on the Principle of
the Conversion of Passions, through a wide variety of subjects,
within the science of man, such as commerce, religion, and
divorce; now we can see them employed in his political
writings.
The subject matter that Hume chooses for the lesson in
moderation within the essay is the state of the parties 'into
which our country is presently divided' [ibid 107]. More
particularly, their opinions on the character of Walpole. But
the first half of the essay informs the lesson: the behaviour
of the contending parties would be more fitting to an
'absolute' government. There, the character of a minister is
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the only object of appraisal; but in a government of laws it is
the constitution itself to which we must look.
When this distinction is made, we can see the point of the
following reasonings: the English must train themselves to
deserve their constitution. They must not fall back on
political thinking that consists of little more than loving
one's own leader and clan and hating their enemy. 'Public
Spirit', he writes in the Preface to the original edition:
'shou'd engage us to love the Public, and to bear an equal
Affection to all our Country-Men; not to hate one Half of
them, under Pretext of loving the Whole' [ibid 41].
That is not the sort of behaviour which the nature of the
Constitution requires in order for it to work properly. To be
sure, given the pressures that factions create, such self-
discipline will be difficult. But the alternative of the
dissolution of the Constitution was such a dreadful prospect
that Hurne did not, at this time, despair. When he did, as we
saw in section 1, he decided that the appalling behaviour of
the English was an effect of a deep cultural malaise that is
not discussed in these essays or in the extant letters of the
later thirties and early 1740's.
He believed that the English did not understand their
political situation. On the one hand, Bolingbroke and the Tory
writers argued that Walpole
'is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed
every security provided against wicked ministers for the
future' [ibid 107].
He had, that is, undermined 'the best constitution in the
world' [ibid]. To these interested arguments Hume replies that
if
'our constitution does in any degree deserve these
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eulogies, it would never have suffered a weak and wicked
minister to govern triumphantly for a course of twenty
years' [ibid 108].
And if he was wicked and weak, then the Constitution could not
have been so gloriously perfect as claimed.
On the other hand, the supporters of Walpole also failed to
remember that they were living in a country of laws and rules -
which laws and rules provide the context in which to assess the
actions of any individual. So again Hume starts with the
Constitution: if it is so excellent, as the partisans of
Walpole hold, 'then a change of ministry can be no such
dreadful event' [ibidil. But if the constitution is bad, then,
whatever the administration, 'Public affairs...must necessarily
go to confusion, by whatever hands they are conducted' [ibid
109].
In this way, through reminding the reader of the nature of
political arrangements, the rules of the game, Hume hopes to
detach the reader from feelings about Walpole that are the
product of the pressures of faction; the feelings, that is,
which Hume perceived as clouding the appreciation of what is in
the public interest and thus in the reader's own interest. This
detachment from the pressures and novelties of the day is not a
form of quietism: in fact he thinks that it leads to a keener
attachment to the ends of politics:
'I would not be understood to mean, that public affairs
deserve no care and attention at all' [ibid].
For he believes that
'the surest way of producing moderation in every party is
to increase our zeal for the public' [ibid 107].
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That is, if we are conscious that our interest lies in the
promotion of the common good, we will make allowances for the
party prejudices that almost inevitably encourage the violent
passions. Or, in the discredited language, those prejudices
which act on our passions to the detriment of our reason. So
the activities of a Walpole should be condemned or praised with
a 'suitable degree of zeal' [ibid 109]. And this is only
possible if we understand the nature of the political
arrangements - here the British Constitution; and also, the
factious pressures we are under. Without moderation, the
outlook is bleak:
'I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were
fighting p	 aris & focis, and change a good constitution
into a baFne, by the violence of their factions' [ibid].
Now Peter Jones has pointed out that Hume's use of the
notion of moderation owes much to Cicero. Cicero had argued
that moderation is above all 'the art of doing the right thing
at the right time' [Jones p.156; cf p. 157-8; De Officiis 1
40]
.
 Jones also notes how Hume's notion of moderation does not
imply an idea of compromise [Jones p.156]. Nor, as has been
seen, does it imply quietisrn. What can be added to Jones'
remarks is that Hume's notion of moderation in political life
has a theoretical foundation in his theory of the imagination.
It is with this issue that I end this section.
In the essay under consideration, Hume refers us to the
immoderate language of the Tories and Whigs. The former call
Walpole wicked; the latter ascribe all political and economic
blessings to him. Hume comments:
'When this accusation and panegyric. are received by the
partizans of each party, no wonder they beget an
extraordinary ferment on both sides, and fill the nation
with violent animosities' [G I 108].
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To see what underlies this assumption, we must turn to his work
on the calm and violent passions that is found in Book 11 of
the Treatise. When I considered this matter in detail in
Chapter III, I argued that a central part of his interpretation
of the so-called 'struggle' between reason and the passions is
the role played by any opposition that the passions find. Thus
for example, it is perhaps precisely the opposition that
British Rail provide, that makes visiting one's auntie such an
attractive idea. The opposition to a 'rendezvous' with one's
favourite auntie is found in the passion of frustration, and
this passion is 'swallowed up' by the predominant passion of
love, thus increasing the passion of love. Similarly, Hume
writes:
''Tis a quality very observable in human nature, that any
opposition, which does not entirely discourage and
intimidate us, has rather a contrary effect, and inspires
us with a more than ordinary grandeur and IzzagnanzJzü.ty'
[T433].
This 'quality', then, finds its expression through his model of
the imagination where a conversion of passion occurs through an
obstacle producing a minor passion. The mind 'naturally seeks
after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation,
and agitate the spirits' [T353]. For the 'mind, when left to
itself, immediately languishes' [T421]. What is needed is 'work
for the imagination' [T422]. Then,
'The efforts, which the mind makes to surmount the
obstacle, excite the spirits and inliven the passion'
[T421].
The consequence is that the emotion which opposition excites is
converted into the predominant passion, 'and encreases its
violence, beyond the pitch it wou'd have arriv'd at had it met
with no opposition' [ibid].Thus does the Principle of the
Conversion of Passion come into play.
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It is easy to see the application of this theory to the
present question: political opposition will increase the vigour
with which beliefs are held. Thus do factions grow fiercer and
more extreme in their claims when they are heartily opposed.
Also, the process will have the consequence that beliefs which
are not actually very relevant to political issues, such as
those about the character (or indeed sex) of a minister, may
bloom so as to hide substantial questions. Moreover, if
opposition raises the temperature, so to speak, the influence
of sympathy within the faction will be proportionately
increased. I will sympathise with my raging colleagues: I begin
to rage myself. And then the opposing faction will be stirred
by the opposition that we give. And so on.
Yet this is not all. 'Opposition', Hume notes,
'not only enlarges the soul; but the soul, when full of
courage and magnaminity, in a manner seeks opposition'
[T434].
So we can desire enemies! Just as we love the company of our
friends for its enlivening of our thought [T353], so, for the
same reason, do we desire, in 'certain dispositions', the
challenge of opposition.
Of course, this applies just as much to philosophers as to
pamphleteers and parliamentarians. Thus we saw in discussing
moderate scepticism in Chapter II, how Hume's perception of
such qualities in human nature provide one of the chief reasons
for welcoming that scepticism. The seeking of opposition, for
example, is a tendency of philosophers that Hurne draws our
attention to in the Introduction to the Treatise when he
discusses the 'present imperfect condition of the sciences' [T
xiii]. What I have tried to show in this section is how a
crucial element in his political writings have the same
foundation.
240
section 5
factions
Hume's interest in factions or parties - he makes no
distinction - was characteristic of his age. Many believed that
the claim of parties to promote the public good was a mere
pretence, and that their real objective was 'power and prizes'
[Kramnick p.153]. For example, the Marquess of Halifax wrote:
'the best Party is a kind of conspiracy against the rest
of the nation' [Halifax (Works p.l57), quoted in Wolin
p.248].
But when Hume raged against the 'factious barbarians' and when
he remarked that the 'influence of faction is directly contrary
to that of laws' [G I 127], he is drawing on an understanding
of the nature of factions of far greater subtlety than that
which consists merely in an appeal to 'hypocrisy'. This can be
seen if we consider his thoughts on how parties create
'opinion' by turning to the essay 'Of the First Principles of
Government'.
He begins by claiming that as the ruled have a greater
force than their rulers, it is therefore 'on opinion only that
government is founded' [G I 110]. He divides this opinion into
two kinds: opinion of interest and opinion of right. By the
former he means, firstly, 'the sense of the general advantage
which is reaped from government'; and secondly, the opinion
that the 'particular government, which is established, is
equally advantageous with any other that could easily be
settled' [ibid]. By 'opinion of right' Hume means the 'right to
power' and the 'right to property'. It is on this basis, then,
that 'all governments' are founded 'and all authority of the
few over the many' [ibid iii].
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Note what is happening: Hume is developing an account of
how men respond to particular ideas in political society. These
are the beliefs that will inform political decisions. It is
clear, from what we have already seen of Hume's conception of
man, that some such account is needed. For on that conception,
it is quite implausible to see man as plotting within factions
and only pretending to care for the wider public. For Hume does
not think, that is, that man is without any concern for
society. But on the other hand, Hurne's belief about man's
limited generosity rules out the idea that the party men are
determined wholly by their love of the public. This, in one way
or another, is what many parties would have us believe; whilst
their enemies will attribute to them the former motives.
Thus the issues that interest Hume are those that reveal
the force of the benevolent and self-interested principles in
man; what prevalence the opinion of right has; how opinion of
interest results in security; how other principles 'add force'
to the opinions of right and interest; and how they 'determine,
limit, or alter their operation' [ibidj. The upshot is, as we
shall see in a moment, that he can refuse to accept the
dichotomy between sincerity and hypocrisy that informs the
arguments of contending parties. This is transcended: such is
the force of opinion that party men are caught up in ways of
seeing the world that cannot easily be escaped: for parties
evolve within themselves reasons to jstify their passions.
Indeed, it is precisely because they are not simple hypocrites
that they are so dangerous.
We can see how such an explanation of belief structures his
account of faction creating opinion if we consider the essay
'Of the Independency of Parliament'. Hume there says that it is
'a just p2litical maxim, that every man must be supposed a
knave'{ibid 118]. He then asks why this maxim is 'true in
politics' if it is 'false in fact' [ibid 118-9]. The answer
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lies in the way in which groups represent anew the true state
of things:
'Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a
considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a
great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved
of by his own party, for what promotes the common
interest; and he soon learns to despise the clarnours of
adversaries' [ibid 119; cf H VI 276; H VI 513].
Thus groups evolve the regulatory power akin to that given by a
system of moral sentiments. A point of view is constructed
which does not coincide with the moral point of view. Approval
is met with if members act accordingly. And, of course, men
have a natural desire for approval; a desire which has been
strengthened from their early years through their moral
education. Elsewhere Hume remarks that
'a mind will never be able to bear its own survey, that
has been wanting in its part to mankind and society'
[r62o].
And it is precisely from this disposition of man that factions
draw their strength. They are parasitic on our social nature.
This may be seen if we recall that for Hume, moral
behaviour is in part a product of our desire for a good name
and reputation. This 'spring of our constitution' leads us to
survey ourselves 'in reflection', through earnestly considering
how we appear in the eyes of those who 'approach and regard us'
[E II 276]. This is not to say that our moral beliefs are
dependent on the beliefs of others: our interest in what others
think must have an independent foundation or else we would not
be able to account for moral argument. But nevertheless, in
order to attain the end of 'preserving a character with
ourselves',
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'we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgement on
the correspondent approbation of mankind' Libidi.
More generally, Hume allocates a powerful influence to other
people in the formation of belief. For example, in Book I of
the Treatise, he suggests that more than one half of the
opinions which prevail among mankind are owing to education
[T117]. We saw in Chapter II that the benefits of cultivating a
moderate scepticism are not least due to the fact that even men
of 'the greatest judgment and understanding' find it difficult
to follow their own reason in opposition to that of their daily
companions [T316]. Therefore, we should not be surprised that
the social dimension of man plays such an important role in his
account of morality, if we consider morality's basic role as a
regulatory system of society. Indeed at one point Hurne
describes the virtuous as the 'party of human-kind against vice
or disorder, its common enemy' [E II 275]. And nor should we be
surprised if parties, that are composed of like minded men with
common interests, satisfy the need for approval that their
members have.
This was to contradict the conclusions of Shaftesbury about
how we are to understand the power of faction. He believed that
political parties are inevitable developments of the
'associating spirit'; 'wheels within wheels are formed, 'one
empire within another' [Shaftesbury (1) p.76-7]. The paradox is
that the very sociability that makes society possible leads to
separateness and selfishness. Shaftesbury writes:
'And the associating genius of man is never better proved
than in those very societies that are formed in opposition
to the general core of mankind, and to the real interest
of the state. In short, the very spirit of faction for the
greatest part, seems to be no other than the abuse or
irregularity of that social love and common affection
which is common to mankind' [ibid p.77].
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So pace Shaftesbury, then, we cannot understand faction by
referring to 'the abuse or irregularity of...social love and
common affection'. What we must understand is the way that
factions enable men to live with themselves through providing
'moral' reasons to justify their passions. This is not the
abuse of affection, it is the abuse of the capacity we have to
detach ourselves from the opinion of the unjust.
So the common Augustan belief that party men are mere
hypocrites and pretenders is not 1-lume's view. Rather, their
sincere belief in the merits of whatever serves their party is
due to the fact that opinion of interest receives all the
motivation associated with an opinion of right. The issue is
discussed in 'Of the First Principles of Government.. Hume
writes:
'When men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or
remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality,
in order to serve their party'[G I 110].
Paradoxically, however, there is the phenomenon of a faction
being motivated by a sense of duty alone:
'when a faction is formed on a point of right or
principle, there is no occasion, where men discover a
greater obstinacy and a more determined sense of justice
and equity' [ibid 110-111].
Such determination arises from the backing and support of a
fellow group of believers appealing directly to the moral
sentiments.
Thus 'the same social disposition of mankind is the cause
of these contradictory appearances' [ibid 111]. On the one
hand, men riding roughshod over the claims of morality when
their group's interest is served; and on the other hand, the
moral obstinacy shown by some factions. These are both
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phenomena to be explained by man's social nature: his reasons
for actions must have the support of others for him to believe
them.
Evidently, when Hume speaks of men in factions following
their 'interests' he does not mean their real interests. For
these lie in the service of the common good. In his last years
the significance of the distinction became frighteningly clear
for Hume. In the language of the Treatise, men were preferring
the 'trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of
order in society, which so much depends on the observance of
justice' [T535].
We saw in sections 2 and 3 particular reasons as to why
Hume ttiought that the English were failing in this respect. Yet
whatever these reasons are, it is clear that a chief purpose of
the essays is to teach men about certain relationships between
their social dispositions and the problems of living with their
Constitution. The science of politics, he says in the
Introduction to the Treatise, is the science of how men are
'united in society, and dependent on each other' [T xv]. The
philosopher's task, therefore, is to bring to consciousness the
nature of that dependence. This involves not only an
examination of the apparatus of government, but also the
psychological dependence that men have upon each other. It is
here that we find the sources of discord and ill-considered
political action. That factions lead to error is a commonplace;
however, Hume attempts to give an experimental foundation to
this thought. In the next section we will hear more about the
ways that men are misled.
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section 6
factions, Whigs, Tories, and Christianity
As I have already noted, Hume was not alone in his age in
being interested in the phenomenon of factions; nor the
ap)arently trivial reasons upon which they were founded. In
Gulliver's Travels, Lilliput is divided into two factions
called the Tramecksans and Slamecksans 'from the high and low
heels on their shoes, by which they distinguish themselves'
[Swift p.45]. Redresal, the Principal Secretary of LiliLiput,
tells Gulliver that the 'animosities between these two parties
run so high that they will neither eat nor drink, nor talk with
each other' [ibid]. In 'Of Parties in General' Hurne says that
the Prasini and Veneti factions destroyed the Greek empire;
though what, he asks,
'can be imagined more trivial than the difference between
one colour of livery and another in horse races?' [G I
128].
In the History, he writes how in Oxford, during the 1540's, the
foundation of a chair for teacning Greek divided the students
into parties they called 'Greeks' and 'Trojans'. They sometimes
fought, he says, 'with as great animosity as was formerly
exercised by those hostile nations' [H III 332]. Furthermore,
he adds, the 'Grecians' then divided amongst themselves,
between those who favoured one form of pronunciation, and those
who favoured another [ibid].2
So why is it that 'the smallest appearance of real
difference' [G I 128] can produce factions? In considering this
question we can see once again how Hume's science of politics
rests on a model of the imagination. We can begin with some
primary facts about social existence.
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In Chapter III it was seen how Hume's doctrine of sympathy
consists of an account of how an idea is transformed into an
impression; this happens because of the transition of the
vivacity there from the idea of ourselves, to whatever is
related to it, such as an idea of a passion that a person has
who is contiguous to us. This gives the otherwise languishing
mind the stimulation that it needs [T352-3]. For not all
objects are equally arousing. And yet, if the most enlivening
ones are rational beings like ourselves, it is still true that
we do not find that all people are equally the same in this
regard.
It is the principles of association that guide the enquirer
in understanding the variations that people will show in their
reactions to others. These are the principles that help us to
predict those relations which facilitate an easy transition
from the idea to the impression. The first principle is
resemblance:
''Tis obvious, that people associate together according to
their particular tempers and dispositions, and that men of
gay tempers naturally love the gay; as the serious bear an
affection to the serious' [T354j.
Whether we are conscious of the resemblance or not, this
resemblance facilitates the transition of an idea into an
impression. So here is the first way that his theory of the
imagination illustrates principles which explain how factions
or groups may be formed. Even the resemblance of complexion, as
in the case of the sides formed in the 'MOORISH civil wars' [G
I 129-130], or the colour of livery, may result in a faction
being formed.
The second principle of association is that of contiguity.
Impressions of objects are stronger when the objects are
nearer:
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'The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at
home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some
hundred leagues distant' [T429].
Likewise, the nearer we are to suffering, the more likely we
are to feel it ourselves [T567j1. Similarly, Hume employs the
idea of contiguity as a factor in explaining how a nation forms
a national character:
'Where a number of men are united into one political body,
the occasions of their intercourse must be so
frequent...that, together with the same speech or
language, they must acquire a resemblance in their
manners, and have a common or national character' [Es
248].
So if we add this factor of contiguity to resemblance, we
arrive at a still more complete explanation of the propensity
of men to create factions.
As well as these two principles, the phenomenon of
'acquaintance' deserves to be mentioned. We may be convinced of
another's superior merit, but we do not prefer him to the
person we know. Why is this? Hume writes:
'as the company of strangers is agreeable to us for a
short time, by inlivening our thought; so the company of
our relations and acquaintance must be peculiarly
agreeable, because it has this effect in a greater degree,
and is of a more durable influence [T353].
So the personal friendships that are found in factions are a
further bond. Hume remarks that even
'in those factions which are founded on the most real and
most material difference, there is always observed a great
deal of personal animosity or affection' [G I 128].
In the light of this 'scientific' explanation of the forces
behind the creation and sustaining of factions, we may proceed
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to an examination of what he says about the parties of his own
day. It will be seen that he considered the Whigs and Tories as
examples of a very singular kind of party, 'parties from
principle'. Such parties fall into a sub-class of 'real
factions'. 'Real factions' are to be opposed to 'personal
factions' such as the Prasini and Veneti, and the black and
white Moroccans. The other sorts of real factions are those
from 'interest' and those from 'affection'. But 'parties from
principle' are the most extraordinary type of this sort. He
writes:
'Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative
principle, are known only to modern times, and are,
perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable
phenomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs [ibid
130j.
So does not Hume even try to explain the nature of the Whigs
and the Tories? This indeed would be a disappointing answer.
But let us see what he says.
In any society there will be persons with various
inclinations, even when they 'have been educated under the same
government, and have early imbibed the same prejudices' [ibid
2 6 6 ]. And when we add this fact to the nature of the British
Constitution, we immediately 'perceive in it a source of
division and party, which it would be almost impossible for it,
under any administration, to avoid' [ibid 133]. For the 'just
balance' between the 'republican and monarchical' parts of
government, that the Constitution demands, is so 'extremely
delicate and uncertain', that
'different opinions must arise concerning it, even among
persons of the best understanding' [ibid].
On the one hand, those who 'love peace and order, and detest
sedition and civil wars' will always ernphasise favourable views
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of monarchy and will incline towards trusting the crown. On the
other hand, those who are'passionate lovers of liberty' will be
'terrified at the most distant approaches of tyranny and
despotic power' [ibid 134]. Thus, says Hume, 'there are parties
of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our constitution'
[ibid]. These parties, he says, 'may properly enough be
denominated those of COURT and COUNTRY' [ibid].
If parties from principle are a defining mark of the modern
age, then so is the British Constitution. The achievement of
the Constitution would have surprised a Cicero or a Tacitus,
who would not have understood how a mixed government could
function without one rank swallowing another [ibid 119]. So,
Hume believes that the peculiar nature of the constitution is
the first cause of the strange phenomenon of parties from
principle. But this is not enough of an explanation. Principles
that express an interest in stability, or an interest in
liberty, cannot thus be classified as principles of the
'abstract speculative kind', however much the conditions of the
constitution dispose men towards holding them.
And it is this speculative element that Hume finds
dangerous. Such principles lead to animosity even though there
is no 'contrariety of conduct' consequent upon their
differences:
'Where different principles beget a contrariety of
conduct, which is the case with all different political
principles, the matter may more easily be explained...But
where the difference of principle is attended with no
contrariety of action...what madness, what fury can beget
such unhappy and fatal divisions?' [ibid 130-131].
Thus the motivation seems to spring not from 'opinion of
interest'; nor from 'opinion of right'; nor indeed from the
nature of the Constitution itself. So does this state of
affairs defeat Hume's political psychology? Or does he attempt
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to explain the causes of the elements that he finds so
dangerous?
It is because the Whigs and Tories rely on religious
principles that we can explain their need to fortify, through
finding opposition, beliefs which would otherwise dissipate.
For it is a tenet of Hurne's philosophy that as the mind
'is wonderfully fortified by an unanimity of sentiments,
so is it shocked and disturbed by any contrariety' [ibid
130].
Thus we can understand the
'eagerness, which most people discover in a dispute; and
hence their impatience of oppositions even in the most
speculative and indifferent opinions [ibid; cf T433-4].
But this is not enough. After all, there were philosophical
sects in the 'ancient world' that were more zealous than
'parties of religion' - yet these did not result in the fury
and the animosity that is found in the latter [G I 132; cf
T272]. We need, therefore, something else to account for this
modern phenomenon. Hume suggests that we should look to the
history of Christianity.
Most religions, Hune thinks, 	 in baiacos ages, anti
are soon controlled by the magistrate who thus unites
ecclesiastical with civil power. Christianity, however, arose
only to be despised by a 'polite part of the world' who held
'principles directly opposite to it'. This allowed the priests
to 'engross all the authority in the sect' [G 1 132]. From a
desire to keep their power, they instilled violence into their
followers; a spirit of persecution was engendered; that spirit,
Hume says,
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'has ever since been the poison of human society, and the
source of the most inveterate factions in every
government' [ibid; cf ibid 248].
From the first, the Whigs and the Tories were marked with the
spirit of religion. They sprang from the Court and Country
factions under James II. Those who petitioned for a session of
parliament, the 'petitioners', were called Whigs by their
enemies .iho acquiesced to the wisdom of the king. These latter
were called the 'abhorrers' as they abhorred any encroachment
on the king's perogative. They themselves soon became known as
Tories by their enemies who saw them as resembling the 'popish
banditti' in Ireland who were known by this name. The Tories,
meanwhile, called the petitioners 'Whigs' for supposedly
resembling certain 'fanatical covenanters' in Scotland called
thus [H VI 381].
But this connection with religion, that the originally
opprobrious appellations signified, did not vanish with the
common memory of their birth. This is because such factions
needed to find reasons to justify their passions; and they
chose theological reasons. So in 'Of the Original Contract'
Huine writes:
'As no party, in the present age, can well support itself,
without a philosophical or speculative system of
principles, annexed to its practical one; we accordingly
find, that each of the factions, into which this nation is
divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in
order to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which
it pursues' [G I 443; cf E I 11].
On the one hand, the Tories trace up 'Government to the Deity',
so as to render it 'sacred and inviolate'; in this way, they
attempt to make it 'little less than sacrilege' to interfere
with its powers [ibid]. On the other hand, 'the other party',
appealed to 'a kind of original contract'. Recent attempts at
rescuing the idea owe their secular basis to Hurne. But no
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reader of the Second Treatise could fail to be aware that
Locke's beliefs are represented as arrangements of God's
purpose. The 'ideotogies' of the Whigs and Tories, then, were
implicitly or explicitly theological.
In attempting to make his readers aware of how parties
annex a 'system of principles' by which to control 'opinion' so
that they can 'protect and cover' their 'schemes of action',
Hume bel.ieved that he was serving the cause of moderation. It
is not just that he was pointing out the Civil War as an
example of the horrible effects of immoderate politics; nor is
he merely describing the Constitution from a perspective
outside faction. I have tried to show that his lesson in
moderation employs a model of the mind that can explain how men
are seduced by prejudice; how they are driven by their passions
to find reasons to justify their desires; and how factions can
control 'opinion'. The influence of Christian thinking, which
is part of Hume's account of the nature of the Whigs and the
Tories, is examined further in the final chapter.
That Hume chose to present his conclusions in a series of
essays should not hide the continuity in his thought. He wrote
to Henry Home, in 1742, of his hope that they
'may prove like dung with marl, and bring ftwarc t	 rest
of my Philosophy, which is of a more durable, though of a
harder and more stubborn nature' EL I 43].
Thus though the essays do not draw attention to the details of
his previous work on the imagination, their conclusions stem
from that work. And the same may be said about his letters. So
I have argued in this chapter that when, in the 1760's and the
1770's, he wrote about the factious barbarians; and when in his
essays, he attempted to explain the nature of British political
factions, his analysis (and the way that analysis reflects his
conception of the philosopher's role) is based on his work in
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the Treatise. There, a model of the imagination is employed in
his attempt to give the science of politics an experimental
foundation. We cannot, for example, fully understand his work
on factions in his later writings without reference to the way
that the imagination is said to control our relations with
others, through the association of ideas, and through the
Principle of the Conversion of Passion.
In the final chapter I examine his writings on religion.
There, more will be said about the way that men find reasons to
justify their desires. Moreover, the peculiar nature of
religious belief that Hume presents will throw more light on
the causes of animosity between political parties that have
theological principles.
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Chapter VI
Religion
introduction
At the beginning of this work I suggested that Hume's
fascination with religion is not only to be discovered in
several famously clever arguments; but throughout his work.
This, I suggested, has been missed by critics. For example, in
two of the most substantial works on Hume in recent years
(works which represent two very different approaches to
studying the history of philosophy) Hume, by Barry Stroud, and
The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, by John Wright, Hume's
thoughts on religion are hardly meDticr^&d at all. T 	 s'ae is
true of a very much lesser work than either of these, WiThw)cs'
Hume's Theory of the Imagination. Yet Hume remarked upon, and
attempted to explain, the profound influence of religion on
almost all the philosophical assumptions of his age. Thus in
every chapter of the present work, I have tried to show how we
cannot understand his thought without considering his views on
the influence of religion. I have also suggested that Hume
believes that one general way that religion has misled is
through its helping to create a false view of man as a creature
of reason. I shall now summarise what I have said about this
point; and also briefly indicate what is to be found in this
last chapter.
Firstly, the natural propensity man has to consider
necessity as independent of the mind, and beliefs as
susceptible of ultimate justifications, is encouraged by the
ambitions of natural religion. This is well brought out in the
Enquiry. There, Hume says that a 'considerable part of
metaphysics' arises,
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'either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which
would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the
understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions,
which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground,
raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their
weakness' {E I lii.
We cannot hope, he adds, that too frequent disappointments will
lead men to 'abandon such airy sciences'. This is not only
because of the fact that there will always be found an
'adventurous genius' to leap at the prize; but also because
'many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually
recalling such topics' [ibid 12]. So as well as wanting to make
clear the proper limits of thought, Hume is also interested in
showing how men are led into the 'airy sciences' - both in
terms of propensities of the imagination and the grip that
certain sections of society have on men's thought.
His thoughts on the true nature of reasoning were the
subject of the first two chapters; in this chapter, then, the
subject is the growth of religious belief, and the self-
deception and false consciousness that tends to corrupt
philosophical opinions.
A second area that has already been discussed, in which
Hume thinks he finds evidence that religion can corrupt
thought, is political thinking. We saw in Chapter V that here
too he is keenly aware of how religion can function as a cover
for the interests of a section of society. But in this case, it
is riot the clergy who are served by an appeal to religion, or
at least not directly, it is the political interests of a party
or faction. The Tories attempt to find a justificatory theory
by tracing up government to the Deity so as to make it 'little
less than sacrilege...to touch or invade it, in the smallest
article' [G I 443]. The Whigs, meanwhile, present their own
point of view through using theological asssumptions.
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Now it is worth noting that in the case of politics, and in
the case of 'metaphysics', Hume's account emphasises the fact
that the theological constructions are to be understood as the
products of groups of men. Why should this be so?
There is no adequate answer to this that does not take into
account the various ways that man is adapted for survival
through his membership of society. As I mentioned in Chapter I,
in order to provide his empirical account of how men gather
their beliefs, Hume finds that he has to give a central role to
testimony and education. There I also argued that his
explanation of our reasoning about matters of fact appeals to
how men publicise their feelings of expectation, and how a
language of causality develops. In each case I suggested that
Hume's theory in these areas is developed in terms of
principles of the imagination. The same point was made in
Chapter III, where I discussed his theory of sympathy; and
this, in turn, was found, in Chapter IV, to be of great import
in his discussion of how a society develops a moral system.
However, it was seen in Chapter V that this proclivity men
have to belong to groups sometimes has most unfortunate
consequences. On the one hand, men come to approve anything
that serves the interests of their party, because the party
takes over, as it were, the regulatory force that belongs to
morality; on the other hand, through their susceptibility to
the influence of others, men commit themselves to theological
beliefs from which, we shall see, no moral implications can be
drawn. Such beliefs nevertheless inform their 'ideologies'. The
consequence is that the party members are stirred to
intolerance on account of the legacy of intolerance that
Christianity has left.
But there is a particular reason why, of all areas of human
activity, religion is where man's cantonizing tendencies have
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perhaps the most significance. Hume thinks that religious
belief is far weaker than the beliefs of common life, and would
vanish were it not for the interest of some members of the
'group'; that is, the priests.
In this chapter I argue that this	 -. 'sociological'
understanding of the relation between reason and desire
provides much that is distinctive and unique in Hurne's thought
on religion. Firstly, on the development of religion in the
primitives; secondly, on particular episodes in the history of
religion, commonly viewed as showing the influence of the
supernatural.
As to the first matter, this includes, for example, the
development of Christian ethics. To some extent Hume's views on
Christian ethics have already been discussed - in Chapter III
he was presented as a figure battling against what he saw as a
dreary morality full of useless austerities. In this chapter
the discussion is taken further. Two points can be made here.
Firstly, far from agreeing with the common view that a belief
in an afterlife is a necessary bulwark for moral conduct, Hume
thinks that religion provides a cover for sectional interests.
Secondly, and as regards the actual content of Christian
ethics, one reason, Hume thinks, why Christianity is so
dangerous is because of the unnaturalness of its ethical
precepts. Seeing it as a reaction against Roman ethics, Hume
thinks of Christianity as in some measure a mirror image of a
healthy moral outlook. It is a malign inversion. It was the
product of a people in slavery.
Naturally enough the chapter includes an examination of the
path of religion from polytheism to pure theism and
superstition. Particular emphasis is placed on the way that
Hume appeals to the projective disposition of the imagination.
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The second matter is his explanation of particular episodes
in the history of the Church. Now just as special attention was
Paid to the letters and the essays in the previous chapter,
here the focus is on the massive History of England, which has
been so neglected by Hurne scholars. For our purposes, 'hat is
chiefly worth remarking is the way that in these volumes Hume
employs his principles of the mind in order to account for
behaviour hitherto explained in religious language. History,
Hume remarks in 'Of the Study of History', 'affords materials
to most of the sciences' [G IV 390]. Here, then, is where we
can see Hume applying his principles to explain, not
conjectures, as in the Natural History of Religion, but
concrete events which were, and are, part of the history of the
Church.
He also remarks in 'O the Study o history' , that history
is of value in that it 'brings us acquainted with human
affairs, without diminishing in the least from the most
delicate sentiments of virt'xe'	 Th s'ns o' virtue In
the man of the world is likely to be warped by interest; the
philosopher who takes 'a general abstract view' of characters
and manners is apt to be left cold and unmoved'; but the
historian, and his readers are interested enough in the
characters to have a lively sense of virtue, without having any
particular concern or interest to warp their judgment [ibid
391-392].
Hume's examination of the history of religion in the
History illustrates both these points from the essay. Firstly,
the iistory of religion presents him with materials aplenty to
which he can apply his principles of the human mind. Secondly,
in making events intelligible, such principles, he thinks,
allow him to achieve a moral point of view.
The major part of this chapter, then, is concerned with
Hume's explanation of the causes of the particular religious
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beliefs that men hold; and the nature and effects of religious
belief. I end, however, with a consideration of the Dialogues
concerning Natural Religion. At first sight, it might seem
quite unlikely that that work has much to do with principles of
human nature. Is it not a work about what 'foundation in
reason' theistic claims have [NHR 21]? Certainly it is. But I
think it also displays Hume's belief that his science of man
can explain how attempts to produce natural religion are bound
to go.
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section 1
the development of religion (A)
Near the beginning of the Natural History of Religion, Hume
speaks of the 'natural progress of human thought' [NHR 24]. The
way that his theoretical beliefs about the imagination enter
into his account of this progress is exhibited in what he says
about the transition from polytheism to theism.
Thus he says that there is the 'clear testimony of history'
that men 'in ancient times' were polytheists. The farther, he
says, that we 'mount up into antiquity, the rore do we find
mankind plunged into polytheism' [NHR 23].Here is the
'historical' aspect of his conclusion. The other aspect is of
course not a priori but consists in the employment of
principles discovered from the study of man, in the belief that
human nature is, in some ways, uniform. So it 'seems certain',
that the multitude must first have a 'groveling and familiar
notion of superior powers' before they progress to the idea of
a 'perfect Being' [ibid 24]. What beliefs underlie this
certainty of Hume's?
It was seen in earlier chapters that Hume considers the
mind to possess a productive or projective disposition. And it
is likely that Malebranche's writings played a role in the
formation of Hume's thoughts about this disposition.
Malebranche argues that the mind 'spreads itself externally'
[Malebranche p.657]: we fancy that objects actually have the
power that God alone possesses. Our tendency to worship leeks,
to use one of his examples, is a consequence of original sin.
Not to put too fine a point on it, we hide from God and we look
instead to leeks. This tendency is 'one of the most deplorable
consequences of original Sin' [ibid]. Like Hume, Malebranche
finds in history evidence to support his conclusions. Appealing
to Vossius' De idolatria, Malebranche writes:
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'almost all people have adored the sun because they have
all judged it to be the cause of the goods they enjoy. And
if the Egyptians adored not only the sun, the moon, and
the river Nile, whose over low caused the fertility of
their Country, but also w 	 as far as the vilest
animals..[it was]..because of some utility they derived
from them' [Malebranche p.684].
Hume's analysis of the productive disposition, we saw, is
founded on the way that certain relations facilitate the
association of ideas in the imagination. Considering the wider
audience Hume was aiming at, it is understandable that in the
Natural History he does not discuss such an analysis.
Nevertheless, he uses its results implicitly and faithfully. He
writes of how man's productive or projective tendencies lead
him
'to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which
they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are
intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon,
armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not
corrected by experience and reflection, ascribe malice or
good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us' [NHR
29].
The child who yells at the rake that strikes him, will soon be
corrected by his parents; he gains, in effect, a consolatory
lesson in the language of causes. Philosophers make the same
category of error when they ascribe to matter sympathies and
antipathies [ibid 30]. But the religious go so far as to
ascribe to 'unknown causes' 'thought and reason and passion'
[ibid].
The passion that Malebranche understands as activating the
imagination of the idolaters, is a love of that which does us
good [Malebranche p.681]. But the passions that Hume discerns
are more varied and are drawn from the idolater's beliefs about
the society in which he lives. In this way, Hume can attempt to
explain more than Malebrariche does about the content of the
idolater's beliefs. In fact, we shall see this interest of Hume
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throughout his writings on religion, even up to the content of
the Protestant religions.
Men would not 'see' faces in the moon unless they were
drawn, as when they notice a great silvery glow, to look at it.
We would not 'see' power were it not for the interest we have
in certain constant conjunctions. As regards unknown causes,
Hume writes:
'We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death,
iiealth and sickness, plenty and want; which are
distributed amongst the human species by secret and
unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected and
always unaccountable' [NHR 28-29].
As the 'passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious
expectation of the events' so is the 'imagination.. .equally
employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so
entire a dependence' [ibid 29]. And in a variation of the
language of projection, Hume says of such causes that the
'active imagination of men' begins to 'clothe them in
shapes...suitable to its natural comprehension' {NHR 47]. Now
given the unforeseen events of life, there is thought to be a
dependence on these powers: and it seems that it is for this
reason that they do not take on the character of our family or
friends, but those we associate with leaders. For our family
and friends are not comparable to the forces on which our
happiness depends. Whatever our difficulties at home, our
family will not, unless we are very unlucky, deprive us of our
food as droughts and severe taxes can. So the imagination,
'represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like
mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by
gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence the
origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or
polytheism' [NHR 47].
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Thus Hume seems to think that the nature of polytheistic
belief reflects the primitive's assumptions about the political
structure of his society. The thought is developed further when
Hume describes the subsequent transition to theism. He speaks
of the 'distribution of power and territory' among the gods: a
god may have 'jurisdiction' in a particular nation;
'or, reducing heavenly objects to the model of things
below, they may represent one god as the prince or supreme
magistrate of the rest, who, though of the same nature,
rules them with an authority, like that which an earthly
sovereign exercises over his subjects and vassals' [NHR
43].
The primitives will suppose him to be pleased, like themselves,
with praise and flattery; in this way they try and 'insinuate
themselves into his favour' [ibid].
They swell up the 'titles of this divinity', each of them
seeking to outdo the other, 'til at last they arrive at
infinity itself' [ibid]. And this is how polytheism gives way
to theism.
So it seems that Hume believes that the progress of
religion is consequent upon the development of society. Those
qualities with which the primitives are familiarly acquainted
include dispositions which are only found in societies which
have a political structure that involves the notion of a ruler:
religion, therefore, is not possible in those societies which
are able to function without a government [cf T539]. In such
societies there would be no notion of dependence on a
superior's decision which could be transferred, or projected,
onto an unknown cause; nor, of course, would there be an
understanding of the wiles of entreaty and flattery. For in
such a society man lives through familial affections and
conventions alone:
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'Look out for a people, entirely destitute of religion: If
you find them at all, be assured, that they are but a few
degrees removed from	 brutes' [NHR 76].
There is another way in which 	 man's development in
society controls the content of religious belief. This is seen
in the ethical aspect of the transition from polytheism to
theism:
'The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior: By
abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of
perfection. And slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of
its own frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only
the former much elevated and refined, to its own
divinity' NHR 24].
This includes transferring to the divinity the highest moral
qualities available in his society. Thus in making a similar
point in the Enquiry, Hume speaks of the augmenting of the
Divinity's 'goodness and wisdom' [E I 19]. However, the 'rude
untaught savage...has but faint conceptions of a general rule
or system of behaviour' [E II 274n]. Such a person, therefore,
is unable to progress from his polytheism.
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section 2
the development of religion (B)
We have progressed so far as to reach monotheism. In this
section, after briefly noting how Hume thinks a superstitious
monotheism has its origins, I turn to the origin of that which
he calls 'enthusiasm'.
When men swell their Deity so that he possesses the
attributes of infinity, they cannot, being of a 'vulgar
comprehension', keep to this conception for very long. For this
reason, Hurne says, 'inferior mediators or subordinate agents'
are invented in order'to interpose between mankind and their
supreme deity' [NHR 47. These are 'derni-gods' and their
presence marks the decline of pure theism into superstition.
There is, however, no danger of a return to the democracy of
polytheism; for the fear which was responsible for the
invention of religion keeps men 'from imputing to [the Deity]
the least shadow of limitation and imperfection' [NHR 48].
How does superstition give rise to that 'species of
religion' which Hume calls 'enthusiasm' [G I 144]? The detached
historian does not want to explain the success of the
Reformation by appealing to the workings of Providence.
Moreover, it 'owed not its success to reason and reflection' [Fl
III 140]. A 'convenience of events' contributed to the attack
on an establishment that was so 'hurtful to the peace and
happiness of mankind' [ibid 136]. The path was taken, and the
content of the new beliefs formulated, partly because of
political opposition.
To be sure, he thinks that there are principles of human
nature which explain the expression and the success of a set of
theological principles such as characterise the Protestant
churches. So he writes in the essay 'Of Superstition and
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Enthusiasm', that though the 'mind of man' is subject to the
terrors and anxiety that feed superstition, it is also prone to
fits of 'elevation and presumption':
'In such a state of mind, the imagination swells with
great, but confused conceptions, to which no sublunary
beauties correspond...Hence arise raptures, transports,
and surprising flights of fancy' [G I 145].
Such raptures are attributed to the Deity, and in a little
time, the 'inspired person comes to regard himself as a
distinguished favourite of the Deity' [ibid].
Nevertheless, this does not happen in a vacuum, and if we
attend to his work on the Reformation in the History, we can
see how Hume attempts to explain the behaviour of Luther, and
the basic content of Protestant beliefs - those beliefs which
Hume classifies as beliefs of 'enthusiasts'.
We can see Flume wanting to show how Luther's acts should be
understood as being the products of his passions; and not as
due to theological reasoning. This in fact is an application of
his general thesis that the thoughts and feelings of the
religious should be explained through appealing to non-rational
connections, rather than be explained in terms of rational
beliefs about God's will. In arguing thus, Hume relies on
principles that have been given their theoretical foundation in
the Treatise. More particularly, we can see Hume employing his
'discoveries' about, for example, sympathy and opposition in
order to make his thesis plausible.
We can pick up the story with Flume's reporting of how, in
1521, Bishop Ariemboldi gave to the Dominicans the task of
selling 'general indulgences'. This, Hume says, angered the
'Austin' friars of Saxony, who had previously been entrusted
with their sale. The Dominicans, subsequently, praised the
merits of 'general indulgences' to a quite unprecedented
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degree. This robust attitude of the Dominicans, Hume suggests,
stemmed not from any beliefs about the quality of the product,
but from a desire 'to prove themselves worthy of the
distinction conferred on them' [H III 138]. However, their
panegyrics scandalised the people, n,ot, Hume says, because the
'general indulgence' was any more ridiculous than any other
indulgence, but because the people were not yet used to it;
furthermore, the scandal was intensified with the sightings of
Dominicans spending the monies collected in places that were
more infamous than taverns. All this helped create the general
sentiment upon which Luther was to build.
In the 'Author's Introduction' to the Natural History, Hume
speaks of the 'accidents and causes' that direct the operations
of religion [NHR 21]. And in Saxony, in 1521, there just
happened to be a man 'qualified to take advantage of the
incident' [H III 139]. In describing the manner of Luther's
reactions, Hume displays how his understanding of events and
the nature of religious behaviour and belief is guided by
principles of the imagination.
What at first animated Luther, Hume says, were not beliefs
about the institution of indulgences, nor about the notion of a
'general indulgence', nor about the authority of the Pope, nor
indeed about any theological issue at all. What happened was
that he resented the 'affront put upon his order' [ibid]. Thus
Luther's first harangues were not directed against the sale of
indulgences; but against abuses that he claimed were committed
by his rivals, the Dominicans. The implication is that history
would have been different if he had regained, for his party or
group, the indulgence sub-contract. Instead of success here,
Luther found opposition, which, as we have seen throughout the
present work, is always so provocative to the Hurnean mind. Only
when faced with opposition to the interests of his order did
Luther start to attack the notion of an indulgence. And then he
found the authority of the Pope used as a weapon against his
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order, so he began to attack that too, And turning to his books
to find reasons to justify his desires, he kept finding, as he
went through them, some 'new abuse or error in the Church of
Rome' [ibid].
Luther was encouraged by the receptions of his doctrines,
and he soon found himself pursuing an object far more pleasing
than the power to sell indulgences. He became quite incapable
'either from promises of advancement, or terrors of
severity, to relinquish a sect, of which he was himself
the founder, and which brought him a glory, superior to
all others, the glory of dictating the religious faith and
principles of multitudes' [ibid].
Thus what began as a political fight within a massive
institution between factions, or religious orders, that had
their own interests, ended in the founding of another
institution with its own supporters and principles.
The content of the Protestants' religious belief, Hume is
suggesting, was not established through spiritual and
theological illumination, but through the leader's political
acumen. In the same way as Luther had found 'reasons' in order
to justify the protection of his interests against the Church,
so too did he and his followers arrive at theological
principles, which, distinguishing them from Rome, served to
unite them as a body. The genesis and character of the
intellectual foundations of Protestantism that is, had a cause
no more august than did their rancorous insults as in their
referring to the Pope as the antichrist, and Rome as the
'scarlet whore'. 1 About the wild expressions of the
Protestants, Hume remarks that such
'expressions were better calculated to operate on the
multitude than the most solid arguments' [H III 141].
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The 'enthusiastic strain of devotion' arrived at by the leaders
gave to their people a common identity through its contrast to
the established religion [ibid]. It therefore allowed the
forces of sympathy to work on men. Just as Luther and his
colleagues feverishly sought out biblical citations which, they
thought, cast doubt on the leadership of Rome, so
'in contradiction to the multiplied superstitions, with
which that communion was loaded, they adopted an
enthusiastic strain of devotion, which admitted of no
observances, rites, or ceremonies, but placed all merit in
a mysterious species of faith, in inward vision, rapture
and ecstasy' [ibid].
We have seen in previous chapters how Hume considers that
opposition to any passion, so long as it is not overwhelming
opposition, will effect to increase the intensity of that
passion; so too will the effects of sympathy. Such principles,
together with his beliefs about the behaviour of groups in
regard to their interests, underlie his account of the
formation of the content of the Protestant religions. So
describing the Lutherans he says:
'Excited by contest and persecution on the one hand, by
success and applause on the other, many of the reformers
carried to the greatest extremities their opposition to
the Church of Rome' [ibid].
But how does Hume justify attempting to explain the
behaviour of the religious through reference to worldly desires
alone? This is the topic of the next section.
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section 3
hidden desires
Luther's actions are explained in the History solely in
terms of his desire for fame, the injury done to his party etc.
In the History such a reduction of the motives of the religious
to worldly motives is a constant move. From the top, as in
Hume's explaining the actions of Rome:
'the pope and his courtiers were foreigners to most of the
churches which they governed; they could not possibly have
any other object than to pillage the provinces for present
gain' [H II 4];
to the bottom:
'the preachers, finding that they could not rival the
gentry...in opulence and plenty, were necessitated to
betake themselves to other expedients for supposing their
authority. They affected a furious zeal for religion...'[l-I
IV 45].
Yet if we were to explain, for example, a planning squabble
within the board room of a space agency, we would not start by
discounting any real belief in the existence of places to
explore, and appeal instead only to local interests. Why, then,
does Hume discount belief in an after life? The answer is that
he believes that the actions of the religious can be far more
economically explained in terms of their worldly desires. But
in fact the matter is not as simple as this. For he seems to
think that there is often some belief, even if it is only a
little. The way I will discuss this is by looking again at his
explanation of concrete events.
Hume's scepticism about professions of religious belief makes
its first appearance in the Treatise. In speaking of how
Catholics deplored the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of
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Protestants, who, he says, were in any case condemned by the
Catholics to eternal punishment, he comments:
'All we can say in excuse for this inconsistency is, that
they really do not believe what they affirm concerning a
future state; nor is there any better proof of it than the
very inconsistency' [T115].
In the Natural History of Religion, Hume suggests that man's
assent in religion
'is some unaccountable operation of the mind between
disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer to
the former than to the latter' [NHR 60].
Does this mean that Hume considers that all religious behaviour
in the clergy is hypocritical? I will argue that Hume's
understanding of the nature of belief and the psychology of
group pressures gives him a far mare interesting view of the
hypocrisy and self-deception involved than any belonging to the
more vulgar detractors of religion. Ultimately, in fact, it is
his work on the imagination that allows him to take seriously
many of the protestations of commitment; and yet still explain
religion as sui generis and explicable through a naturalistic
method.
Different degrees of hypocrisy, for example, emerge in his
discussion of the struggle between Henry II and St. Thomas
Becket. As for the King, Hume presents Henry's actions towards
the 'haughty prelate' as chosen solely with a view to his
temporal interests. Thus excommunication was feared by Henry,
says Hume, not out of fear for his soul, but because it might
'make his subjects renounce their allegiance to him' [H I 329;
cf H I 337]. After Becket's death, Henry saw that:
'the point of chief importance...was to convince the pope
of his innocence; or rather, to persuade him, that he
would reap greater advantages from the submissions of
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England than from proceeding to extremities against that
kingdom' [H I 335].
Therefore,
'as it was extremely his interest to clear himself from
all suspicion, he took no care to conceal the depth of his
affliction' [ ibid 334].
There is never any suggestion that Henry was sincere in his
very public atonement for any part he played in causing the
death of Becket. Hume implies that this was unlikely when
Becket had been a man, who, through 'violence and ingratitude',
had long disquieted Henry's government; and who had 'been the
object of his most inveterate animosity' [ibid 355].
In discussing the Civil var, Thme remar\s that religIous
hypocrisy 'is of a peculiar nature' and it implies less
falsehood than any other species of insincerity' [H VI 142]. If
we now attend to what he says about Becket, we may be able to
see what he means.
Hume begins by making clear that he thinks that Becket was
an extremely ambitious man. As Chancellor, Becket exceeded any
previous subject of England in the luxuriousness of his life [H
I 307]; but once ensconced as Archbishop of Caaterbur., tLs
outward manner quickly changed:
'He wore sack-cloth next to his skin, which, by his
affected care to conceal it, was necessarily the more
remarked by all the world...His aspect wore the appearance
of seriousness, and mental recollection, and secret
devotion: And all men of penetration plainly saw, that he
was meditating some great design, and that the ambition
and ostentation of his character had turned itself towards
a new and more dangerous object' [ibid 310].
In his opposition to Henry, he was 'animated by the present
glory attending his situation' [H I 325]. As Archbishop, he is
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described as engineering the 'highest veneration of the public
towards his person and his dignity' [ibid 331]. And he met his
death, Hume says, because he trusted entirely to the sacredness
of his character [ibid 333]: an ironic comment in that Hume is
speaking of Becket's belief that no one would dare to attack
his august personage, whilst giving the appearance of speaking
of Becket's faith. Hume also notes how Becket compared himself
to Christ [ibid I 324]. Furthermore, the description of
Becket's journey to Southwark evokes that of Christ's entry
into to Jerusalem:
'men of all ranks and ages, came forth to meet him, and
-	 celebrated with hymns of joy his triumphant entrance'
[ibid 330].
Yet, and in contrast to his evident belief about Henry, Hume
does not consider Becket a hypocrite. All his letters evidence
'a most entire and absolute conviction of the reasons and piety
of [his] own party' [H I 334]. Nevertheless, as with Henry, his
animating passions were not religious; there is deception. He
was, says Hume,
'able to cover, to the world and probably to himself, the
enterprizes of pride and ambition, under the disguise of
sanctity and of zeal for the interests of religion' [H I
333].
So the deceived included himself.
One part of Hume's explanation of how this is possible
reminds us of the primary significance of the social dimension
of human nature. Becket's case, Hume seems to think, is an
example of how a man can hide from himself certain desires,
partly through his great desire to win the approval of his
party. Though in reality religious feelings act in fits and
starts [D 222; C I 246n; NHR 60], the individual may come to
believe that religion is his animating principle not least
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because this is what others attribute to him.( For as we have
seen more than once, it is a cardinal principle that we find it
almost impossible not to believe that which our daily
companions believe [T316]. Especially, of course, if it is in
our interest to believe it.) And he has led them to this
opinion by carefully presenting his character so as to exclude
the sight of his real motives.
One reason why the opinion of others is so important for
the religious believer is because there is no primary religious
instinct or sentiment, as there is, for example, in morals.
This is why Hume lays such emphasis on the need for the
religious believer to feign. Because fervour is often absent, a
'habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted: And
fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle.
Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the
highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far
from being inconsistent, are often or commonly united in
the same individual character' [D 222j.
Henry did not need to deceive himself in order to satisfy any
ambition. He was, after all, the King. But Becket had to act
like an Archbishop, and was treated like an Archbishop, at
least by the clergy and the people. In this way he expressed
that ambition which was already discernible in his younger
days.
So the explanation of the behaviour of Becket does not rest
with the passion of ambition. Flume presents his behaviour as
bound up with his membership of a group. The support and
applause Becket won from the clergy was a consequence of his
forwarding their interests. His usefulness here, depended on
the effect he made outside the group: in this case, the effect
on the populace, for whose support Becket and Henry fought. His
success, therefore, depended on the opinion of others. Whether
they were willing to forward the interests of the Church or not
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depended on whether they believed in his authority. In the same
way as the government of a state is ultimately founded on
opinion [G I 110], so too is the government of the minds of men
by the Church. Though 'men be much governed by interest', he
says, 'yet even interest itself, and all human affairs, are
governed by opinion' [G I 125].
Becket, according to Hume, directed his energies precisely
towards this end. On the one hand, he took 'affected care' to
conceal his sackcloth; on the other hand, whilst giving up
much, he
'maintained, in his retinue and attendants alone, his
ancient pomp and lustre, which was useful to strike the
vulgar' [H I 309].
Nor did his service to the interests of the clergy go without
recognition. Hume notes how after his murder, the clergy were
not idle
'in magnifying the sanctity of Becket; in extolling the
merits of his martyrdom; and in exalting him above all
that devoted tribe, who, in several ages 2 had, by their
blood, cemented the fabric of the temple' [ibid 336].
Other saints had died only for the Christian doctrines, but
'Becket had sacrificed his life to the power and
privileges of the clergy; and this peculiar merit
challenged, and not in vain, a suitable acknowledgement to
his memory' [ibid; cf ibid 254].
Hume's explanation of the social forces that so shape men,
even when they are dead, gives him room to sympathise with
individuals whilst lamenting their actions. Hume, one can see,
is no great lover of St Thomas
	 Becket; and nor is this
surprising when one considers his bigoted Calvinist upbringing.
But the detachment at which he aims at least has the
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consequence that he is not really interested in passing moral
judgments on Becket; and in this he distinguishes himself from
the historians and religionists of his day. His chief interest
lies in the manner in which a man can be led to act against the
interest of society. So he regrets that the gifted Becket was
ever moved from the Chancellorship, when he would have
otherwise continued to have 'directed the vehemence of his
character to the support of law and justice'; instead, alas,
'of being engaged, by the prejudices of the times, to
sacrifice all private duties and public connexions to
tyes, which he imagined or represented, as superior to
every civil and political consideration' [ibid 333].
Another instance of detachment in the historian and an
attempt to display the forces that can lead to self-deception,
is found in Hume's discussion of St. Joan of Arc. If the
passions that caused Becket's actions were ambition and and a
love of fame and glory, Hume presents Joan as being animated by
the love of her country and compassion for the beleaguered,
handsome, and 'amiable' Dauphin. In Joan's case too, the
justification she gave for her actions were reasons of
religion; and,like Becket, she is described by Hume as sincere.
From the beginning, the force of sympathy had a powerful
effect on Joan's actions: 'inflamed by the general sentiment',
that the sovereign should be relieved of the distress caused by
the English, her
'unexperienced mind, working day and night on this
favourite object, mistook the impulses of passion for
heavenly inspirations; and she fancied that she saw
visions, and heard voices, exhorting her to re-establish
the throne of France, and to expel the foreign invaders'[H
II 397-398].
Hume makes it fairly clear that he thinks that sexual
attraction was behind Joan's dreams. She belonged, after all,
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to that sex 'whose generous mind know no bounds in their
affections'; moreover, Charles was not only a Dauphin-in-
distress, but a character 'strongly inclined to friendship and
the tender passions' [H II 397]. It is no wonder, Hume remarks,
that he became a hero for women [ibid].
Whilst the theme of Becket's sincerity was advanced through
an artful contrast with Henry, that of Joan's is developed
through a contrast with the actions of the King and his
ministers. They thought that she could serve their interests.
Cunningly, the
'more the King and his ministers were determined to give
into the illusion, the more scruples they pretended' [ibid
399].
Some of those they brought in to examine Joan were indeed
credulous. But enough care was taken by the King and his
ministers to tcarket Joat tt a iaj	 that
not prepared to put all their trust in God. So 'miraculous
stories were spread abroad' in order to dominate the minds of
the vulgar; and a more romantic impression was effected by
tampering with Joan's Curriculum Vitae: before she was a
servant in an inn: now she is a shepherdess [ibid]. For good
measure, they decided to iop ten years off her age [ibid].
This strategy went not without an effect:
'A ray of hope began to break through that despair, in
which the minds of all men, were before enveloped. Heaven
had now declared itself in favour of France, and had laid
bear its outstretched arm to take vengeance on her
invaders' [ibid].
E-iume, of course, did not see matters in this light; and not
only because the French lost. He writes of how
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'Few could distinguish between the impulse of inclination
and the force of conviction; and none would submit to the
trouble of so disagreeable a scrutiny' [ibid].
Thus it was hardly surprising that Joan, believed in by
thousands of Frenchman, should continue to see herself a
heavenly deliverer. But in the end, of course, the forces of
interest, again under the guise of religion, led to her death.
So Hume never doubts her sincerity. Indeed, perhaps because
she was a victim of the English, and French, and a woman, Hume
goes so far to say that 'the more generous superstition of the
ancients would have erected altars' to this 'admirable
heroine'[ibid 410].
There is another reason for his sympathy. Joan was a victim of
the clergy.
'where the interests of religion are concerned, no
morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic
zealot. The sacredness of the cause sanctifies every
measure which can be made use of to promote it' [D222].
By the 'interests of religion' Hume means the worldly interests
of the sect. And indeed, such imputations were familiar to his
readers; though, of course, it was always members of another
sect - usually the Catholics - who were the guilty ones.
Hume's appeal to the interests of the clergy to explain
their actions, marks him as a child of his time; and he
introduces a critique as unsympathetic as that offered by any
philosophe. Just as it is the financial and political will of
the sect that controls its actions, so too, he argues, are men
drawn to the ministry, not through recognising the will of God,
but 'as people are to other employments, by the views of
profit'; moreover, the dissimulation that is necessary, for
religion acts by fits and starts, greatly harms their moral
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character; their ambition is to control the beliefs of the
multitude, and as their livelihood depends on this, they brook
no opposition to their beliefs; they are, like women, very
revengeful creatures, because, deprived of the means of
violence, they fancy themselves despised; they are more
conceited than other men on account of the veneration they
inspire in the ignorant multitude; they hate to be
contradicted, as they know that their livelihood depends on
their beliefs [G I 246n].
It was hinted in Chapter II that Hume considers that there
is a significant parallel between the Pyrrhonians and the
religious. Neither group believe-in what they say they believe
with anything like the solidity that beliefs in common life
possess. In one sense the Pyrrhonian and the religious believer
are both pretenders. There is, however, a vital difference
between them in that religion can be dangerous; whUst the.
Pyrrhonism is more a matter for humour [cf T272; E I 160]. In
the following section, on toleration, we will see how Hume
attempts to provide a theoretical underpinning for what he
considers the wisest way for a magistrate to attempt to lessen
the dangers of religion.
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section 4
toleration
In this section I examine further Hume's work on the causes
of religious behaviour, and argue that his theory of the
imagination gives him a new and interesting perspective on
religious toleration.
In the Dialogues Philo comments that a 'wise magistrate'
should try to 'preserve a very philosophical indifference' to
all religious sects, trying especially to restrain the
'pretensions of the prevailing sect' [D 223]. Or else he may
expect endless quarrels. I shall approach the matter through
exploring certain elements in his analysis of intolerance,
beginning with his discussion of religious martyrdom.
An explanation of the fact that men appear to die for
their faith is demanded from a theory of religious behaviour
that holds that 'the conviction of the religionists, in all
ages, is more affected than real' [NI-JR 60]. Hume finds his
answer in the way that religous belief is strengthened through
sympathy and esteem. 'it is in vain', he comments, in
describing the behaviour of Walter Mill, a priest martyred in
St. Andrews, a city once given over to lively theological
disputes, 'for men to oppose the severest punishment to the
united motives of religion and public applause' [H IV 21; cf H
III 433]. Relatedly, Hume writes of George Fox:
'When he had been sufficiently consecrated in his own
imagination, he felt that the fumes of self-applause soon
dissipate, if not continually supplied by the admiration
of others; and he began to seek proselytes' [H VI 143; cf
H IV 14].
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The esteem that the martyrs feed on can produce a constancy at
the stake 'that appears almost supernatural' [H III 433; cf H
IV 21].
Hume believes that it is the very weakness of religious
belief that gives to sympathy such a comparatively powerful
role. Belief is a lively idea related to a present impression.
But there is little liveliness in a belief, say, about the
afterworld, in comparison to the beliefs of common life. One
iho has visited the Holy Land, Hume says in the Treatise, will
be a stronger believer in the miraculous events told of in the
gospels:
'The lively idea of the places passes by an easy
transition to the facts, which are suppos'd to have been
related to them by contiguity, and encreases the belief by
encreasing the vivacity of the conception' [T11O- 111].
And sympathy, as we have already seen, also works by increastn
the vivacity. The belief in the glory of a death for religion
that the spectators at a burning have, inspires the one who is
actually going to suffer. Naturally, he may begin to doubt the
wisdom of his course; but in the sight of his fellow believers
he believes again. Moreover, he naturally seeks praise from
those he respects; a recantation would be a betrayal of them.
Thus Hume seems to think that in a very real way the ordinary
believer is as responsible for the deaths of martyrs as those
who actually condemn him. But certainly he believes that such
religious belief would wither away were it not for the artifice
of those iho have an interest in upholding it [G IV 401].
Hume's most extensive discussion of the sources of
intolerance appears in his reconstruction of the arguments of
Pole and Gardiner, as to whether heretics ought to be burnt.
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The weak hold that religious belief has on the imagination,
that makes one's brethren blessed, also has the consequence
that it is made still weaker through the doubt of others. When
faced with someone who denies a belief that we are perfectly
assured of, we are likely to treat their doubt with contempt.
'But while men zealously maintain what they neither
clearly comprehend, nor entirely believe, they are shaken
in their imagined faith by the opposite persuasion, or
even doubt of other men' [H Ill 431-2].
So they 'vent on their antagonists that impatience, which is
the natural result of so disagreeable a state of the
understanding'. [H III 432]. This anger leads them to find
reasons that makes the passion not only forgivable, but
praiseworthy. And if they can represent their antagonists not
only as impious, but as a danger to civil government, then they
'can no longer be restrained from giving uncontrouled scope to
vengeance and resentment' [ibid].
It might be argued that severity from the.beginriing would
deter all heresy, and so prevent the anger and resentment
arising. Hume says to this that there will always be
differences about questions that of all others are the 'least
subjected to the criterion of human reason' [ibid]. For
'events' will occur that produce 'a faction amongst the clergy'
and so give rise to differences of opinion [ibid].
Nietzsche once spoke of the 'world-historical stupidity' of
all persecutors for bestowing on their opponents the honour of
martyrdom [Nietzsche (1) p.171]. Hurne shares this view.
Furthermore, it is grounded in his earlier work: the desire for
fame and approval, a considerable motive in many of our actions
[T31 61J, will only serve to stimulate the persecuted. Moreover,
the melancholy that the fear of torture and death introduces
into society makes men even readier for superstition. And,
because of an association of ideas in the imagination, 'men
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naturally pass from hating the persons of their tyrants, to a
more violent abhorrence of their doctrines' [H III 433].
In the midst of dispute there is a flux between belief and
doubt. The opponent of a believer will have the effect of
weakening his belief. But the Principle of the Conversion of
Passion ensures that the opposition and uncertainty that the
opponent brings, serves to increase the belief. The effort that
the imagination makes to overcome the uncertainty 'rouzes the
spirits, and gives an additional force to the passion' [T422].
The fact that the person will belong to a group, and will be
opposed by a group, intensifies the various effects; resolve is
strengthened by the forces of sympathy [cf H Y 256; H VI 182];
and, relatedly, by the desire to emulate [cf H V 12; H V 342].
But if a study of the imagination aids us in finding the
sources of rancour, it can also help us find the path to peace:
'Open the door to toleration, mutual hatred relaxes among
the sectaries; their attachment to their particular modes
of religion decays...and the same man, who, in other
circumstances, would have braved flames and tortures is
induced to change his sect from the smallest prospect of
favour and advancement, or even from the frivolous hope of
becoming more fashionable in his principles' [H III 433].
Security diminishes the passions 'because it removes that
uncertainty, which encreases them' [T421]. The result is that
the mind languishes for a while, and the energies expended on
religion become available for use elsewhere. Thus the security
introduced by a strong magistrate is the best method of
answering a special case of belief which is 'more affected than
real'. The decrease in the sound of the opposition's drums will
mean that men will not adhere to their own sect with the same
degree of tenacity; the disappearance of terror will have the
effect that the reliance on leaders will weaken, and with it,
the strength of their own interest governed dominion; finally,
the breaking down of the desire to gain the esteem of members
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of one's own sect gives way to the hope of gaining the esteem
of all.2
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section 5
false religion
My overriding concern in this chapter has been to show how,
in the field of religion, Hume presents his thesis that man is
not to be understood as being determined by reason, but by the
passions. The passions, in turn, are dependent upon the
association of ideas in the imagination. It is in this way,
Hume believes, that we can explain the nature of religious
belief: it is not, that is, to be explained in terms of reason
and insight, or Providence.
What I now want to do is to provide some background to this
view. In section 4 of Chapter III, when discussing Hume's
general views on reason and the passions, I suggested that if
we are interested in the development of his views on reason and
the passions, then for all the importance of Bayle, we cannot
afford to ignore Malebranche; this is on account of the place
the latter gives to the imagination In his account o action.
However, I mentioned, in that discussion, Bayle's special
importance for understanding the development of Hume's views on
religious belief. And I will now argue that Hume's account of
the misunderstanding that he thinks Christians labour under
(his development in the area of 'relIgIous' behaviour of the
idea that man is a slave to his passions) was made possible by,
on the one hand, the writings of Bayle; and on the other hand,
by the pre-eminent English student of passionate man in the
early 18th centu ry, Shaftesbury.
We know for certain that Hume thought Bayle's Dictionaire
Historigue et Critique particularly helpful for understanding
the Treatise [cf L I 12]. But the book that is most relevant
to our purposes is Penses diverses sur la Comte [1683].
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The notion that man is a slave to the passions, is at the
heart of Bayle's analysis of religion as it has commonly been
found. Without the benefit of grace, all behaviour is
determined by self-love: ordinary religious practices,
therefore, are just another opportunity for man to express his
selfishness. For it is the selfish passions that determine
fallen man. So in the Penses, Bayle writes:
'The Jew...Christian and Infidel...Men who differ in
almost all things else, except the general Notion of
Humanity...exactly agree with regard to which passions we
find in them' [Bayle (2) p.274].
'Whence can this proceed', Bayle asks,
'but from hence That the true Principle of Man's Actions
(I except those in whom the Grace of the Holy Spirit
operates efficaciously) is nothing else than the
Complexion, the natural Inclination for Pleasure, a taste
for particular objects, a desire of pleasing others...or
some other Dis?osition resulting from the ground of our
corrupt Nature [ibid p.275].
The ostensible reason for propounding such conclusions was
the question of whether the comet which appeared over Europe in
1680 should be taken to have any theological significance. This
allowed Bayle the opportunity of examining the relation of
speculative opinion to action.
The idea that the comet was sent by God in order to correct
the vicious inclinations of man, says Bayle, is absurd. This is
not only because, as there have always been comets, it would
follow, he says, that in pagan times God wanted to convert men
to paganism. More importantly, man is not the reasonable
creature that he pretends to be. The view that he is such a
creature naturally leads men to think that were it not for the
sanctions of heaven and hell, the passions would be
unrestrained. It is this view, then, that leads men to say that
a society of atheists is impossible.
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In fact, says BayLe, that which prevents men from
destroying each other is nothing other than the laws. And far
from superstitious beief providing an indispensable necessity
to the moral life, it only serves to incr'ase the opportunities
for vice:
'For the passions themselves are so ingenious at making
Reprasentations that they find matters of Enjoyment in the
very things design'd for their Mortification. What can be
prettier than a Festival? [ibid p.277].
Unless one's heart is truly converted to God, and one 'is
sanctify'd by the Graces of the Holy Spirit, the Knowledge of
God and of a Providence, is too loose a Rein for the Passions'
[ibid p.262]. Certainly, rulers know how to use religion: an
idolatrous religion will tend 'to fix men to the Free-hold,
make 'em of a piece with their City-Walls, and struggle lustily
if there [sic] be attacked' [ibid p.262]. But it does not make
them 'wise nor vertuous' [ibid]. And in so far as they do live
moral Lives, then this is because of 'Human Justice'[ibid
p.329] and the desire for praise [ibid p.367].
These, he says, are the conclusions of experience [ibid
p.271]. Perhaps if one considers matters 'in their Ideas &
Metaphysical Abstractions' one might arrive at a conclusion
that the sense of God corrects the vicious inclinations of man.
But then why is it that if a people from another world had to
spend time among Christians, they would so clearly arrive at
the conclusion that 'the People here did not walk according to
the light of their Conscience' [ibid]?
Bayle concludes that man is not determined to act by
'general Notions, or Views of his Understanding, but by the
present reigning Passion of his Heart' [ibid p.279]; that men
may believe and yet be dissolute; and that the chief influence
of religion is bad: it fills us with
291
'a certain unaccountable Fervour in the practice of
outward Acts of Religion: in a persuasion, that these with
a Publick profession of the Faith, are a sufficient
Bulwark against the Consequences of our Sins and will one
day avail to our Pardon [ibid p.290].
Such conclusions, which contradict the Cartesian picture of
rational man, would seem likely to be very important for
understanding the genesis of Hurne's work. But the general
importance of Bayle's reasonings for Hume should not hide their
role in influencing Hume's understanding of the relation
between specifically religious speculative opinion and action.
The example that Bayle showed in cutting through the self-
consciousness of a society was certainly undertaken with a very
different aim. Bayle wanted to make 'Man sensible of his
extreme Depravity' so that he would pray for Grace [ibid 323].
But the exercise in teaching man about himself that Hume
undertook ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is no
reason to make such a contrast. The experimental method,
furthermore, leads Hume to reject the thought that the
religious believe in a way comparable to the beliefs of common
life. The imagination does not rise to such solidity. And this,
we have seen, is a chief reason why the ruling passions of
religious believers can be so dangerous. An examination of
this, however, must be founded on a study of the imagination:
to be sure Bayle shows the way by turning to the passions of
men: but precisely because he himself is working with
Augustinian ideas, however much he appeals to experience, his
work is flawed.
Now we saw in section 2 of Chapter III that Hume does not
accept the Augustinian picture of man as a selfish creature
that Calvinists such as Bayle propounded. On the other hand, we
have seen in this chapter that he thinks that the forces of
religion can unleash a selfishness that can tear society apart.
What I am suggesting, then, is that the powerful attack (in the
language of the passions) on religion that Hume makes was made
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possible for him through Bayle's attack on idolatry
(Catholicism) carried out in the name of Christianity
(Calvinism). A 17th century analysis of human nature carried
out for sectional religious purposes, that is, provided a
crucial influence on the development of the greatest 18th
century attack on all vulgar religion. What I now want to
suggest is that this step was not made all at once; and that
Shaftesbury played an important role in the development of a
theory of religious behaviour that allowed Hume to impute to
the religious that selfishness which they discern in the
damned.
Shaftesbury was in fact friends with Bayle. He once
persuaded, Elisabeth Labrousse says, the austere Bayle to
accept the present of a watch [Labrousse p.46]. And when the
latter died Shaftesbury wrote to Basagne:
'I must own my private loss makes me think less of that
which the public has sustained by the death of so great a
man. This weakness friendship may excuse, for whatever
benefit the world in general may have received from him, I
am sure no one in particular owed 	 more to him than I,
or knew his merit better' [Shaftesbury (2) p.372].
But Shaftesbury's conception of the affections of man are
diametrically opposed to his friend's picture - at least as
regards man in general. For in a crucial move Shaftesbury
suggests that the selfishness which Bayle claims is at the
heart of all men, excepting those who have received the Grace
of the Holy Spirit, is more likely to be found in religious
enthusiasts. Those religionists who can escape the attribution
of selfishness completely are not the Calvinist elect, but the
adherents of what Shaftesbury called 'True Religion'.
Shaftesbury argued that the principles of Christianity
express a love of God and virtue for their own sakes. In
practice, though, when someone is brought up with the sanctions
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of heaven and hell imprinted upon him, his actions will be
determined by the passion of fear. Furthermore, self-love, that
'principle' which nature has given man for the good of himself
and the good of society, is thus fostered by such religion to
an unnatural and debilitating degree. Self-love is made
stronger 'every day' by the contemplation of the alternatives
of heaven and hell. And,
'if the habit be such as to occasion in every particular,
a stricter attention to self-good, and private interest;
it must insensibly diminish the affections towards public
good or the interest of society; and introduce a certain
narrowness of spirit, which, (as some pretend) is
peculiarly observable in the devout persons and zealots of
almost every religious persuasion' [Shaftesbury (1) I
p.269; cf ibid I p.274-5].
Now this disturbance in the natural harmony of man's
affections, he says, occasions a misunderstanding of the nature
of virtue. Christianity has corrupted the idea of virtue
through presenting it as valuable because of the consequence o
the agent - over and above the 'natural advantages' of virLue
Christianity makes virtue into a 'mercenary...thing' [ibid (1)
I p.66]. There, virtue is presented as a means to satisfy the
agent's own ends. Yet acts, he argues, performed from such
motives are not in themselves meritorious. And any schema that
contradicts this as Christianity does, thereby displays a
misunderstanding of religion as well as of virtue:
'Whilst God is beloved only as the cause of private good,
He is no otherwise beloved than as any instrument or means
of pleasure by any vicious creature' Libid (1) I p.269].
Furthermore, the more there is of the affection towards
'private good', then the less room there is for the other sort
towards goodness in it-self' [ibid].
Hume agrees, we have seen, that religion is a force for
selfishness. But he disagrees as well as agrees with
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Shaftesbury's reasons for saying this. He disagrees in so far
as he thinks that the religious person does not really believe
in the afterlife: so that the behaviour that Shaftesbury
interpreted as denoting a long term plan is really all about
serving desires for things in this world. Nevertheless, Hume
does sometimes give the impression of agreeing with Shaftesbury
that religious people do believe in the afterlife, and they are
made more selfish by it. For example, in the Dialogues, Philo
virtually echoes some words of Shaftesbury noted above:
'The steady attention alone to so important an interest as
that of eternal salvation is apt to extinguish the
benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted
selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it
easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and
benevolence' [D 22211.
A critic might say that Hume wants to have his cake and eat it.
He might reply that human nature is very inconstant. He never
denied that there was any belief in the afterlife: just that it
is natural for the believer and his observers to grossly
overestimate its significance.
Whatever their differences, Bayle, Shaftesbury, and Hurne
were all writing against an intellectual background where, far
from belief in an afterlife being thought of as a danger to
moral rectitude, it was considered as an essential element of
that rectitude. In the next section I want to discuss further
how his conception of the imagination enters into Hume's
rejection of this view; after this I will turn again to his
views on Christianity.
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section 6
the imagination, rectitude, and Christianity
In Hume's Philosophy of Religion, J.C.A.Gaskin quotes a
typical eighteenth century argument as to the necessity of
belief in the afterlife; it comes in fact from the first review
of the Dialogues:
'But suppose that Mr Hume's principles are let loose among
mankind, and generally adopted, what will then be the
consequence? Will those who think they are to die like
brutes, ever act like men? Their language will be, let us
eat and drink, for tomorrow we die. When men are once
tbTTeve thateath puts 	 fTil period to their
existence, and are set free from the idea of their being
accountable creatures, what is left to restrain them from
the gratification of their passions but the authority of
the laws?' [Gaskin p.201].
The same argument in fact, as Gaskin notes, is found in the
Enquiry. As a reply to his sceptical friend's attack on the
design argument 'Hume' says that
'men reason not in the same manner you do, but draw many
consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and
suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice,
and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appears in the
ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of
theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its influence on
their life and conduct must still be the same' [E I 147].
His interlocutor is not given a reply to this. But there is a
principle of the imagination which might have been used,
though, it would undoubtedly have been referred to in the
Enquiry, as a 'principle of human nature'. This is the
principle which we have seen employed many times: for instance
in Hume's discussions of justice, of government, and of
sympathy. It appears as part of Philo's answer to Cleanthes'
claim that 'The doctrine of a future state is so strong and
necessary a security to morals that we ought never to abandon
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it' [D 219]. Finite and temporary rewards and punishments,
Cleanthes says, affect behaviour: ergo, infinite and eternal
rewards and punishments will affect behaviour more [ibid 219-
20].
Philo disagrees: the 'inference is not just' [ibid 220].
And in a passage that was scored out in 1776 he says that
certainly, if we consider the natural self-love of man, we
would expect such considerations not only to have a great
effect, but to be 'absolutely irresistible and infallible in
their operation' [ibid 220n]. For what could 'reasonably'
counterbalance such motives, 'even for a moment'? He continues:
'But this is not found to hold in reality; and therefore,
we may be certain that there is some other principle of
human nature, which we have here overlooked, and which
diminishes, at least, the force of these motives' [ibid].
This principle is nothing other than 'the attachment which we
have to present things, and the little concern which we
discover for objects so remote and uncertain' [ibid 220].
It is this principle, as we saw in Chapter V, that makes
the rules of justice so precarious an invention. We are likely
to fall prey to the temptation of filching our neighbour
gooseberries because the impression of the gooseberries is
more forceful than the idea of the anarchy that may follow the
deed. Ultimately, this is due to the fact that we are not, pace
Clearithes, other philosophers, and men of his day, governed by
'reason'. We are not reasonable about gooseberries, and nor
about heaven and hell. No doctrine of original sin is needed to
explain this. But nor can we just say that this is because we
are beings of the passions rather than reason. Though there
were reasons for Hume not wanting to lay out the details of a
theory of almost forty years old, partly perhaps, because he
had some doubts about the theory itself as well as doubts about
the wisdom of offering it to the previously ungrateful public,
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he nevertheless gives implicit credence to that theory. The
theory which explains that we are determined by the association
of ideas in the imagination. So in discussing the need for
government in Book III of the Treatise, he says that
'men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and
proportion their affections more to the light, under which
any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic
value' [T534J.
This is because of the contiguity of the object under
consideration. The powerful impression that the temptation
creates, enlivens the idea of pleasure in a way that
counterbalances any effect from the promise of heavenly
felicity.
The comparison with politics may be continued for a moment.
We saw in Chapter V that the prospect of immediate advantages
in government, even within an established constitution like the
British, may lead men to neglect the longer term advantages of
public order. This, of course, is due not least to the
phenomenon of sympathy. But when this happens, reasons are
found to 'justify' their actions; reasons, a fortiori, that are
couched in the language of the public interest. So we saw
Hume's interest in the phenomenon of faction and hypocrisy.
And we also saw this in earlier sections of the present
chapter. For the point is not just the negative one that the
prospect of an afterlife is unnecessary for moral rectitude.
Rume believes that the language of religion will be used to
justify actions consequent upon the great desires had for
'present things'. Like attention from one's Dauphin; riches and
power; economic dominion in Africa; revenge against the United
States; revenge in Northern Ireland; land on the West Bank;
power in Nicaragua; and, no doubt, making a large Scottish
philosopher suffer. So after being presented with arguments for
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and against toleration, Hume says that Mary concurred with the
latter as more a;reeable to her 'cruel bigotry'. He continues:
'England was soon filled with scenes of horror...which
prove, that no human depravity can equal revenge and
cruelty, covered with the mantle of religion' H LU 43-
5; ef H V 342].
It is in this context, I want to argue, that we should
understand the core of Hume's attack on religion. It is not
enough to see it, as it is invariably seen, as a series of
sharp points which may indeed find better expression elsewhere.
What is so extraordinary about it is the way that Hume provides
a sort of genealogy of deception. To consider aright certain
'criticisms' of religion that are found in Hume's writings, for
example, the idea that eligion causes misery through terror;
the idea that the 'monkish virtues' are useless; we should not
see them as more or less arbitrary con:lusions of a free
thinker. They are part of a vision founded on a sophisticated
theory of human nature. Tiis may be further seen if we attend
to what he says about the history and character of
Christianity.
Now I suggested in Chapter I that Hume seems to think that
Christianity has played its role in corrupting man's conception
of himself as regards the belief that, unlike the animals who
are governed by their passions, he. is	 j 'e.asc.
is another corruption, he holds, as regards the content of
morality. Thus in the Enquiry, after giving his account of that
in which 'Personal Merit' consists, he cotnments that
'it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and
hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when
a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have
escaped the most elaborate examination' [E II 268-9].
So how could men be led to reject a 'natural' system? To
answer this we must first note his view that, in general, sects
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will seek to please their Gods, not by virtue, but by
'frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous
extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions'
[NHR 70]. Why should this be so? If the Deity is perfect, he
should be pleased with virtue alone. The reason Hurne says is
that in virtue 'a superstitious man' finds nothing which can be
held to be performed for the sake of the Deity: virtue is what
we owe to society. So,
'any practice, recommended to him, which either serves no
purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his
natural inclinations; that practice he will the more
readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances,
which should make him absolutely reject it' ibid 72;
emphasis minej.
I shall now try and see how Hume thinks this thought
applies to Christianity. I noted in section 6 of the previous
chapter how Hume places great emphasis for understanding the
character of Christianity on the fact that in its early years
it was a sect with principles 'directly opposite' to those of
the 'polite part of the world' [G I 131]. By this latter phrase
he means, of course, Rome. And the Romans 'despised the nation
that first broached this novelty' [ibid]. It seems that he
thought that because Israel was more or less in a condition of
slavery, that Christianity was less content with distinguishing
itself by means of more frivolous principles. For, unlike the
religion of the ancients, it does not sit 'light on merf's
minds' [NHR 65 ]. It seems, then, that this product of a
'nation' distinguished itself from the moral principles of
another nation - that is, Rome. If it had not contradicted
these principles as a way of affirming itself, it would not
have such a hold.
This reading would be consistent with Hume's belief that in
a sense, Christianity has a tendency to malignly invert. This
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may be seen if we consider for a moment what he has to say
about the virtue of courage.( And we can see that his phrase
'the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst'
[NHR 51], is not merely rhetoric). Understandably, he contents
himself with attacking the Catholics and Mohammedanism:
'The heroes in paganism correspond exactly to the saints
in popery, and holy dervises in MAHOMETANISM. The place of
HERCULES, TI-IESEUS, HECTOR, ROMULUS, is now supplied by
DOMINIC, FRANCIS, ANTHONY, and BENEDICT. Instead of the
destruction of monsters, the subduing of tyrants, the
defence of our native country; whippings and fastings,
cowardice and humility, abject submission and slavish
obedience, are become the means of obtaining celestial
honours among mankind' [NHR 52].
Now my point is not indeed that Hume was interested in
installing in his readers a reverence for the martial virtues.
Nor indeed am I denying that he perceived a considerable
overlap between the values o Rome and those o Chtistia'nit"j;
and nor that he would not have favoured many of the latter's in
so far as they conflicted with the former's. However, if one is
faced with a tyrant, or indeed a monster, then the right thing
to do is to fight. And such was the character given to their
heroes by the Romans and Greeks. Hume suggests that the
Christian heroes did not whip monsters; they whipped
themselves. They did not subdue tyrants, but slavishly
submitted. They did not show courage and defend their lands,
but showed cowardice. These, then, were the examples held up by
the priests. But the influence of religion goes further. If one
has written a fine play one should be proud of it and accept
praise; and if one has contributed to the welfare of society,
one should be proud of that and not pretend that one is not.
But Christianity, he says, decries as 'purely pagan'
'intrepidity', 'ambition', 'love of glory', 'magnanimity' and
all the virtues that 'have plainly a strong mixture of self-
esteem in them' [T600]. Certainly, though, 'the world naturally
esteems a well-regulated pride' [ibid]. This is 'natural', for
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if we elevate humility above all else we deprive ourselves of a
great propulsion to glorious deeds; and we may also drive men
to misrepresent their real feelings of pride.
One way to consider Hume's understanding of this tendency
of Christianity to invert is to see him noting Christianity
thriving on opposition. 3 In discussing in the Treatise the way
that opposition has a tendency to inliven passions, Hume
remarks that this is 'why we naturally desire what is forbid'
[T 4211. This, then, would help explain how men may come to
o1d beliefs ti-tat are either in 'direct opposition to morality'
or else are at least a distraction from their duties [D 222].
Christianity is attractive because we are not fitted for it. It
is attractive because it is unattractive. It is attractive,
that is to say, on account of the very difficulty of accepting
moral values so unnatural to man. On this reading, men not only
sometimes look for opposition from others, but also within
themselves. The Christian, Hume t-tought, is indeed at war with
the 'flesh'. But we swuld understand, as it were, the
mechanics of this not in the language of Pugustine; but through
the vagaries of the imagination. This, I suggest, is the way
that the Principle of the Conversion of Passion enters into his
explanation of how the 'natural' system that he pretends to
uncover, could be so long hidden from men. We associate,
perhaps, the idea of transgression with the Christian doctrine
of original sin. Hume, however, seems to have thought that
Christianity not only preaches about transgression: it lives by
it.
Yet how far does it live by it? Here we come back to the
weakness of religious belief. It is this that creates so much
of the character of religion. This is the reason why interest
rules and the virtues take second place. Just as it is the
attachment that we have to what is near that makes government
necessary [T 535]; so too is it the attachment to earthly
delights that leads to the hypocrisy of the religious.
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As for Christianity, the great contrast between their moral
principles and Roman and Greek principles, Hume remarks, led
Machiavelli to say that the doctrines of the Christian religion
'which reconmend only passive courage and suffering, had
subdued the spirit of mankind, and had fitted them for
slavery and subjection' [NHR 52].
Hume comments that Machiavelli's observation is one
'which would certainly be just, were there not many other
circumstances in human society which controulL the genius
and character of a religion' LNHR 52]
So while they profess principles which would lead them into
slavery, the weakness of religious belief is such that they
find ways to satisfy their natural sense of morality and their
other passions. The 'circumstances' include those we have
already noted. For example, the influence of faction; passions
which rule, such as ambition in Becket; and in general, the way
that the passions are served by religion. And the result is not
a slavish mentality; though there will be extended exercises in
'humility', especially amongst the clergy. In discussing the
horrors of the Crusades Hume exclaims:
'So inconsistent is human nature with itself! And so
easily does the most effeminate superstition ally, both
with the most heroic courage, and with the fiercest
barbarity' [H I 250].
That curious mechanism, the imagination, is I have argued,
at the centre of Hume's explanation of this inconsistency. He
has, that is, adopted a different perspective on the rule of
the passions from that given by Calvin, Malebranche, and Bayle,
who all saw this rule as a consequence of the Fall. Crudely
speaking, it appears that the the experimental study of human
nature has replaced St. Augustine. All of these writers
referred to this rule; and considering the early influence of
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Calvin on Hume, we need hardly be surprised at Flume's
fascination in finding ways to deny what the believer hardly
dares to believe: that he is one of the elect and acting in a
godly manner. Flume does this through showing how their
behaviour is best explained in terms of the imagination
directing the passions.
He agrees, then, that man is not guided by reason: but this
is not on account of the Fall. Though if this chapter is
broadly correct, Flume might say that the temptation to reach
for hat is forbidden - opposition rather than the devil
enlivening our passions - has indeed a permanent significance
for man. It should be understood in terms of overstepping the
limits of reason; and also trying to make virtues out of what
are at best morally insignificant acts, and at worst, vices.
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section 7
the Dialogues (A)
A theme, not to say paradox, of previous sections has been
Hume's interest in the weakness of religious belief. Human
beings, he seems to think, cannot stand too much unreality, in
the sense of trying to order their lives through 'God's will'.
But the most economic explanation of this will not involve a
reference to the Fall, but a study of the practice of religion
together with other beliefs, such as political beliefs, and the
means through which we arrive at them. The way Hume chose to
present his answer, we have seen, is in terms of a 'principle
of the imagination'. In this way he attempts to explain why men
yield to their desires for riches, power, not to mention the
love of one's Dauphin. The same principle, moreover, explains
why others, though they are church goers, are hardly affected
by religion. Hume's faith in this principle, undoubtedly arises
from its generality. One of the best descriptions of it, for
example, is found in his discussion of the origin of
government. He writes:
''men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and
proportion their affections more to the light, under which
any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic
value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively
idea commonly prevails above what lies in a more obscure
light...[we ] . ..yield to the sollicItations of our
passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near
and contiguous...This is the reason why men so often act
in contradiction to their known interest' [T53-535].
Yet it is not only, Hume thinks, the religious who are
influenced by non-rational factors in the question of religion.
So is the sceptic. How? This is one of the questions I want to
discuss in this section, which revolves around the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. I will argue that the Dialogues
loses much of its mystery if we consider it less as a vehicle
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for the arguments of Hume in the guise of Philo, and more as an
artful work in which Hume investigates not only the existence
and nature of God, but also the nature of religious belief.
Though I am not offering a complete examination of the
Dialogues, I want to suggest that we will not understand them
unless we see in them the continued working out of	 the same
basic picture of the way the human mind works which Hume
arrived at almost forty years before they were published.
What of the great dispute over Philo's words in Part XII?
The problem is that there, Philo seems to agree with the
conclusion of the design argument which Cleanthes has been
propounding, and which, hitherto, he seems to have been
attempting to undermine. Certainly, as we shall see, the
'theism' at which he arrives is very far from any conclusion
that Cleanthes would like to prove. Nevertheless, Philo says of
himself that
'notwithstanding...my love of singular arguments, no one
has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or
pays more profound adoration to the divine Being, as he
discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable
contrivance and artifice of nature' ED 214].
Few words from Hume have engendered so much commentary.
One answer to this 'inconsistency' is that this is a sign
of Hume accepting that belief in design is a 'natural belief'.
This is the answer of R.J.Butler [Butler passim]. That is, it
is a belief which may not have rational grounds, but which is
unavoidable; like, for example, belief in the external world.
This would explain why all the disputants of the Dialogues
affirm God's existence; and, furthermore, it would explain why
Hume himself affirms this. J.C.A. Gaskin, in Hume'sPhilosophy
of Religion, has usefully collected together the following
statements from Hume that would seem to support this
interpretation:
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'From accusing me of believing nothing, they now charge me
with believing everything. I hope you will be perswaded,
that the Truth lyes in the middle betwixt these
Accusations' [NL 231].
In 1743 Hume wrote of his objection to:
'every thing we corimonly call Religion, except the
Practice of Morality & the Assent of the Understanding to
the Proposition that God exists' [ibid 13].
In the Introduction to the Natural History of Religion he
wr i t e s:
'The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author;
and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection,
suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary
principles of genuine Theism and Religion' [NHR 21; cf 24,
26, 38, 42, 75].
If Hume thought that belief in God was a natural belief, such
remarks would be explicable notwithstanding his fierce
criticisms of theistic arguments.
However attractive the natural belief interpretation may
seem at first sight, it has insoluble difficulties. As Gaskin
points out, Hume does not think that belief in God is
universal; unlike, say, belief in the external world. Nor is it
a precondition of corimon life: some believe and some do not
[NHR 21; Gaskin p.129-130].
Perhaps, then, Philo's words are a sign of an
unacknowledged levity within Hume's philosophy? This would lend
credence to Dr. Johnson's belief that, in general, Hurne was not
sincere. Only such a view could reasonably support the approach
of one commentator iho says: 'The conclusion being disconnected
from the argued content of the Dialogues, I shall ignore it'
[Jessop p.220].
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Instead of this I will argue that Philo accepts the
minimal theism of Part XII; and if one reason for this is that
Hume is aware of the force of a 'natural propensity' to believe
in design; another is the same factor of education that leads
Pamphilus to prefer, against the conclusions of reason, the
arguments of Cleanthes, his tutor. But whereas Pamphilus is the
passive receptacle of the mighty influence of this propensity
and education, Philo's awareness of their influence leads him
to decide to concur with their conclusion; though of course,
this is his minimal theism and not Christianity. He does not
think that it is worth fighting against the forces of
education, habit, and inclination.
And does this represent flume's position? That Philo
'represents Hume throughout' is the view of most commentators.
However, I shall argue that Philo helps us to some extent in
the question of the views of his creator; and his creator's
views, help us to some extent in understanding Philo's views.
* * * * * * *
I will now try and show that the structure of the Dialogues
is in a happy harmony with the content of its arguments. I
start with the former. What is the significance of Flume's
employment of the dialogue form? Unless we understand this, it
seems unlikely that we can achieve the proper point of view
required for its comprehension and appreciation.
The debt to Cicero's De Natura Deorum has been discussed
by, amongst others, Christine Battersby and Kemp-Smith. Both
writers note that a chief difference between the two works is
that Hume does not speak in his own person, as Cicero does
[Battersby p.245; cf p.247; cf D 61]. Instead, it is Pamphilus
who introduces the discussion and who in the end 'judges' it.
Now unlike Battersby, Kemp-Smith does not draw the conclusion
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that the recognition of the model supports: that we should not
take any single character to be representing Hume's opinions.
That we must find a voice is a dominant assumption in the
literature. James Noxon airs the assumption when he says:
'The Dialogues...have not proven to be the key to the
riddle of David Hurne. On the contrary, they have
themselves posed a riddle: who speaks for 1-lume? Unless
this question can be answered, Flume's last philosophical
testament provides us with no clue to his own religious
convictions' [Noxon (2) p.363].
Dugald Stewart, Pringle-Pattison, John Burton and B.M Laing, he
says, opt for Cleanthes; Kemp-Smith, and, one can add, most
recent commentators, choose Philo [ibid p.369]. No one, as yet,
has argued that Demea should have the supposed honour. Noxon,
himself alights on a footnote, as 'the only place available in
such a composition for making his own voice heard' [ibid
p.379].
In discussing Wagner and Parsifal, Nietzsche makes a
reference to Flume's thoughts on 'psychological contiguity' in
order to warn us not to confuse the creator with his creations
[Nietzsche (1) p.101]. (Perhaps Nietzsche should have spoken of
resemblance). Just because a Rottweilerphobic person creates a
character, who wants to 'wipe out' all Rottweilers, and indeed,
if he is allowed, all so called American Pit bull dog terriers
as well, we should not assume that the writer shares such a
policy. As regards the Dialogues, the point becomes all the
more pressing the more we learn to appreciate the artistry of
that work. As, for example, the way that the temperaments of
the characters are revealed; and the way that the form enables
Hume to explore the relation between speculative opinions and
practice. We should, that is, agree with Battersby and refuse
to say that a character represents Flume. Thus, however much any
character resembles Flume, we should not say that he represents
Hume, and for the same reason as we cannot say that a footnote
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in Part XII represents Hume: in each case this would be to
undercut any non-trivial explanation as to why he went to the
trouble of writing such an intricate dialogue. It may well be
the case that we come to the conclusion that there is no real
difference between Hume's opinions and Philo's opinions, and
conclude, furthermore, that in the writing of the work, Hume at
times identified himself with Philo EL 1 154; cf Stewart
p.258]. Likewise, Cleanthes and Demea may also have an
historical basis as M.A. Stewart has argued [Stewart p.258-
269 ]. This does not conflict with the point that we should also
attend to the psychology of the characters and understand how
the dialogue form of this superb work reveals Hume's
principles.
Thus to see why Hume chose a form where he is nowhere, is,
paradoxically, to learn more about Hume's own opinions. Because
he is not only nowhere he is also everywhere.
The first reason is given by Pamphilus. Any question of
philosophy, he says, that is 'so obscure and uncertain, that
human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to
it' seems 'to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and
conversation' [ID 128]. This literary principle reflects the
behaviour of the enlightened: in previous sections we have been
seeing how, far from obscurity and uncertainty always leading
to dialogue and conversation, these. ve.tj fa.to
to preach and kill. Demea is a useful contrast to Philo and
Cleanthes in that he is not wholly thus enlightened: he refuses
to continue to the end of the conversation; furthermore he is
depicted as a rather intolerant figure: this seems a
consequence of the uncertainty finding an outlet in impatience
rather than philosophical inquiry. Such behaviour, then,
contrasts with the spirit of free inquiry that the other two
embody and which Hurne had praised many years before in the
Introduction to the Treatise [T xvii]. However, Hume's opting
for the dialogue form was for reasons that ultimately, he
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thinks, provide the best foundation for inquiry. Pamphilus
continues:
'Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can
reasonably be positive' [D 128].
The uncertainty referred to here is a reflection of Hume's
scepticism: and so is the form. For we have seen that a main
reason for welcoming sceptical principles is the dogmatic
nature of man:
'The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be
affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while
they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any
counterpoising argument, they throw themselves
precipitately into the principles, to which they are
inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite sentiments' [E I 161].
The dialogue form can counter such tendencies. Battersby points
out that the sections are shorter than, for instance De Natura
Deorurn; and that there are frequent conversational exchanges
within the sections [Battersby p.243].
A second reason why Hume chose the dialogue form is the
following. This is that by presenting arguments through
characters, Hume can display what little influence reason has
against the forces of inclination and education. Clearly this
is displayed in the character of the intolerant and bigoted
Demea. It is also, I now want to argue, displayed through
Pamphilus and Philo. In effect, this is to say that the answer
to the problem of Part XII shows one reason why he chose the
dialogue form.
The Dialogues takes the form of a letter from Pamphilus to
his friend Hermippus. The letter recounts a discussion in which
Pamphilus took no part. His youth, he says, rendered him a
'mere auditor'. Nevertheless, he adds,
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'that curiosity, natural to the early season of life, has
so deeply imprinted in my memory the hole chain and
connection of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not
omit or confound any considerable part of them in the
recital' [D 129].
The idea that this is not a purely formal device receives
support from the content of Part I, and, we shall later see,
from that of Part XII. So the conversation opens with Demea and
Philo discussing the implications of a religious education.
Demea congratulates Cleanthes on the care Cleanthes takes over
Pamphilus' education. Of his own children, Demea says:
'To season their minds with early piety is my chief care;
and by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too,
by example, I imprint deeply on their tender minds an
habitual reverence for all the principles of religion' [D
130].
Hume presents elsewhere his views on the passivity that makes
'education' possible through talking of 'imprinting' [eg T
117 ]. A nice example is found in a letter written to Hugh
Blair:
'as to the youthful propensity to believe, which is
corrected by experience; it seems obvious, that children
adopt blindfold all the opinions, principles, sentiments,
and passions, of their elders, as well as credit their
testimony; nor is this more strange 2 than that a hammer
siould make an impression on clay' LL II 349].
Hume, then, is presenting Pamphilus as a product of his
education. Thus it is not surprising that at the end of the
conversation Pamphilus awards the laurels to his tutor,
Clean thes:
'nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the
reasonings of that day; so I confess, that, upon a serious
review of the whole, I cannot but think, that PHILO'S
principles are more probable than DEMEA'S; but that those
of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth' [D 228].
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The point of this emphasis on the causes of belief in Part
I can be seen by considering Part XII. In the sentence from
Part XII that was mentioned above as providing such a puzzle,
Philo says that no one 'has a deeper sense of religion
impressed on his mind' [D 214]. Thus Philo seems to commit
himself to 'religion', but his words, it should be noted, make
room for that commitment to be explained not only in terms of
reasons but in terms of causes. The reader might say: isn't
this odd? Surely the Dialogues is concerned with the
possibility of finding a 'foundation in reason' for religion
rather than its 'origin in human nature' [NHR 2111? I am not
denying that the philosophical (and historical) importance of
the Dialogues lies in its examination of the former. But I am
saying that if we want to understand this artful work as a
whole we cannot ignore the expression of Hume's .interest in the
latter.
section 8
the Dialogues (B)
I will return to education in a moment. Before then,
though, there are some other matters to which we must attend if
we want to understand the relation between Part XII and the
rest of the work. I shall begin with the 'propensity' to
believe in design that I mentioned above.
The evidence that Philo believes in this can be brought out
by reflecting on the differences between his beliefs and those
of Cleanthes. In Part XII, Cleanthes says:
The comparison of the universe to a machine of human
contrivance is so obvious and natural, and is justified by
so many instances of order and design in nature, that it
must immediately procure universal approbation...A false,
absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice,
is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and
perserverance: But no system at all, in opposition to such
a theory, supported by strong and obvious reason, by
natural propensity, and by early education, I think it
absolutely impossible to maintain or defend'	 2I3.
Philo, however, evidently does not believe that the theory is
'supported by strong and obvious reason': this is the burden of
the earlier Parts. Therefore, his acknowledgment that 'suspense
of judgnient in the present case' does not seem possible [ibid]
suggests that he considers that the other (non-rational)
factors, such as the 'natural propensity' and 'education', have
a proportionately greater role to play.
There is also direct evidence that Hume himself believed
that we have a 'propensity' to believe in design. This appears
in a letter of 1751 written to Gilbert Elliot of Minto in order
to elicit stronger arguments for Cleanthes. For Hume hoped to
avoid the 'vulgar error...of putting Nothing but Nonsense into
the mouth of the Adversary' [L I 154]. His own researches, he
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have uncovered no reason to think that the inclination to
believe in design is any more universal and unavoidable than
our seeing faces in the moon. That is, it is not as 'strong &
Universal as that to believe in our Senses & Experience' {L I
1 5 5 ]. But this would be 'esteem'd a suspicious Foundation'.
'We must endeavour to prove that this Propensity is
somewhat different from our Inclination to find our own
Figures in the Clouds, our Face in the Moon, our Passions
& Sentiments even in inanimate matter' [ibid].
Hume returns to the matter in a postscript. Cleanthes'
'Inference is founded on the Similitude of the Works of Nature
to the Usual Effects of Mind'.
'The only Difficulty is, why the other Dissimilutudes do
not weaken the Argument. And indeed it woud seem from
Experience & Feeling, that they do not weaken it so much
as we might naturally expect'.
He adds: 'A theory to solve this would very acceptable' [L I
15 7]. In other words, there is some propensity, but Nume is
looking for a strengthening of Cleanthes' arguments. He is also
looking for a strengthening of his account of why belief in
design does not diminish in proportion to the admittance of the
weakness of the arguments. A weak propensity is not enough. His
answer to this question in the Dialogues, I believe, is
education. Education builds on the propensity to find
resemblances, where, in fact, the resemblances are really very
small indeed.
How does this affect the problem of Part XII? There are
great differences between Philo's and Cleanthes' beliefs.
Cleanthes believes that natural theology can support orthodox
theism: but Philo's position is much more modest. The 'atheist'
must allow that the analogy discernible between a rotting
turnip and the generation of an animal is probably similar to
the 'principle which first arranged, and still maintains, order
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in this universe' [U 218]. The theist, on the other hand, must
allow that there is a ''reat and immeasurable, because
incomprehensible, difference between the human and the divine
mind' [ibid]. So he says,
'Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter
into a controversy, which admits not of any precise
meaning, nor consequently of any determination?' [ibid].
Thus though he says that the 'atheist' can 'never possibly be
in earnest' the 'theism' to which this figure is in reality
committed is not theism in any usual sense. tnd the same can be
said about the 'theist': in so far as he gives content to his
theism through natural religion, he too is deluding himself,
and can never possibly be in earnest.
The consequence, then, is that the argument 'resolves
itself' into one proposition, 'that the cause or causes of
order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to
human intelligence' fo 227]. And if this is the case, then t
follows that all other commitments must be explained by causal
factors, such as education.
Now this applies to Philo himself. That is, he is aware,
that he is subject to the influence of custom and education.
This means that he will take into account such factors in his
choosing to commit himself to emphasise one side of the
question or the other. He is aware that there is a 'natural
propensity' to believe in design; and aware that this is often
supported by education. For what reason has he to battle
against such forces? As long as there is rio moral import to the
choice, then he has no reason at all not to emphasise the
'theistic' angle, if he finds this easier.
This line of thought would go some way towards explaining
the theme of education that the presence of Pamphilus
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introduces. It also I think explains the difference in emphasis
between the remorseless attacks that Philo makes on Cleanthes'
arguments in Parts l-XI, and in Part XII when the arguments are
discussed in the context of belief. As a philosophical
argument, Philo says, the argument from analogy is far weaker
than its adherents think; nevertheless, it is not totally
without sense, though indeed the conclusion is hardly
recognisable as	 But if we cannot suspend judgment on
cosmological questions altogether [D 216], Philo thinks that
the watered—down design argument is a far more attractive
proposition than Demea's pretended renunciation of inquiry.
Similar reasons, I will now argue, underlie Philo's
commitment to 'true religion'. Though I should probably say
that what follows is more speculative than might be hoped.
Hume's remarks on 'true re1jgion are significantly few. In
the Dialogues, Philo does not object to the following statement
from Cleanthes:
'The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of
men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of
temperance, order, and obedience' [o 220].
In an unpublished preface to the second volume of the History,
Hume writes:
'The proper Office of Religion is to reform Men's Lives,
to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moral Duties, & to
secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate' [quoted
in Mossner (1) p.306].
In this way religion is defined by the very opposite
characteristics to those we have been considering in this
chapter. For we have seen how 'religion, as it has commonly
been found in the world' [D 223], claims the attention of the
historian and student of human nature not through the way it
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fosters order in the state, but in its functioning, in
Cleanthes' words, as 'a cover to faction and ambition' ED 220].
Far from ordinary religion humanizing man, Hume goes out of his
way to lay at the door of religion the very worst acts of
humanity. In contrast this new 'religion' serves the needs of
man as social creature. It does not draw on his readiness to
associate in order to create a divisive faction: on the
contrary, it 'only enforces the motives of morality and
justice' [ibid]. Its adherents would, one might say, be
'members' of the 'party of human-kind' that Hume talks of in
the Enquiry [E II 275].
But why do Philo and Hume affirm any religion? My answer to
this is fairly speculative. Hume, I think, saw the category of
'true religion' as at once a harmless outlet for the propensity
that some will have to connect morality (which is independent
of any theistic belief) and a minimal theism; and a way of
highlighting what is false or inauthentic about ordinary
religion.
As we saw in Chapter I, we are always seeking more general
rules through which to explain events. Thus we have seen how,
for example, some attempt to give to objects 'occult
qualities', whilst others go further and ascribe to the Deity
the active power in the Universe [T158]. Of course, such
conclusions display a certain amount of sophistication. But the
vulgar will also be led into conclusions about ultimate causes.
For the need that we have to constantly expand and refine our
'scientific' principles, is expressed in their talk as well as
that of the philosopher. Such a need may be described in the
language of the Treatise in terms of the need to reduce our
principles of resemblance to the fewest possible. Or else it
may be described in the following way:
'from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in
forming more general principles of conduct and
reasoning...and that what we call philosophy is nothing
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but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind'
[D 134].
Now the problem is that not only are we inclined to come to
conclusions when we have insufficient evidence, but we also
suffer from the propensity to transfer, because of the
influence of the principle of resemblance, to objects qualities
with which we are familiar. Philosophers are thus led to people
the world with 'qualities' and the vulgar are led to create
gods. Hume cannot indeed condone their arguments; but he does
not completely dismiss the design argument.
Such dispositions, then, underlie the conclusions of
natural religion. It is 'almost impossible' Hume says in the
Treatise, for 'the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts'
in a 'narrow circle of objects' [T271]. An example of the
delight man finds in considering matters outside common life is
shown in Pamphilus' words at the beginning of the Dialogues.
After recounting questions about the nature of God, he says
that
'these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain
our restless enquiry with regard to them; though nothing
but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have as yet
been the result of our most accurate researches' ED 128
Thus the civic-minded philosopher should not be content with
displaying how terrible the effects of religion can be. For his
effort to teach men about themselves includes the lesson that
we have a propensity to philosophise about final causes.
Two consequences of this view of Hume's about 'true
religion' should be mentioned. The first is that there is now
no cause for animosity between the theist and the atheist. The
'likeness' of the analogy that the theist emphasises and the
atheist debunks are not, unlike 'quantity or number,
susceptible of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard
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in the controversy' [ D 218]. For the dispute seems at best
'merely verbal', or perhaps 'still more incurably ambiguous'
[ibid]. So the particular gloss that one will give to the
question, that will not admit of any precise determination wi11
depend on psychological factors. Thus does this argument of
Hume's pretend to provide a foundation for a more tolerant
attitude on the part of disputants.
The second consequence is that this theism, if it may be so
named,can afford
'no inference that affects human life or can be the
source of any action or forbearance' D 227].
In the Enquiry, as in the Dialogues, Hume emphasises the
relevance of his belief that all the rules of reasoning forbid
us to infer anything more about the cause than is found in the
effect. It follows, he says, that
'No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious
hypothesis; no event forseen or foretold no reward or
punishment expected or dreaded' [E I 146.
And this is to remove from religion its most characteristic and
most harmful aspects.
I believe that more work needs to be done on the historical
context of Hume's thoughts about 'true religion'. In the
meantime, a couple of remarks about his scepticism may make his
words more comprehensible. Firstly this scepticism allows for a
considerable element of latitude in one's commitments. Hume
says in the Treatise that a 'true sceptic will be diffident of
his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical
conviction'; and he adds that such a sceptic 'will never refuse
any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of
either of them' [T273]. It seems that it is for this reason
that Philo, so long as he has made it very clear that he will
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have no truck with Christian ethics, can fall, in good
conscience, into the commitments that we have seen him make.
Such commitments are not only easier with a point of view to
having to live with a theistic upbringing; they also make life,
at least in 18th century Britain, a little safer. And how can
Philo be accused of hypocrisy when all he is doing is stressing
that the analogy is of some worth? For if the question is
'incurably ambiguous', so are the terms which the disputants
use {cf Kemp-Smith: D 72]. Then why should he not choose to
call his description of the principle of order, the 'Deity'?
This is his 'innocent satisfaction'.
The second remark I want to make about Hume's scepticism
and Philo's arguments, arises from noting how in the Treatise
Hume says that the pleasure that he finds in philosophical
arguments functions as a reason for not giving them up -
notwithstanding the weakness of human reason [T271]. This, I
would argue, explains why it seems as if there is a reversal in
Part XII. Philo loves arguing, especially if he can, in the
process, annoy the likes of Demea. Thus for most of the
conversation, he takes it upon himself to emphasise the
weakness of the design argument; above all, he criticises the
attempt to draw moral attributes of God from the world. This
disposition is mentioned by Philo himself when he talks of his
love of 'singular arguments' ED 2 14]. And it is recognised by
Cleanthes, who says to Demea that he should have perceived how
Philo has been 'amusing himself' at their expense ED 213]. But
the reader has a much earlier warning than this. After Philo
first expounds his sceptical principles in Part I, Pamphilus
comments:
'While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a
smile in the countenances both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES.
That of Demea seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction
in the doctrines delivered: But in CLEANTHES'S features, I
could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived
some raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of
PHILO' ED 132].
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Demea, of course, is mistaken if he thinks that he has an ally
in inconsistent fideism; and Cleanthes, who lives in
'unreserved intimacy' with Philo, is not [0 214;cf D 213].
What I have tried to do in these two final sections is to show
how the structure of the Dialogues reveals Hume's opinion that
the science of man throws light on why men are led into
producing arguments for God's existence; and why sceptical
arguments, in the face of training and inclination, have little
effect on actual beliefs. We will not argue ourselves to
unbelief any more than we will argue ourselves to belief.
Though certainly, it would be absurd to deny that he thought
that speculation has no influence at all. For unlike belief in
the existence of body, we can doubt belief in God.
Nevertheless, he seems pessimistic about the effects of his
work.
In the Dialogues, Hume does not explain the influence of
non—rational factors in terms of the imagination. After all, he
wanted to try to disabuse people of their errors. The
Dialogues, therefore, had to be a pleasant work to read. They
are, however, misunderstood when they are considered merely as
an attractive way of presenting Hume's thoughts on design and
the problem of evil.
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Notes
La!.2: I: Belief
1) Arc.hiwum Historii Filozofi i Myli Spolecznej, 9, 1963,
pp.127-41. Most of the translations of Recherc.he de la Vrit
which I use are from the Lennon and Olscamp edition. Exceptions
are noted in the text.
2) For an extremely ambitious work on the concept of
imagination in 'Western Culture', see Richard Kearney's The
Wake of Imagination. This work makes references to Aquinas and
also to Frank Zappa. For a brilliant attempt to explain the
influence of metaphors of the mind on romantic poetry, see M.
H. Abrams The Mirror and the Lamp. In 'Imagination and
Perception' Sir Peter Strawson examines the 'family' of
'image', 'imagine' 'imagination' through reflecting on Hume,
Kant and Wittgenstein [Strawson (2)]. Mary Warnock's
Imagination provides an examination of the concept of
imagination in several great thinkers, starting with Hume. Her
discussion of Hume, however, makes no mention of the Science of
Man. For the influence of Hume's work on imagination on Adam
Smith, see D. D. Raphael's paper ' "The true old Humean
philosophy" and its influence on Adam Smith'; and Andrew
Skinner's 'Adam Smith. Science and the Role of the
Imagination'.
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Chapter LI: Morality
1) On the sense of talk of 'projec.ting' see Anthony Price's
'Doubts about Projectivism'. Abrams' The Mirror and the Lamp
shows, in a discussion of conceits iNich present the mind as
having a projective faculty, somethinc of the influence of Hume
on romantic poets [Abrams pp. 7-69].
Cbapter V: Pditics
1) A novel wuich explores, amongst other things, the relation
between elf-understanding and art, is Money, by Martin Amis.
For example, the narrator's own obsession with the possible
infidelity of his girlfriend is one reason for his viewing the
plot of Otello in the following way:
'The flash spade general arrives to take up a position on
some island, in the olden days there, bringing with him
the Lady Di figure as is bride. Then she starts diddling
one of his lieut-nants, a fun loving guy whom I took to
irimediately. Same old story. Now she tries one of these
double-subtle numbers on her husband, you know, always
cooting for the boyfriend and singing iis praises. But
Otello's sidekick is on to them, and, hoping to do himself
;ome good, tells all to the guvnor. This big spade,
though, he can't or won't believe it. A classic
situation.' [Money p.300].
See Chater III section 5 for Hume's understanding of the
effect that a 'double-subtle number' can have. Montaigne
rightly seaks of a 'thousand variations' on the experience of
opposition increasing desire [Montaigne (1) p.166].
2) Hume, it can be seen, would not have been surprised at the
following words after a 'cultious ohservation' of football fans
at an 'End' of a terrace.
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'Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of an End is its
cohesion. Despite the fact that there are isoatable sub-
roups within it, action often achieves a very remarkable
unity - especially in singing, gesturing and the chanting
of bloodcurdling imprecations. If you've ever stood in
front of a terrace of people who are chanting, "You're
gonna get your [iramoderate language here] head kicked in",
the unity can appear quite alarming' [Marsh p.363].
VI: Religion
1) ' "Faith" has been at all times, with Luther for instance,
only a cloak, a pretext, a screen, beiind which the
instincts played their game...one has always spoken of
faith 2 one has always acted from instinct [Nietzsche (3)
p. 151j.
Nietzsche believed that the psychological study of the
religious man had hitherto failed because 'it itself believed
in antithetical moral values and saw, read, interpreted these
antitheses into the text and the facts' [Nietzsche (2) p.59].
Hume, I have argued, was aware of this problem. So he includes
in his study of religious natures, the study of ho'
Christianity created the values that blind inquirers. This is
why the study of religion assumes a central role in the project
of discovering a foundation for the sciences.
2) The conclusions which Hume arrives at through use of his
'experimental principles' are not, of course, always new. For
example, in the view of Celsus (c.180) the social coherence
within Christian groups was not the consequence of any internal
principle but merely the result of being persecuted. "Their
agreement is quite amazing, the more so as it may be shown to
rest on no trustworthy foundation. However they have a
trustworthy foundation for their unity in social dissidence and
the advantage which it brings and in the fear of outsiders -
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these are factors which strengthen their faith" [quoted in
Chadwick p. 54].
3) Nietzsche also held Christianity to be a creation of
opposition, of 'ressentiment' [Nietzsche (1) p.36]. Likewise,
he argues that the Jewish people were conscious of their
impotence [ibid p.33]; and that the result was a revolt against
the 'knightly-aristocratic values' which are the expression of
a life of a people. The 'oriental slave' took vengeance on Rome
and 'its noble and frivolous tolerance' [Nietzsche (2) p.57].
So the principles of their enemies were denoted 'evil'; and
their own 'weakness' was clad in 'ostentatious garb' and called
a 'deed, a meritorious act' [Nietzsche (1) p.46]. This was
their re-evaluation of values. A much lengthier comparison with
the German might be of interest. (And not only because we know
that he read Hume [Nietzsche (1) p.101]).
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